in all manufactures. But in those things which are honest and just, and which concern the public, toσaútnv ëxei diapogàv nai λáv, “There is so much dissension and deception," that things are good or bad not by themselves, but as they are in law ; πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ ̓ ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται: “ He is well instructed who expects that manner of proof for things, which the nature of the things will bear," said Aristotle. And in moral things, it is sufficient that a thing is judged true and certain, though by an uncertain argument; and the opinion may be practically certain, when the knowledge of it is in speculation only probable.

It hath two sorts of motives, intrinsical and extrinsical. That is reason, this is authority: and both of them have great considerations in order to practice, of which I am to give account in the following rules.

RULE II.

A Conscience that is, at first, and in its own Nature, probable, may be made certain by Accumulation of many Probabilities operating the same Persuasion.

EVERY probable argument hath in it something of persuasion and proof, and although it cannot produce evidence and entire conviction to a wise and a discerning spirit, yet it can effect all that it ought; and although, if the will list, or if passions rule, the understanding shall be made stubborn against it, and reject it easily; yet if nothing be put in bar against it, it may bring a man to adhere to it beyond the evidence. But in some cases there are a whole army of little people, heaps of probable inducements which the under-standing amasses together, and from every side gathers all that can give light and motion to the article in question; it draws auxiliaries from every thing, fights with every weapon, and by all means pursues the victory; it joins line to line, and precept to precept, reason to reason, and reason to

VOL. XII.

Ethic. lib. i. c. 3.. Wilkinson. p. 5.

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authority; the sayings of wise men with the proverbs of the people; consent of talkers, and the arguings of disputers; the nature of the thing, and the reasonableness of its expectations; the capacities and possibilities of men, and of accidents; the purposes and designs, the usefulness and rewards; and by what all agents are and ought to be moved; customs are mingled with laws, and decencies with consideration of profit; the understanding considers the present state and heap of circumstances, and by prudence weighs every thing in its own balance; it considers the consequent of the opinion it intends to establish, and well weighs the inconvenience of the contrary. But from the obscurity and insufficiency of these particulars, there cannot come a perfect light; if a little black be mingled with white, the product must have something of every influence that can be communicated from its principle, or material constitution; and ten thousand millions of uncertains cannot make one certain.

In this case, the understanding comes not to any certainty by the energy of the motives and direct arguments of probability, or by the first effort and impresses of their strength; but by a particular reflection which it makes upon the heap, and by a secondary discoursing extracted from the whole; as being therefore convinced, because it believes it to be impossible, that so many considerations, that no way conspire either in matter or design, should agree in the production of a lie. It is not likely that so many beams of light should issue from the chambers of heaven for no other reason but to lead us into a precipice. Probable arguments and prudential motives are the great hinges of human actions; for as a pope once said, 'It is but a little wit that governs the world;' and the uncertainty of arguments is the great cause of contingency in events; but as uncertain as most counsels are, yet all the great transactions of the affairs of the world are resolved on and acted by them; by suspicions and fears and probable apprehensions infinite evils are prevented; and it is not, therefore, likely to be an error by which so perpetually so many good things are procured and effected. For it were a disparagement to the wise providence of God, and a lessening the rare economy of the Divine government, that he should permit almost all the world, and all reglements, the varieties of event, and all the changes of king

doms, and all counsels and deliberations, to be conducted by moral demonstrations, and to be under the power of probabilities, and yet, that these should be deceitful and false. Neither is it to be imagined, that God should permit wise men and good,-- men that on purpose place their reason in indifference, that abate of their heats, and quench their own extravagant fires,-men that wipe away all clouds and mists from their eyes, that they may see clearly,-men that search as they ought to do, for things that they are bound to find, things that they are commanded to search, and upon which even all their interests depend, and yet, requiring after the end whither they are directed, and by what means it is to be required, that these men should be inevitably abused by their own reason, by the best reason they have; and that when concerning the thing which cannot be demonstrated by proper and physical arguments, yet we are to enter into a persuasion so great, that for the verification of it men must venture their lives and their souls;-I say, if this kind of proof be not sufficient to effect all this, and sufficiently to assure such men, and competently to affirm and strengthen such resolutions, salvation and damnation must be by chance, or, which is worse, it must be impossible to be well, but when it cannot choose to be otherwise: and this, I say, is not to be imagined that God will or does permit, since all these intercourses so much concern God's glory and our eternal interest. The main events of heaven and hell do, in some regards, depend, as to us, upon our faith, whose objects are represented with such lights from God and right reason, as are sufficient to persuade, not to demonstrate; they are such which leave something to us of choice and love, and every proposition of Scripture, though it be as sure, yet it is not so evident as the principles of geometry; and the Spirit of God effects his purposes with an influence as soft and placid as the warmth of the sun, while a physical demonstration blows hard and high as the north wind; indeed a man must use rudeness, if he does not quit his garment at so loud a call, but we are more willing to part with it, when the sun gently requires us: so is a moral demonstration, it is so human, so persuasive, so complying with the nature and infirmities of man, with the actions of his life and his manner of operation,

