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ideas of the blue colour and sweet scent of that flower, to be produced in our minds; it being no more impossible to conceive that God thould annex such ideas to such motions, with which they have no similitude, than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our Aesh, with which that idea hath no resemblance.

§. 14. What I have said concerning colours and smells may be understood also of tastes and sounds, and other the like sensible qualities; which, whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us, and depend on those primary qualities, viz. bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts; as I have said. Ideas of pri

6. 15. From whence I think it easy to mary quali. draw this observation, that the ideas of prities are re- mary qualities of bodies are resemblances of semblances; them, and their patterns do really exist in of secon

the bodies themselves; but the ideas, prodary, not.

duced in us by these secondary qualities, have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. They are in the bodies, we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us: and what is sweet, blue or farm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves, wbich we call so.

§. 16. Mame is denominated hot and light; snow, white and cold; and manna, white and sweet, from the ideas they produce in us : which qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those bodies that those idcas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror; and it would by most men be judged very extravagant, if one should say otherwise. And yet he that will consider that the same fire, that at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth, does at a nearer approach produce in us the far different sensation of pain, ought to bethink himself what reason he has to say, that his idea of warmth, which was produced in bim by the fire, is actually in

of parts.

the fire; and his idea of pain, which the same fire produced in him the same way, is not in the fire. Why are whiteness and coldness in snow, and pain not, when it produces the one and the other idea in us; and can do neither, but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion of its solid parts ?

$. 17. The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire, or snow, are really in them, whether any one's senses perceive them or no; and therefore they may be called real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies : but light, heat, whiteness or coldness, are no more really in them, than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes sce light, or colours, nor the ears hear sounds ; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell ; and all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, as they are such particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i. e. bulk, figure, and motion

§. 18. A piece of manna of a sensible bulk is able to produce in us the idea of a round or square figure, and, by being removed from one place to another, the idea of motion. This idea of motion represents it as it really is in the manna moving: a circle or square are the same, whether in idea or existence, in the mind, or in the manna; and this both motion and figure are really in the manna, whether we take notice of them or no tothis every body is ready to agree, tel Besides, manna by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of its parts, has a power to produce the sensations of sickness, and sometimes of acute pains or gripings in us. That these ideas of sickness and pain are not in the marna, but effects of its operations on us, and are nowhere when we feel them not;Sthis also every one reádily agrees.ta. And yet inen are hardly to be brought to think, that sweetness and whiteness are not really in manna ; which are but the effects of the operations of manna, by the motion, size, and figure of its particles on the eyes and palate; as the pain and sickness caused by manna, are confessedly nothing but the effects of its operations on the stomach and guts, by the size,

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motion, motion and figure of its insensible parts (for by nothing else can a body operate as has been proved :) if it could not operate on the eyes and palate, and thereby produce in the mind particular distinct ideas, which in itself it has not, as well as we allow it can operate on the guts and stomach, and thereby produce distinct ideas, which in itself it has not. These ideas being all effects of the operations of manna, on several parts of our bodies, by the size, figure, number, and motion of its parts; why those produced by the eyes and palate should rather be thought to be really in the manna, than those produced by the stomach and guts; or why the pain and sickness, ideas that are the effect of manna, should be thought to be no-where when they are not felt; and yet the sweetness and whiteness, effects of the same manna on other parts of the body, by ways equally as unknown, should be thought to exist in the manna, when they are not seen or tasted, would need some reason to explain. Ideas of pri.


6. 19. Let us consider the red and white mary quali. colours in porplıyry: hinder light from ties, are re. striking on it, and its colours vanish, it no semblances ; longer produces any such ideas in us; upon of seconda

the return of light it produces these apry, not.

pearances on us again. Can any one think any real alterations are made in the porphyry, by the presence or absence of light; and that those ideas of whiteness and redness are really in porphyry in the light, when it is plain it has no colour in the dark; it has, indeed, such a configuration of particles, both night and day, as are apt, by the rays of light rebounding from sone parts of that hard stone, to produce in us the idea of redness, and from others the idea of whiteness; but whiteness or redness are not in it at any time, but such a texture, that hath the power to produce such a sensation in us.

9. 20. Pound an almond, and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one, and the sweet taste into an oily one. What real alteration can the beating of the pestle make in any body, but an alteration of the texture of it?

§. 21. Ideas being thus distinguished and understood, we may be able to give an account how the same water, at the same tine, nay produce the idea of cold by one hand, and of heat by the other; whereas it is impossible that the same water, if those ideas were really in it, should at the same time be both hot and cold: for if we imagine warmth, as it is in our hands, to be nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves, or animal spirits, we may understand how it is possible that the same water may, at the same time, produce the sensations of heat in one hand, and cold in the other; which yet figure never does, that never producing the idea of a square by one hand, which has produced the idea of a globe by another. But if the sensation of heat and cold be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies, caused by the corpuscles of any other body, it is easy to be understood, that if that motion be greater in one hand than in the other; if a body be applied to the two hands, which has in its minute particles a greater motion, than in those of one of the hands, and a less than in those of the other; it will increase the motion of the one hand, and lessen it in the other, and so cause the different sensations of heat and cold that depend thereon.

g. 29. I have in what just goes before been engaged in physical inquiries a little farther than perhaps I intended. But it being necessary to make the nature of sensation a little understood, and to make the difference between the qualities in bodies, and the ideas produced by them in the mind, to be distinctly conceived, without which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly of them; I hope I shall be pardoned this little excursion into natural philosophy, it being necessary in our present inquiry to distinguish the primary and real qualities of bodies, which are always in them (viz. solidity, extension, figure, number, and inotion, or rest; and are sometimes perceived by us, viz. when the bodies they

are in are big enough singly to be discerned) from those | sccondary and iinputed qualities, which are but the

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powers of several combinations of those primary ones,
when they operate, without being distinctly discerned ;
whereby we may also come to kuow what ideas are, and
what are not, resemblances of something really existing
in the bodies we denominate from thein.
Three sorts §. 23. The qualities then that are in
of qualities bodies, rightly considered, are of three
in bodies.

First, the bulk, figure, number, situation, and mo-
tion, or rest of their solid parts; those are in them,
whether we perceive them or no; and when they are
of that size, that we can discover them, we have by
these an idea of the thing, as it is in itself, as is plain
in artificial things. These I call primary qualities.

Secondly the power that is in any body, by reason of its insensible primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different ideas of several colours, sounds, smells, tastes, &c. These are usually called sensible qualities.

Thirdly, The power that is in any body, by reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities, to make such a change in the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of another body, as to make it operate on our senses, differently from what it did before. Thus the sun has a power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid. These are usually called powers.

The first of these, as has been said, I think, may be properly called real, original, or primary qualities, because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceived or no; and upon their different modifications it is, that the secondary qualities depend.

The other two are only powers to act differently upon other things, which powers result from the different modifications of those primary qualities. The first are $. 24. But though the two latter sorts resemblances, of qualities are powers barely, and nothing The second

but powers, relating to several other bothought resemblances,

dies, and resulting from the different modibut are not

fications of the original qualities; yet they The third are generally otherwise thought of. For


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