Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in BeliefIn this book Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. Some of these authorities can be in the moral and religious domains. Why have people for thousands of years accepted epistemic authority in religious communities? A religious community's justification for authority is typically based on beliefs unique to that community. Unfortunately, that often means that from the community's perspective, its justifying claims are insulated from the outside; whereas from an outside perspective, epistemic authority in the community appears unjustified. But as Zagzebski's argument shows, an individual's acceptance of authority in her community can be justified by principles that outsiders accept, and the particular beliefs justified by that authority are not immune to external critiques. Why have people for thousands of years accepted epistemic authority in religious communities? A religious community's justification for authority is typically based on beliefs unique to that community. Unfortunately, that often means that from the community's perspective, its justifying claims are insulated from the outside; whereas from an outside perspective, epistemic authority in the community appears unjustified. But as Zagzebski's argument shows, an individual's acceptance of authority in her community can be justified by principles that outsiders accept, and the particular beliefs justified by that authority are not immune to external critiques. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Chapter 1 The Rejection of Epistemic Authority | 4 |
Chapter 2 Epistemic SelfTrust | 29 |
Chapter 3 Epistemic Trust in Others | 52 |
Chapter 4 Trust in Emotions | 75 |
Chapter 5 Trust and Epistemic Authority | 99 |
Chapter 6 The Authority of Testimony | 120 |
Chapter 7 Epistemic Authority in Communities | 140 |
Chapter 8 Moral Authority | 159 |
Chapter 9 Religious Authority | 181 |
Chapter 10 Trust and Disagreement | 204 |
Chapter 11 Autonomy | 229 |
| 255 | |
| 269 | |
| 273 | |
Other editions - View all
Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski No preview available - 2012 |
Common terms and phrases
accept acquired akrasia Alvin Plantinga argued argument authoritative autonomy basic belief on authority better chap chapter conflict connection conscien conscientious judgment conscientious person conscientious reflection conscientious self-reflection conscientiously judge conscious defeasible reason deliberative reasons Descartes desire for truth disagreement egalitarianism emotion dispositions epistemic admiration epistemic authority epistemic communities epistemic egoism epistemic faculties epistemic self-reliance epistemic trust epistemology ethical egoism evidence exemplar experience extreme epistemic facie reason fact feel first-person Fricker getting the truth give heteronomous human intellectual intellectual virtues Joseph Raz Justification Thesis justified Kant moral beliefs moral judgment natural desire norms one’s philosophers Plato political principle problem proposition rational reason to believe reason to think reason to trust relevant reliable religious belief relying satisfy self-conscious sense skepticism someone survive conscientious taking a belief tell testimony theoretical reasons things third-person Thomas Reid thority tion tradition treat true belief trustworthy Zagzebski