"Sacred history has acquainted us with the power of music over the passions, and there is little doubt but the verse as well as the lyre of David was able to soothe the troubled spirits to repose.”—KNOX, Essays.

APPLAUSE. PRAISE.

Although these words are applicable both to persons and things, yet APPLAUSE (Lat. applaudere, part. applausus) is better suited to things, such as actions, discourses, or performances. And PRAISE (cf. Fr. priser, to prize, Lat. pretiare) to persons. One applauds in public, and at the moment when the action is done, or the speech pronounced. One praises at all times, on all accounts, and under all circumstances, the absent and the present, for what they do, or are, or have become. Applause is the lively expression of our satisfaction at the exhibition of excellence in persons, and may be even by gesture or significant actions, as clapping the hands. Praise is supposed to be based upon judgment, and to be the expression of discernment. It is manifested in words exclusively. Almost any applause is flattering. But we put praises to the test, and require that they should be delicate and sincere. Slight applause is so far grateful. Slight praise is often indirect condemnation. From formal and flippant praises we naturally recoil; the former may be hollow ceremony, the latter may be only irony.

These terms express different degrees of attention which the mind gives to the subjects with which it is occupied. Application is serious and sustained attention. It is needful for knowing the whole of a subject. MEDITATION (Lat. meditationem) is a reflecting attention given in detail, which is needful for knowing thoroughly. STUDY (Lat. studia, pl. studies) is a strong and laborious attention needful for resolving complex subjects, or overcoming difficulties. Application implies the will and desire of knowledge. Meditation implies sympathy with

the subject, and a desire to become familiar with it in all its aspects. Study implies difficulty or importance in the subject-matter, a firm resolution to master it, not to be deterred by its difficulties, nor repelled by its hardness. Soundness of mind for application, penetration of mind for meditation, and strength and breadth of mind for study.

ATTENTION (Lat. attentionem) is a condition of mind; its ordinary attitude, so to speak, in study. It may be casual. We often give attention without being employed in study. We shall not understand the most ordinary observation addressed to us without some degree of attention. Attention is no more than the giving of the mind to a subject to the disregard of other subjects. APPLICATION (Lat.applicationem ănĭmi, Cic.) is a wider term than attention, and is not only a state of mind, but a power. Application involves attention. Hav. ing application, I am able to give attention. Application is the faculty of sustained attention. Many persons are capable of attention (in short, to some extent every thinking being is so), who have not application. Their attention, therefore, is irregular and inadequate. Study should be systematic; its subjects rightly apportioned as to arrangement and the time to be devoted to it. It will vary in character according to the subject of it, which may be any department of human knowledge. Study should be systematic, application diligent, attention close. Habits of study are formed in these earlier stages by converting the attention of the young into application by indirect methods, such as by making the subjects of learning attractive, or by the adventitious enhancement of them by prizes for competition.

That very philosophy which had been adopted to invent and explain articles of faith was now studied only to interest us in the history of the human mind, and to assist us in developing its faculties, and regulating its operations."-WARBUR

TON.

"They say the tongues of dying men Enforce attention like deep harmony." SHAKESPEARE.

These terms have an exclusive reference to the suitableness or propriety of statements in relation to some main case or argument. RELEVANT is the Fr. relevant, the participle of relever, probably in the sense of holding in feudal tenure. APPOSITE is Lat. participle appositus, placed in juxtaposition. Hence APPOSITE expresses a quality, RELEVANT a force. A remark is apposite which harmonizes with the case under consideration. An observation is relevant which helps the main question to a decision. That, however, which is done directly by that which is relevant, may be done indirectly by that which is apposite. The apposite elucidates, the relevant promotes discussion. The apposite is a proposition; the relevant either an argument, or something which links itself on to argument. Apposite remarks are commonly made in general conversation by persons not taking a main part in the discussion, but throwing in pertinent sayings as listeners. The relevant owes its force solely to its argumentative appropriateness; the apposite is also timely, and often tells with peculiar effect upon the conjuncture at which it is introduced.

APPRAISE. APPRECIATE. ESTIMATE. ESTEEM. VALUE. PRIZE.

