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and intellectual world. For the materials in both being such as he has no power over, either to make or destroy, all that man can do is either to unite them together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them. I shall here begin with the first of these in the consideration of complex ideas, and come to the other two in their duc places. As simple ideas are observed to exist in several combinations united together, so the mind has a power to consider several of thein united together as one idea; and that not only as they are united in external objects, but as itself has joined thein. Ideas thus made up of several simple ones put together, I call complex ; such as are beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe; which though complicated of various simple ideas, or complex ideas made up of simple ones, yet are, when the mind pleases, considered each by itself as one entire thing, and signified by one name. Made yolun

§. 2. In this faculty of repeating and tarily.

joining together its ideas, the mind bras

great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts, infinitely beyond what sensation or reflection furnished it with; but all this still confined to those simple ideas which it received from those two sources, and which are the ultimate materials of all its compositions : for simple ideas are all from things themselves, and of these the mind can have no more, nor other than what are suggested to it. It can have no other ideas of sensible qualities than wbat come from without by the senses ; nor any ideas of other kind of operations of a thinking substance, than what it finds in itself; but when it bas once got these simple ideas, it is not confined barely to observation, and what offers itself froin without: it can, by its own power, put together those ideas it has, and make new complex ones, which it never received so united. Are either §. 3. Complex ideas, however, commodes, sub- pounded and decompounded, though their stances or re- number be infinite, and the variety endlations. less, wherewith they fill and entertain the

thoughts thoughts of men; yet, I think, they may be all reduced under these three heads: 1. Modes.


1. Modes. 2. Substances. 3. Relations. $. 4. First, Modes I call such complex

Modes. ideas, which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on or affections of substances; such as are ideas signified by the words triangle, gratitude, murder, &c. And it in this I use the word mode in somewhat a different sense froin its ordinary signification, I beg pardon ; it being unavoidable in discourses, differing from the ordinary received notions, cither to make new words, or to use old words in somewhat a new signification : the latter whereof, in our present case, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two.

$. 5. Of these modes, there are two Simple and sorts which deserve distinct consideration. mixed

modes. First, there are some which are only variations, or different combinations of the same simple idea, without the mixture of any other; as a dozen or score; which are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct units added together: and these I call simple modes, as being contained within the bounds of one simple idea.

Secondly, there are others compounded of simple ideas of several kinds, put together to make one complex one; v. g. beauty, consisting of a certain composition of colour and figure, causing delight in the beholder ; theft, which being the concealed change of the possession of any thing, without the consent of the proprietor, contains, as is visible, a combination of several ideas of several kinds : and these I call mixed modes.

Ý. 6. Secondly, the ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas, as

Substances are taken to represent distinct particular lective.

single or col. things subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed or confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus if to substance be joined the simple idea of a certain dull whitish co



Vol. I.

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lour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility,
and fusibility, we have the idea of lead, and a combi-
nation of the ideas of a certain sort of figure, with the
powers of motion. Thought and reasoning joined to
substance, make the ordinary idea of a man. Now of
substances also, there are two sorts of ideas; one of
single substances, as they exist separately, as of a man or a
sheep; the other of several of those put together, as an
army of men, or flock of sheep : which collective ideas
of several substances thus put together, are as much
each of them one single idea, as that of a man, or an

9. 7. Thirdly, the last sort of complex

ideas, is that we call relation, which consists in the consideration and comparing one idea with another. Of these several kinds we shall treat in their order. · The abstru. 9. 8. If we trace the progress of our sest ideas minds, and with attention observe how from the two it repeats, adds together, and unites its sources.

simple ideas received from sensation or reflection, it will lead us farther than at first perhaps we should have imagined. And I believe we shall find, if we warily observe the originals of our notions, that even the most abstruse ideas, how remote soever they may seem from sense, or from any operations of our own minds, are yet only such as the understanding frames to itself, by repeating and joining together ideas, that it had either from objects of sense, or from its own operations about them: so that those even large and abstract ideas are derived from sensation or reflection, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may and does attain unto. This I shall endeavour to show in the ideas we have of space, time, and infinity, and some few others, that seem the most remote from those originals.



Of Simple Modes, and first of the Simple Modes of



$. 1. 'HOUGH in the foregoing part Simple I have often mentioned simple

Modes, ideas, which are truly the materials of all our knowledge ; yet having treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the mind, than as distinguishe:] from others more compounded, it will not be perhaps amiss to take a view of some of them again under this consideration, and examine those different modifications of the same idea : which the mind either finds in things existing, or is able to make within itself, without the help of any extrinsical object, or any foreign suggestion.

Those modifications of any one simple idea (which, as has been said, I call simple modes) are as perfectly different and distinct ideas in the mind, as those of the greatest distance or contrariety. For the idea of two is as distinct from that of one, as blueness from heat, or either of them from any number : and yet it is made up only of that simple idea of an unit repeated; and repetitions of this kind joined together, make those distinct simple modes, of a dozen, a gross, a million.

$. 2. I shall begin with the simple idea idea of of space. I have showed above, chap. 4. space. that we get the idea of space, both by our sight and touch; which, I think, is so evident, that it would be as needless to go to prove that men perceive, by their sight, a distance between bodies of different colours, or between the parts of the same body, as that they see colours themselves; nor 'is it less obvious, that they can do so in the dark by feeling and touch. §. 3. This space considered barely in

Space and length between any two beings, without extension. considering any thing else between them,


L 2


is called distance; if considered in length, breadth, and thickness, I think it may be called capacity. The term extension is usually applied to it in what manner soever considered. Immensity.

$. 4. Each different distance is a diffe

rent modification of space; and each idea of any different distance, or space, is a simple mode of this idea. Men for the use, and by the custom of measuring, settle in their minds the ideas of certain stated lengths, such as are an inch, foot, yard, fathom, mile, diameter of the earth, &c. which are so many distinct ideas made up only of space. When any such stated lengths or measures of space are made familiar to men's thoughts, they can in their minds repeat them as often as they will, without mixing or joining to them the idea of body, or any thing else ; and frame to themselves the ideas of long, square, or cubic, feet, yards, or fathoms, here amongst the bodies of the universe, or else beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies ; and by adding these still one to another, enlarge their ideas of space as much as they please. The power of repeating, or doubling any idea we have of any distance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any stop or stint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the idea of inmensity. Figure.

9. 5. There is another modification of

this idea, which is nothing but the relation which the parts of the termination of extension, or circumscribed space, have amongst themselves. This the touch discovers in sensible bodies, whose extremities come within our reach; and the eye takes both from bodies and colours, whose boundaries are within its view; where observing how the extremities termi. nate either in straight lines, which meet at discernible angles; or in crooked lines, wherein no angles can be perceived; by considering these as they relate to one another, in all parts of the extremities of any body or space, it has that idea we call figure, which affords to the mind infinite variety. For besides the vast number of different figures, that do really exist in the


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