pedition had been ufed by him, in fending the orders of council to the proper officers at Spithead ; but miffortunes were not always to be avoided. He hoped, -he wished heartily that our affairs might have a happier turn. The painful pre-eminence of office he faid, was at fuch a time, little to be envied: and for his part, if any gentleman of talents, and inclination to ferve his country, wifhed to come into his place, he was ready to refign it. This fpeech of the minifter agreed but ill with what had been confidently affert ed fome short time before, concerning the state of the navy; for if they durft not venture to fend as many fhips as were fufficient to prevent the Toulon fquadron from failing to America, for fear of an attack upon our own coaft, it was plain that our navy, in the esteem of the miniftry themselves, was not fit to combat the fleets of France and Spain. This was an obfervation that could not efcape the notice of those in the minority. Whatever were the caufes of the mifmanagement at this time, it is manifeft that worse measures could not have been purfued; for had the French fleet not been prevented by storms, more than by the wildom of the ministry, both our fleet and army had been exposed to the greatest danger, if not totally deftroyed. Though the ministry were informed in the month of February, of the number of fhips that compofed the Toulon fquadron, of the arrival of Count D'Ef-` taing, and of the day on which he intended to fail; and also knew that he did fail on the 13th of April, yet our fleet continued lying at Spithead till the latter end of May; nor was a fingle measure taken to prevente dreadful effects which were to be expected from fromthis formidable fquadron. The firft Lord of the Admiralty had, upon the 20th of November, last year, informed the public, that there were forty-two fhips of the line fit for fervice, of which thirty-five might put to fea at an hour's warning, and the remaining feven would be ready in a fortnight; yet when the fervice of these fhips was required, the firft Lord of the Admiralty was found not worthy to be depended upon. Though vaft fums of money had been granted beyond all example in any former war, yet when there was occafion for action, our fleets were always in want of fome one thing or other. Sometimes they wanted men, fometimes rigging, at other times fmall beer; fo that one delay always fucceeded another, when their fervice was required. Our army had not well arrived at Sandy Hook, when they received the intelligence, from fome of Lord Howe's cruizers, that a new enemy had ap-. peared on the coal of America. Lord Howe had received information on which he could depend, that Count D'Estaing was feen off the coaft of Virginia, with a fleet of twelve or thirteen fail of the line of battle fhips. It was fortunate for our fleet and army that this fleet did not come fo far as the Delaware, before our fleet was failed to New York, otherwise it might have been in the power of D'Eftaing to have destroyed the whole; or had he met the tranfports in their paffage as they were encumbred, and only under the convoy of two fhips of the line and fome frigates, the confequence is obvious. The ftate of the army, as well as that of the fleet, would have been deplorable, and the lofs of the latter would have iffued in the lofs of the former; for as the army could could not then, by any poffible means, have pur fued its way to New York, and would have been enclosed on the one fide by the American army, and on the other by the French fleet, cut off from all fupply and provifion, and deftitute of every refource, the confequence must have been, that they must have either all perished, or have furrendered as General Burgoyne did at Saratoga. The badnefs of the weather, more than the wisdom of our ministry, faved our army and fleet; for by various ftorms Count D'Estaing was fo interrupted in his voyage, that he did not arrive fo foon as he might have done, provided the weather had continued favourable and the wind fair. And after all his interruptions, had he directed his courfe directly to New York inftead of Chesapeak Bay, the confequence to our fleet and army would have been much the fame; for he would have come upon both in a fhattered condition, entangled with laying, or paffing the bridge at Sandy Hook. In either of which circumftances, deftruction must have been the confequence, and the event of fuch a nature and magnitude, as had not been experienced in any late ages. To Britain it must have been fatal, as her army, upon which the had fpent immenfe fums, and her fleet, upon which fhe depended for the prefervation of her western dominion, would have been. no more. But the principal object D'Estaing had in view, was to furprize our fleet in the Delaware, and to enclose our army in Philadelphia; whereby he imagined he would gain the fame point, which, if he had known, and purfued his courfe, he might have more effectually gained by failing to New York. A more remarkable remarkable and fignal efcape and deliverance is not eafy to be pointed out. Though the degree of the danger was leffened by the favour of providence, it was not immediately altogether removed. A heavy cloud as yet hung over both the fleet aud army, and how it would burst and difpel, was as yet altogether uncertain. It required great forecast to perceive in what manner the French would proceed, or to understand whether it was poffible for them to effect with their great fhips, what only could be ruinous to our fleet. Upon the fourth day after the account was received of his arrival on the coaft, and fubfequent advice of his having anchored at the Delaware, D'Estaing appeared fuddenly and unexpectedly in fight of the British fleet at SandyHook. He had a great force, and as yet in good condition, confifting of twelve fhips of the line and three frigates of fuperior fize. Among the first there were fome fhips of great force and weight of metal; one carrying go, another So, and fix carrying 74 guns "each; and the fpuadron was faid to have eleven thoufand men on board. On the other fide the British fleet under Lord Howe, confifted of fix 64 gun fhips, three of 50, and two of forty guns, with fome frigates and floops. Mcft of the line of battle fhips belonging to Lord Howe had been long at fea, and were on that account in a very indifferent condition, and were wretchedly manned. The principal balance to these disadvantages, and which was the most effential remedy for the feveral other evils that were attendant on our fleet, was the fuperior abilities of their commander, and the excellency of their other officers. It would be difficult to find in all Europe, either fuch another fea-officer as Lord Howe, or fuch affittants affiftants as thofe inferior officers that were under him. He had a confummate knowledge in naval atchievements, and understood almost every poffible circumftance that might happen in fuch a critical fituation. He provided against all the evils that might happen, as much as his circumftances and the force under his command would permit. His preparations were masterly and judicious, and his fuccefs in the end, anfwerable to the wisdom of his conduct. There was one thing much in favour of Lord Howe: He was in poffeffion of Sandy Hook and the harbour, the entrance of which is covered by a bar, and from whence the inlet paffes to New-York. To force this paffage was not an eafy tafk, though it is believed that D'Eftaing intended to make the grand attack at this point, force the paffage, and attack the English fleet in the harbour. Had this been speedily executed, the ruin of our fleet would have been inevitable; for tho' Lord Howe had made every poffible preparation for defence that the time would admit of, yet from the wind's blowing contrary, and many other unavoid. able accidents, the fhips were not arrived in their refpective fations, and fituations of defence; nor had there as yet been time to choose thofe fituations with that judgment, which was afterwards exercised when the French fleet appeared without Sandy Hook. In thefe circumstances, had D'Eftaing pushed the advantages arifing from the furprize, and paffed the bar directly, and made his attack, neither the advantages of fituation nor any eminence of ability or valour on the one fide, could have been fufficient to have counteracted the vaft fuperiority of force on the other. The engagement would have undoubtedly been dreadful, and probably in that refpect, might have been |