APPRAISE and APPRECIATE are different forms of the same word, Lat. appretiare, of which the Lat. pretium, price, is the root. The English praise has the same origin, meaning literally, to set a price or value. Material goods are appraised for the purpose of ascertaining their market value. Things are appreciated at their moral value; as character, conduct, acts, persons. Appreciate looks on the favourable side of things. We appreciate not a man's faults, but his merits. This idea of favourable regard appears yet more strongly in the adjective appreciative. An appreciative audience is one which appreciates the excellences of the exhibition.

ESTIMATE (Lat. æstimāre) is an act

of judgment. ESTEEM (from the same origin) is an act of valuing or prizing with moral approbation. Nice calculation is necessary to estimate, nice feeling also to appreciate. An union of sound judgment with refined sensibility enables persons to appreciate. That which has to be estimated is open to view, that which has to be appre ciated must often be sought out first. Appreciation notes things not only at their moral worth, but according to their individual and peculiar excellence. Women have a truer appreciation, that is, a more delicate perception of character, than most men. He who can appreciate perceives the niceties and specialities of a case. He does not overlook what is worthy of regard. He sees the importance of what, to people in general, are unimportant differences. I estimate a thing when I determine its present or future value or importance. This is sometimes done in a rough way, and only approximately. I appreciate it when I see characteristics of it in detail. I esteem another when I estimate his character as worthy of regard. Esteem is akin to affection. To VALUE a thing (Fr. Lat. value, subst., from valoir, to be worth) is to affix the idea of worth, great or small, real or fictitious, pecuniary or moral.

PRIZE (Fr. prix, price) and ESTEEM denote mental action, the former being commonly employed of external, the latter of moral things, or of external things for the sake of something beyond themselves. I value a book highly or cheaply. I prize it for its intrinsic worth or for the sake of the person who gave it to me. I do not esteem it at all, though I may esteem the author or the donor of it. The state of mind involved in prizing anything is one of the highest regard; the thoughts are concentrated on the object; it is treasured with a strong personal feeling. It is jealously guarded, and the possession of it confers a happiness on the possessor, which he is fain to think peculiar to himself. He thinks himself more fortunate than others who have it not. The value we set upon that which we prize may be more than just.

of the thing propounded, and CONCEIVE (Lat. concipere) with the order and purpose of something presented to the mind. One understands languages, comprehendssciences, conceives possibilities, and apprehends facts. CONCEIVE Sometimes belongs to the entertainment of an idea, and sometimes In either of a judgment or belief. case one conceives with more than the use of the understanding, and with a combination of understanding and imagination. I fill up the void in the actual by importing ideas of the possible. I suppose causes, reasons, objects or purposes, by supplying which 1 seek to give an account of the thing to myself. I apprehend, understand, and comprehend things present. I conceive things future and unrealized. I conceive a plan, purpose, design. The courtier understands the ways of the court. The mathematician comprehends his problem. The man of business apprehends that there will be a rise or fall of prices, and conceives that it The must be owing to such a cause. architect conceives the plan of a building.

"It was amongst the ruins of the Capitol that I first conceived the idea of a work which has amused and exercised near twenty years of my life."-GIBBON.

"And how much soever any truth may seem above our understanding and comprehension, yet if they come attested by His divine infallible authority, we have infinitely more ground to be persuaded of them than we are of any thing that we ourselves may seem to comprehend or understand."BEVERIDGE.

PERCEIVE (Lat. percipere) has a two-fold meaning. We perceive external objects, when the mind becomes aware of their presence by the senses, and also perceive truths, when the mind has been led, whether by reasoning or otherwise, to take cognizance of them. It is difficult to understand what is enigmatical, to comprehend what is abstract, to conceive what is confused, to perceive what is indistinct, to apprehend what is unlikely in reason or in fact.

"Jupiter made all things, and all things whatsoever exist are the works of Jupiter; rivers, and earth, and sea, and heaven, and

These verbs (Lat. appropiare and approximare) are both formed originally from the Lat. propě, near, proximus, nearest. They differ in the degree of nearness expressed. When two things approach, the interval between them is materially lessened. But they may be said to approximate if the interval is in any degree lessened, though it may after all be very great. An approximate calculation is sometimes professedly inexact, and only the best that can be made. Approximate has a more abstract application than approach. Approach implies a diminution of distance, or o what may be conceived as analogous to distance. Approximation may mean the diminution of difference, as in character or properties. The character of the lowest savage approximates to that of the brute. this sense approximation is similarity.

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"Let matter be divided into the subtilest parts imaginable, and these be moved as swiftly as you will, it is but a senseless and stupid being still, and makes no nearer approach to sense, perception, or vital energy than it had before."-RAY, On Creation.