that it seems to have been created on purpose for the needs and uses of man in this life, for virtue and for hopes, for faith and for charity, to make us to believe by love, and to love by believing; for in heaven they that see and love, cannot choose but love, and see, and comprehend; for it is a reward, and fills all their faculties, and is not possessed by us, but itself possesses us. In this world where we are to do something ourselves, though all by the grace of God,— that which we do of ourselves is nothing else but to work as we ourselves can,-which indeed happens to be in propositions, as it is in the love of God; this cannot fail us, but we may fail of it and so are the sentences of religion, infallible in themselves, but we may be deceived, while by a fallible way we proceed to infallible notices, for nothing else could endear our labour and our love, our search and our obedience; and therefore, this must be sufficient and acceptable, if we do what we can but then this also will secure our confidence: and in the noises of Christendom, when disputing fellows say their brother is damned for not believing them, we need not to regard any such noises, if we proceed prudently as we can, and honestly as we ought; probable motives of our understanding are our sufficient conduct, and then we have this warrant:" Brethren, if our hearts condemn us not, then have we peace towards God." And God would never have inspired his church with prudence, or made any such virtue, if the things which were put under the conduct of it, that is, probabilities, were not instrumental to the service of God, and to the verification of all its just and proper productions.

Probable arguments are like little stars, every one of which will be useless as to our conduct and enlightening; but when they are tied together by order and vicinity, by the finger of God and the hand of an angel, they make a constellation, and are not only powerful in their influence, but like a bright angel, to guide and to enlighten our way. And although the light is not great as the light of the sun or moon, yet mariners sail by their conduct; and though with trepidation and some danger, yet very regularly they enter into the haven. This heap of probable inducements, is not

a 1 John, iii. 21.

of power as a mathematical and physical demonstration, which is in discourse as the sun is in heaven, but it makes a milky and a white path, visible enough to walk securely.

And next to these tapers of effective reason, drawn from the nature and from the events, and the accidents and the expectations and experiences of things, stands the grandeur of a long and united authority; the understanding thus reasoning, That it is not credible that this thing should have escaped the wiser heads of all the great personages in the world, who stood at the chairs of princes, or sat in the ruler's chair, and should only appear to two or three bold, illiterate, or vicious persons, ruled by lusts, and overruled by evil habits; but in this we have the same security and the same confidence that timorous persons have in the dark; they are pleased, and can see what is and what is not, if there be a candle,— but in the dark, they are less fearful, if they be in company.

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This way of arguing some are pleased to call a moral demonstration: not that it can make a proposition clear and bright, and quit from clouds and obscurity, as a natural demonstration can'; for I may in this case use Aristotle's saying, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς, ἀλλ ̓ οὐ σαφές, “Things of this nature may be very true, but are not very evident;" but it can produce the same effect, that is, it can lead into truth, not with as much brightness, but with as much certainty and infallibility in the event of things. For a man may as prosperously and certainly arrive at his journey's end, though but conducted by him that went the way but once before him, as if he had a straight path walled in on both sides; so may we find truth as certainly by probabilities, as by demonstrations; we are not so sure that we find it, but it is oftentimes as surely found. And if the heap arrive at that which we call a moral demonstration, it is as certain that no moral demonstration can be opposed against it, as that no natural demonstration can be brought in contradiction to a natural. For the understanding cannot call any thing a moral demonstra. tion, till, by considering the particulars on both sides, the reasonableness of one, and the unreasonableness of the other, with a cold scent, and liberty of spirit, and an unbiassed will, it hath passed the sentence for the truth; and since, in this case, all the opposition is between strength and power on one