Deterrence by DiplomacyUniversity of Michigan, 1998 I formalize the argument in a game-theoretic model, an infinitely-repeated game in which states interact with different adversaries over time. Each state has incomplete information as to the other's value for the disputed issue. Using factorization, a version of the Bellman principle (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990), I characterize an equilibrium that has history-dependent strategies, where the histories correspond to reputations. After one set of histories, the defender's speech conveys information to the challenger about whether or not the defender considers the issue important enough to be worth a fight. The challenger is more likely to back down after this more-credible threat. I solve numerically for the threshold points that determine the equilibrium and perform comparative statics. |
Contents
The Chinese Attempt Deterrence by Diplomacy 1950 | 25 |
A Liberal Theory of Deterrence | 50 |
Hypotheses on Power Reputations and Success | 80 |
Copyright | |
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38th Parallel acquiesce acquire a reputation adversary argue argument attain its goals attempts deterrence balance of forces balance of power behavior believe bluff Britain caught bluffing challenger escalates Challenger threatens challenger's decision challenger's reputation China China's threats communication convey information crises crisis crossed the Parallel Defender reputation defender tries deterrence defender's credibility Defender's Decision defender's diplomacy defender's reputation defender's threats deterrence fails deterrence success deterrence theory deterrent threats diplomacy honestly diplomatic discussed dissertation effects efficacy equations equilibrium estimates example explanation factors favorable Fearon fight formal model game-theoretic game-theoretic model hypotheses implications important incentive influence interaction interests international disputes intervene Iran Korean War less liberal deterrence theory MacArthur military balance minor power North Korea North Vietnam outcomes Panikkar percent power status probability of deterrence probit realist deterrence theory repeated game reputation for bluffing reputation for honesty Scenario Soviet Union strategies suggests Taiwan theorists troops try deterrence variables