"The largest capacity and the most noble dispositions are but an approximation to the proper standard and true symmetry of human nature."-J. TAYLOR.

APPROBATION. APPROVAL.

APPROBATION (Lat. approbationem) is the sentiment of which APPROVAL is the expression. We entertain approbation and express approval. It is possible to feel in our hearts approbation of conduct in others, which we may not have the moral courage to sanction by open and unreserved approval.

APPROPRIATE.

SUITABLE.

APPROPRIATE (Lat. appropriäre, to make one's own) is to SUITABLE (Fr. suite, a following) as the subjective to the objective, the appropriate being the suitable in conception, and never employed of physical or mechanical adaptation. SUITABLE is, therefore, the wider term and simpler. That is suit

able which is in any way adapted to a thing. That is appropriate which accords with the conceptions formed of it. Suitable belongs rather to the purpose and use of things. Appropriate to their manner and character. Suitable is a practical term. Appropriate is a term of taste. Suitable may be between two physical or two moral terms; appropriate implies, at least, one moral. Again, appropriate is a more specific, suitable a more general term. That is appropriate which peculiarly fits or suits the general character, or some property or peculiarity of a thing. That is suitable which is not unsuitable; the one is an apt, the other a permissible, accompaniment.

In its strict and appropriate meaning, especially as applied to our Saviour's parables, it (parable) signifies a short narrative of some event or fact, real or fictitious, in which a continued comparison is carried on between sensible and spiritual objects, and under this similitude some important doctrine, moral or religions, is conveyed and enforced."-BISHOP PORTEUS.

Raphael, amidst his tenderness and friendship for man, shows such a dignity and condescension in all his speech and behaviour as are suitable to a superior nature." -ADDISON.

APPROPRIATE. USURP. ARRO

The idea common to these words is that of making or pretending a right. Of these, the widest in signification and most varied in force is the last. To ASSUME (Lat. assumère) is to take to one's self. This may be done with or without right, and in any degree from the most temporary to the most permanent assumption. We assume truth, probability, right, that is, we conceive them as proved or granted; in which sense the word is considered elsewhere. We do not assume physical objects simply as such, unless they have some force or significance beyond themselves. I take, not assume, my hat; but if I placed in it a feather as a badge of leadership or party, I should be said to assume it. It is in connexion with this sense of taking, in order to wear, that assume so often bears the meaning of taking with pretence, or falsely assuming.

"Assume a virtue if you have it not." SHAKESPEARE.

ASSUME and APPROPRIATE indicate less demonstrative action than USURP (Lat. usurpare, to make use of, and, afterwards, to usurp) and ARROGATE (Lat. arrogare, to adopt, to claim unfairly). I appropriate a thing when I make it peculiarly mine; and as this may be to the exclusion of others having an equal or better right to it, the word is tinged with an idea of injustice. The radical idea of appropriate is to make property to belong, to set apart, for a peculiar relation, use, or possession, either in regard to one's self or in regard to some other. In this point it differs from the rest, which are applicable only to one's self. Right and wrong are blended in arrogate. To arrogate is to assume as one's right in a haughty manner; to usurp is to take to one's self that which is in the use or enjoyment not properly one's own. The term belongs to power, titles, rights, possessions, authority, privileges, and the like. In their most unfavourable senses, appropriation is without right, usurpation is against right, arrogation claims right, and assumption ignores right. The selfish and unfair appropriate, the audacious and intrusive usurp, the vain arrogate, the cool, determined, and insolent, assume.

"Pompey, Crassus, and Cæsar, had found the sweets of arbitrary power, and each being a check to the others' growth, struck up a false friendship among themselves, and divided the government betwixt them, which none of them was able to assume alone."-DRYDEN.

"But these (glebe tithes, &c.) are sometimes appropriated, that is, the benefice is perpetually annexed to some spiritual corporation."-BLACKSTONE.

"The half lettered are forward, and arrogate to themselves what a modest, studious man dares not, though he knows more."— WOOLASTON.

"An usurper can never have right on his side."-LOCKE.

APT. READY. PROMPT.

These terms all denote the possession of mental activity, with, however, some shades of difference. The APT man (Lat. aptus, fit) is he who can with comparative ease qualify himself for the exercise of some function of body or mind. Aptness is specific