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coherent masses of matter, the stock that the mind has in its power, by varying the idea of space, and thereby making still new compositions, by repeating its own ideas, and joining thein as it pleases, is perfectly inexhaustible ; and so it can multiply figures i ad infinitum. $. 6. For the mind having a power to
Figure. repeat the idea of any length directly stretched out, and join it to another in the same direction, which is to double the length of that straight line, or else join another with what inclination it thinks fit, and so inake what sort of angle it pleases; and being able also to shorten any line it imagines, by taking from it one half, or one tourth, or what part it pleases, without being able to come to an end of any such divisions, it can make an angle of any bigness : so also the lines that are its sides, of what length it pleases; which joining again to other lines of different lengths, and at different angles, till it' has wholly inclosed
any space, it is evident, that it can multiply figures both in their shape and capacity, # infinitum ; all which are but so many different simple modes of space.
The same that it can do with straight lines, it can also do with crooked, or crooked and straight together; and the same it can do in lines, it can also in superficies : by which we may be led into farther thoughts of the endless variety of figures, that the mind bas a power to make, and thereby to multiply the simple inodes of space. 9. 7. Another idea coming under this
Place. head, and belonging to this tribe, is that we call place. As in simple space, we consider the relation of distance between any two bodies or points ; so in our idea of place, we consider the relation of distance betwixt any thing, and any two or more points, which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another, and so considered as at rest : for when we find any thing at the same distance now, which it was yesterday, from any two or more points, which have not since changed their distance one with another, and with which we then compared it, we say it hath kept L3
the same place; but if it hath sensibly altered its distance with either of those points, we say it bath changed its place : though vulgarly speaking, in the common notion of place, we do not always exactly observe the distance from these precise points; but from larger portions of sensible objects, to which we consider the thing placed to bear relation, and its distance from which we have some reason to observe.
§. 8. Thus a company of chess-men, standing on the same squares of the chess-board, where we left them, we say they are all in the same place, or unmoved; though perhaps the chess-board hath been in the mean time carried out of one room into another; because we compared them only to the parts of the chess-board, which keep the same distance one with another. The chess-board, we also say, is in the same place it was, if it remain in the same part of the cabin, though perhaps the ship, which it is in, sails all the while : and the ship is said to be in the same place, supposing it kept the same distance with the parts of the neighbouring land ; though perhaps the earth bath turned round, and so both chess-men, and board, and ship, have every one changed place, in respect of remoter bodies, which have kept the same distance one with another. But yet the distance from certain parts of the board, being that which determines the place of the chess-men ; and the distance from the fixed parts of the cabin (with which we made the comparison) be." ing that which determined the place of the chess-board ; and the fixed parts of the earth, that by which we determined the place of the ship; these things may be said to be in the same place in those respects : though their distance from some other things, which in this matter we did not consider, being varied, they have undoubtedly changed place in that respect; and we ourselves shall think so, when we have occasion to compare them with those other.
$. 9. But this modification of distance we call place, being made by men, for their common use, that by it. they might be able to design the particular position of things, where they had occasion for such designation ;
men consider and determine of this place, by reference to those adjacent things which best served to their preo sent purpose, without considering other things, which to answer another purpose would better determine the place of the same thing. Thus in the chess-board, the use of the designation of the place of each chess-man, being determined only within that checquered piece of wood, it would cross that purpose, to measure it by any thing else: but when these very chess-men are put up in a bag, if any one should ask where the black king is, it would be proper to determine the place by the parts of the room it was in, and not by the chess board; there being another use of designing the place it is now in, than when in play it was on the chessboard, and so must be determined by other bodies. So if any one should ask, in what place are the verses, which report the story of Nisus and Euryalus, it would be very improper to determine this place, by saying, they were in such a part of the earth, or in Bodley's library: but the right designation of the place would be by the parts of Virgil's works; and the proper answer would be, that these verses were about the middle of the ninth book of his Æneid ; and that they have been always constantly in the same place ever since Virgil was printed ; which is true, though the book itself hath moved a thousand times; the use of the idea of place here being to know in what part of the book that story is, that so upon occasion we may know where to find it, and have recourse to it for use. $. 10. That our idea of place is nothing
Place. else but such a relative position of any thing, as I have before mentioned, I think is plain, and will be easily admitted, when we consider that we can have no idea of the place of the universe, though we can of all the parts of it; because beyond that we have not the idea of any fixed, distinct, particular beings, in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of distance; but all beyond it is one uniform space or expansion, wherein the mind finds no variety, no marks. For to say, that the world is somewhere, means no more than that it does exist : this, though a
phrase borrowed from place, signifying only its existence, not location; and when one can find out, and frame ia his mind, clearly and distinctly, the place of the universe, he will be able to tell us, whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable inane of infinite space: though it be true, that the word place has sometimes a more confused sense, and stands for that space which any body takes up; and so the universe is in a place. The idea therefore of place we have by the same means that we get the idea of space, (whereof this is but a particular limited consideration) viz. by our sight and touch; by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of extension or distance. Extension $. 11. There are some that would per, and body, not suade us, that body and extension are the
same thing: who either change the signification of words, which I would not suspect them of, they having so severely condemned the philosophy of others, because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obscurity of doubtful or insignificant terms. If therefore they mean by body and extension the same that other people do, viz. by body, something that is solid and extended, whose parts are separablc and moveable different ways; and by extension, only the space that lies between the extremities of those solid coherent parts, and which is possessed by them: they confound very differentt ideas one with another, For I appeal to every man's own thoughts, whether the idea of space be not as distinct from that of solidity, as it is from the idea of scarlet colour! It is true, solidity cannot exist without extension, neither can scarlet colour exist without extension : but this hinders not, but that they are distinct ideas. Many ideas require others as necessary to their existence or conception, which yet are very distinct ideas. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived without space; and yet motion is not space, nor space motion : space can exist without it, and they are very distinct ideas; and so, I think, are those of space and solidity. Solidity is so inseparable an idea from body, that upon that depends its filling of space, its contact, impulse, and communication of motion upon impulse. And if it be a reason to prove, that spirit is different from body, because thinking includes not the idea of extension in it; the same reason will be as valid, I suppose, to prove that space is not body, because it includes not the idea of solidity in it: space and solidity being as distinct ideas, as thinking and extension, and as wholly separable in the mind one from another. Body then and extension, it is evident, are two distinct ideas. For,
$. 10. First, Extension includes no solidity, nor resistance to the motion of body, as body does.
§. 13. Secondly, The parts of pure space are inseparable one from the other; so that the continuity cannot be separated neither really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continued, even so much as in thought. To divide and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two superficies, where before there was a continuity; and to divide mentally, is to make in the mind two superficies, where before there was a continuity, and consider them as removed one from the other ; which can only be done in things considered by the mind as capable of being separated; and by separation, of acquiring new distinct superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of; but neither of these ways of separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure space.
It is true, a man may consider so much of such a space, as is answerable or commensurate to a foot, without considering the rest; which is indeed a partial consideration, but not so much as mental separation, or division ; since a man can no more mentally divide, without considering two superficies separate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two superficies disjoined one from the other : but a partial consideration is not separating. A man may consider light in the sun, without its heat; or mobility in body, without its extension, without thinking of their separation. One is only a partial consideration,