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WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, Law Publishers and Booksellers, 27. FLEET STREET, LONDON, E.C. NOTICE TO SOLICITORS. FRIDAY, Jan. 13. The Queen v. King and Others, Licensing Justices for Manchester. SATURDAY, Jan. 14. With the view of insuring the greatest possible accuracy and rapidity in the various publications connected with the LAW REPORTS, the Council will be obliged, if the Solicitors to whom In re Palmer. Ex parte Palmer. Appeal from Mr. Registrar Hazlitt. application is made by any Reporter acting for the Council, will as soon as possible after application furnish the neces-Millican v. Sulivan and Others. Appeal from Manisty, J. Allowed. sary Papers, together with any information in their power as to the names of the various Solicitors engaged in the case. same time, the Council thankfully acknowledge the assistance Shrapnel v. Laing. Appeal from Stephen and Charles, JJ. Cur. they have already received from so many members of the Pro-Seely v. Grogan. Appeal from Cave, J. Dismissed. fession in furnishing the papers required to Real and Personal Advance Company, Limited v. Clears. Appeal from prepare accurate Lord Chief Justice and A. L. Smith, J. Dismissed. reports. At the BALKIS CONSOLIDATED COMPANY, In re (Company-Transfer of e. 14), s. 7—Code Civile). PAGE North, J. 3 Kay, J. KENT'S CASE. In re LAND DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (Company-Shares-Payment in Cash-Debt due from Company to Shareholder applied in payment of future Calls-Companies Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 131), 8. 25) Kay, J. KERSHAW, In re. DRAKE V. KERSHAW (Will-Construction-Bequest of Leasehold House-Contract by Testator to purchase Leasehold Reversion-Liability of Legatee to pay Purchase-money-Locke King's Act Amendment Act (40 & 41 Vict. c. 34), 8. 1) 3 2 North, J. 4 Kekewich, J. 4 2 tration-Umpire-1 LIVERPOOL AND MANCHESTER CAUSES (Place of Trial—London— adv. vult. MONDAY, Jan. 16. TUESDAY, Jan. 17. Wilson v. Glossop (Q.B. Crown Side). Appeal from Mathew and Burrell v. Mossop. Appeal from Stephen, J. Allowed. COURT II. WEDNESDAY, Jan. 11. Boucicault v. Boucicault. Appeal from President. Dismissed. In re Wordsworth. Tavernier v. Wordsworth. Appeal from Kay, J. Austin v. Davids. Appeal from Kay, J. Dismissed. The appellants In re West Devon Great Consols Mine. 2 4 SATURDAY, Jan. 14. Per LORD ESHER, M.R., and FRY and LOPES, L.JJ. :Sect. 19 of the Wines and Beerhouse Act, 1869, which preserves vested rights in respect of excise licenses for the sale of beer, cider, or wine which were in force on the 1st of May, 1869, is to be read distributively, reddendo singula singulis, and the meaning of it is, that an application to justices for a certificate for a renewal of such a licence for the sale of any one of those articles cannot be refused, except on one or more of the four grounds specified in sect. 8 of the Act. But the fact that a beer licence was in force for a house on the 1st of May, 1869, does not give the occupier of that house any privilege under sect. 19 with regard to an application for a certificate for a wine licence or a cider licence, and the justices have an absolute discretion as to granting the certificate, just as if the application was an entirely new one. Decision of Charles, J., reversed. If, to a mandamus to justices to hear and determine a matter, they make a return of unqualified obedience, a replication that the justices had declined to exercise a jurisdiction which they possessed, and had determined the matter, assuming to exercise a jurisdiction which they did not possess, will be a good plea, and the Court must then decide whether the justices have exceeded their jurisdiction. Henn Collins, Q.C., and R. S. Wright, for the justices. W. L. C. High Court of Justice. to Shareholder applied in payment of future Calls-Companies Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 131), s. 25. By the articles of association of the above company the directors were empowered to receive from members any moneys due upon their shares beyond the sums actually called for. K., who was a shareholder in the company, purchased a debt due from the company, and on the 2nd of April, 1886, requested the directors to transfer from the amount due in respect of the debt a sum sufficient to pay up in full the shares standing in his name, and on the same day at a meeting of the directors it was resolved that the debt be so applied. Nothing further was done in order to carry the transaction into effect, no entry