Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in BeliefIn this book Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. Some of these authorities can be in the moral and religious domains. Why have people for thousands of years accepted epistemic authority in religious communities? A religious community's justification for authority is typically based on beliefs unique to that community. Unfortunately, that often means that from the community's perspective, its justifying claims are insulated from the outside; whereas from an outside perspective, epistemic authority in the community appears unjustified. But as Zagzebski's argument shows, an individual's acceptance of authority in her community can be justified by principles that outsiders accept, and the particular beliefs justified by that authority are not immune to external critiques. Why have people for thousands of years accepted epistemic authority in religious communities? A religious community's justification for authority is typically based on beliefs unique to that community. Unfortunately, that often means that from the community's perspective, its justifying claims are insulated from the outside; whereas from an outside perspective, epistemic authority in the community appears unjustified. But as Zagzebski's argument shows, an individual's acceptance of authority in her community can be justified by principles that outsiders accept, and the particular beliefs justified by that authority are not immune to external critiques. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Chapter 1 The Rejection of Epistemic Authority | 4 |
Chapter 2 Epistemic SelfTrust | 29 |
Chapter 3 Epistemic Trust in Others | 52 |
Chapter 4 Trust in Emotions | 75 |
Chapter 5 Trust and Epistemic Authority | 99 |
Chapter 6 The Authority of Testimony | 120 |
Chapter 7 Epistemic Authority in Communities | 140 |
Chapter 8 Moral Authority | 159 |
Chapter 9 Religious Authority | 181 |
Chapter 10 Trust and Disagreement | 204 |
Chapter 11 Autonomy | 229 |
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Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski No preview available - 2012 |
Common terms and phrases
accept acquired admiration answer applies appropriate argued argument assume attempt autonomy basic belief better chapter claim committed connection conscientious conscious course deliberative depends desire direct disagreement dispositions dissonance domain emotion epistemic authority epistemic egoism evidence example experience extreme facie fact faculties feel follows future getting give given grounds human idea identify important includes individual instance intellectual interesting issue judge judgment justified kind knowledge lack leads look matter means moral moral beliefs natural object one’s particular person philosophers political position possible powers practical principle problem question rational reason to believe reflection rejection relation relevant reliable religious relying requires resolve response satisfy seems self-reflection self-reliance self-trust sense share situation skepticism someone sometimes tell testimony theoretical thesis things tion tradition treat true trust trustworthy truth understanding