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A Search of Truth in the Science of the Human Mind, Part First
No preview available - 2015
able action admit appear argument asserts attempt attention become believe body brain cause circumstance conceive conception conclusion connected considered consists derived discover distinct doctrine doubt effect efficient cause entirely equal evidence existence experience explain expression external facts figure force give ground human human mind Hume ideas images imagination immediately impressions instance kind knowledge language laws lead light Locke maintains manner matter maxims means memory mind motion nature necessary never objects observation occasion once operations opinion organs original pass passage perceive perception persons phenomena philosophers present principles produced proof prove qualities reason reference reflection regard Reid remarked rest result says seems sensation senses sensible sight simple single soul sound speak succession sufficient suppose theory things thought tion trace true truth understanding whole
Page 207 - IT is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination— either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.
Page 213 - It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world; yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the...
Page 274 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.
Page 484 - He thought he saw an unusual blaze of light fall upon the book which he was reading, which he at first imagined might happen by some accident in the candle; but, lifting up his eyes, he apprehended to his extreme amazement that there was before him, as it were suspended in the air, a visible representation of the Lord Jesus Christ upon the cross, surrounded on all sides with a glory ; and was impressed as if a voice, or something equivalent to a voice, had come to him, to this effect (for he was...
Page 151 - For methinks the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little opening left to let in external visible resemblances or ideas of things without: would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them.
Page 284 - Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to see; quaere, Whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?
Page 209 - The table I write on I say exists, that is I see and feel it, and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.
Page 287 - ... from feeling, he would carefully observe that he might know them again; but having too many objects to learn at once, he forgot many of them, and, as he said, at first he learned to know, and again forgot a thousand things in a day.
Page 201 - There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds : this is intuitive knowledge.
Page 239 - I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the power to produce those ideas in us as they are in the snowball I call qualities; and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings, I call them ideas...