was made in the books of the company (other than the minute of the resolution) in reference to the shares, nor was any contract in writing registered under the Companies Act, 1867, sect. 25. On the 20th of April, 1886, an order was made for the winding-up of the company, and K.'s name out a summons to enforce the payment by K. of a call of 8111. was placed upon the list of contributories. The liquidator took made in the winding-up in respect of his shares. Marten, Q.C., and Vernon Smith, for the liquidator. The respondent, K., in person contended that the shares were fully paid up, and relied on Ferrao's Case (Law Rep. 9 Ch. 355), and Spargo's Case (Law Rep. 8 Ch. 407). KAY, J., said that as nothing had been done to give effect to the contract entered into between K. and the directors there had been no payment for the shares within the principle of Ferrao's Case. The ratio decidendi there was, that the actual writing off in the books of the company of the amount due in respect of shares was equivalent to payment. Here there was nothing but the agreement between K. and the directors, which was not carried into effect by any entry in the books of the company, or in any other way. His Lordship therefore held that as the requirements of the Companies Act, 1867, sect. 25, had not been complied with, K. was liable to pay the amount The plaintiff and defendant were partners, and disputes having arisen between them, a reference to arbitration was proposed under a provision for that purpose in the partnership deed. Two arbitrators were thereupon appointed, one by cach side. The arbitrators first met at an hotel, the plaintiff and defendant and solicitors being present. The arbitrators -the other parties having left the room-then proceeded to appoint an umpire, each proposing a name the other had not heard of. Ultimately the arbitrators agreed to decide the choice by lot. Accordingly the two names were written down on separate slips of paper and thrown into a hat. A waiter called in for the purpose, drew out one of the names, and thereupon the arbiDec 6, 1887; Jan 12. trators settled that the person bearing that name should act as umpire, and they subsequently wrote and signed his appointment as umpire on the back of ore of his business cards. The Company Shares-Payment in Cash-Debt due from Company arbitrators afterwards held several meetings, but without being Kay, J. CHANCERY DIVISION. In re LAND DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION. able to agree, and now the defendant moved for an injunction | to restrain the umpire from acting, on the ground of the irregularity of his appointment. Marten, Q. C., and Ward, for the defendant. Renshaw, Q.C., and Church, for the plaintiff, relied on Neale v. Ledger (16 East, 51), followed in In re Hopper (2 Q. B. D. 367). KAY, J., said that if the case had been that, before drawing lots, the person ultimately appointed umpire had been known to both the arbitrators, and they had both agreed that he was a fit man to act as umpire, and one to whom no kind of objection could be made, it was possible that the case might have come within Lord Ellenborough's decision in Neale v. Ledger, and the appointment might have been free from objection; but here, the name proposed not being known to one of the arbitrators, the case was committed to the decision of the goddess of fortune, and that arbitrator then assented to the appointment of an umpire of whom he knew nothing. That appeared to be a neglect of his official duty. The broad line of demarcation laid down by Lord Ellenborough's decision should be followed with the greatest possible caution, for an arbitrator entrusted with the duty of appointing an umpire had no right to evade what was a judicial duty by leaving the appointment to chance. The appointment in the present case was not a good appointment, and therefore there must be an injunction restraining the person appointed from acting as umpire. No order as to costs. Solicitors: C. A. Swaine; G. B. B. Norman. The KAY, J., said the case depended on art. 17 of the French Code Civile, which said, "La qualité de Français se perdra 1o par la naturalisation acquise en pays étranger." That meant an absolute naturalization-not a qualified one as in the present case: and the point was, would a qualified naturalization deprive a natural-born French subject of his status? French Imperial decree of the 26th of August, 1811, provided, in art. 1, that no Frenchman could be naturalized in a foreign country without the authority of the French Government; and no such authority had been obtained in the present case. According to the qualification in the certificate of naturalization, M. Bourgoise was, at the moment of his death, a subject of the French Government, and therefore his children, who were living in France at their father's death, were also then subjects of the French Government. His Lordship accordingly held that, as the father was at the time of his death a French subject and as his children were then also French subjects, the Court had no jurisdiction, and dismissed the summons, with costs to be paid by the next friend. Solicitors: Dixon, Ward & Co; Murray, Hutchins & Stirling. G. I. F. C. In re SILVA'S TRUSTS. Chitty, J. Jan. 14. Chancery Division-Jurisdiction-Person of unsound Mind not so found-Guardianship and Maintenance-Amount of Fund. A person of unsound mind not so found became absolutely entitled, on the deaths of his parents in 1885, to a fund consisting of about 1500l. Reduced 3 per cents., 12161. New 3 per cents, 42007. Consols, and 751. Bank Stock. The fund was in Jan. 11. 1887 paid into Court under the Trustee Relief Act, 1850 by French Subject-Certificate of Naturalization—Status-Naturali-trustees, of whom his brother, a respondent on the present zation Act, 1870 (33 Vict. c. 14), s. 7-Code Civile. Kay, J. G. I. F. C. In re BOURGOISE, Infants. In 1861, M. Bourgoise, a French subject, came over to this country, and in 1871 he obtained the usual certificate of naturalization under the Naturalization Act, 1870 (33 Vict. c. 14) containing this qualification-which was in the same terms as the "qualification" in s. 7-" that he shall not, when within the limits of the foreign state of which he was a subject previously to his obtaining his certificate of naturalization, be deemed to be a British subject unless he has ceased to be a subject of that state in pursuance of the laws thereof, or in pursuance of a treaty to that effect." In 1879 M. Bourgoise married an English lady, and in 1880 he returned to France with his wife, and until his death they resided in or near Paris. There were two children of the marriage, both being born in France, and their births being registered at the British Embassy in Paris. In October, 1886, M. Bourgoise died near Paris, having, by his will, which was in French, given the residue of his property, half of which was in England, and the other half in France, to his two children. His widow died in France in June, 1887, and the infants' paternal grandmother was thereupon appointed in France as their guardian. This was an application by the two infant children, by their half-brother, as their next friend, for his appointment as guardian of their persons and estates. Renshaw, Q.C., Stock, and Benn, for the infants. Marten, Q.C., and Farwell, for the French guardian and the other French relatives of the father, were not called upon. application, was one. For some years prior to 1885 his parents had made an allowance to his wife for his support, and various sums had subsequently been advanced to her for the same purpose by the trustees, until the fund was paid into Court. A petition was now presented under the Trustee Relief Act, 1850, another brother acting as next friend, for the payment of the annual income of the fund to the wife, with whom and in whose care he was living, The income of the fund amounted to about 2121. per annum. The petitioner had no other property, and it was not possible to obtain an order in lunacy. There was evidence that the entire income was properly required for his maintenance. G. Broke Freeman, for the petitioner. Jeaffreson, for the respondents. Vane v. Vane (2 Ch. D. 124), and In re Bligh (12 Ch. D. 364), were referred to. CHITTY, J., held that it was not necessary to appoint any person in the nature of a guardian, and directed the entire annual income to be paid to the wife during the life of the petitioner or until further order, she undertaking to apply it for his maintenance, comfort, and support. W. L. C. Kekewich, J. SIDDELL V. VICKERS & Co. This was an action to restrain the infringement of a patent for moving heavy forgings under the hammer. Companies Act, 1862, to rectify the share register of the sect. 1 of the Act 40 & 41 Vict. c. 31, which amends Locke company, by substituting his name as the holder of 455 shares King's Act, applies to leaseholds. in lieu of that of A. J. Arnott, in whose name they stood. The Solicitors: Drake, Son & Parton. articles of association of the company provided that transfers of shares must be made by deed. Arnott deposited the certificates of the shares with Barnard, to secure a loan, and signed a blank transfer of the shares, and handed it to Barnard. Barnard filled up the transfer with the name of Lehmann as transferee, and deposited it and the certificates with Lehmann as security for a loan. Afterwards Barnard sold the shares, and Lehmann executed the transfer as transferee, and sent it to the company's office for registration, to enable Barnard to complete the sale. Arnott gave notice to the company not to register any transfer of the shares, on the ground that he had executed the transfer in blank, and that his signature had been improperly obtained. In the transfer there was no seal, or wafer in place of a seal, opposite Arnott's signature, but only a circle printed on the paper, with the words "place for seal" in the middle of it. A clerk of Barnard had attested the transfer as signed, sealed, and delivered" by Arnott, in his presence; but the clerk did not make any affidavit on this motion. Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and Grosvenor Woods, for the motion. Cookson, Q.C., and G. P. Macdonell, for the company. Sir R. Webster, A.G., Aston, Q.C., and Lawson, for the plaintiff. Sir II. James, Q.C., Moulton, Q.C., and Bousfield, for the defendants. KEKEWICH, J., held on the questions raised by the defendants: that the plaintiff was the first and true inventor; that the invention had utility though it might not be commercially successful; that though the claim in the complete specification was wanting in precision it was fairly intelligible when read and construed with the figures and the letterpress; that the provisional specification was not necessarily bad because it did not describe one of the processes claimed in the complete specification, but that the complete specification must first be read, and then it must be ascertained whether on a fair interpretation each essential part was covered by the former, and his Lordship held that it was so. The plaintiff had formerly been in the employment of the defendants, who had then made use of the invention, but this was not a waiver of the plaintiff's rights, nor could it be construed as a perpetual license to the defendants. An injunction must be granted against the de Solicitors: M. Abrahams & Co.; A. Pulbrook; Stretton, fendants. Hilliard, Dale & Newman. Solicitors: J. H. Johnson; Cuttarns & Co., for Younge, Wilson & Co., Sheffield. W. L. C. Jan. 16. C. M. North, J. In re KERSHAW. to pay purchase-money Locke King's Act Amendment Act (40 & 41 Vict. c. 34), s. 1. A testator, by his will, dated the 19th November, 1884, bequeathed to his wife the leasehold house in which he then resided. In February, 1887, the testator entered into a contract to purchase the reversionary ground lease, under which his lessor held the house, for 20507. The testator died on the 3rd March, 1887, the purchase not having been then completed. After his death the testator's executors completed the purchase. The question was, what interest passed to the widow under the bequest, and whether she was entitled to the leasehold interest which belonged to the testator at the date of his will without performing the contract subsequently entered into by him, or whether she was entitled to have the contract carried out at the expense of the estate for her benefit. Phipson Beale, for the executors. NORTH, J., held, that all the testator's interest in the house passed to the widow, subject to her liability to pay the purchasemoney out of her own moneys. He was of opinion that Barber, Q.C., as amicus Curiæ, said that it was doubtful whether his Lordship had power to hear in this Court the Liverpool and Manchester causes, the hearing of which was proposed for Monday next. Under Order xxxvI. r. 22a, if, as was the case, there were not on the 1st of December ten or more such causes sat down for trial, the causes were to be tried at the next Liverpool or Manchester Assizes. Order v. r. 9., under which the causes had been assigned to his Lordship, did not say where the causes were to be tried. Warmington, Q.C., also as amicus Curiæ, referred to the order. KEKEWICH, J., said that probably when Order xxxvI. r. 22A, was made, there was not any idea of a judge in London taking Liverpool and Manchester cases. If any one applied to the Court to change the place of trial, his Lordship had jurisdiction to change it to London, and he thought he could make the order nunc pro tunc at the trial; but if either party objected the trial could not be proceeded with. On further consideration his Lordship thought that he could not hear the causes as proposed. C. M. |