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to have shown here, by some few examples, of what sort these ideas are, and how the mind comes by them; especially since I shall have occasion hereafter to treat more at large of reasoning, judging, volition, and knowledge, which are some of the most considerable operations of the mind, and modes of thinking. The various §. 3. But perhaps it may not be an unattention of pardonable digression, nor wholly impertithe mind in
nent to our présent design, if we reflect thinking
here upon the different state of the mind in thinking, which those instances of attention, reverie, and dreaming, &c. before-mentioned, naturally enough suggest. That there are ideas, some or other, always present in the mind of a waking man, every one's experience convinces hiin, though the mind employs itself about them with several degrees of attention. Sometimes the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness on the contemplation of some objects, that it turns their ideas on all sides, remarks their relations and circumstances, and views every part so nicely, and with such intention, that it shuts out all other thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary impressions made then on the senses, which at another season would produce very sensible perceptions : at other times it barely observes the train of ideas that succeed in the understanding, without directing and pursuing any of thein : and at other times it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint shadow's that make no impression. Hence it is §. 4. This difference of intention, and probable that renission of the mind in thinking, with a thinking is
great variety of degrees between earnest the action,
study, and very near minding nothing at not essence of the soul. all, every one, I think, has experimented
in himself. Trace it a little farther, and you find the mind in sleep retired as it were from the senses, and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense, which at other times produce very vivid and sensible ideas. I need not for this, instance in those who sleep out whole stormy, nights, without hearing the thunder, or seeing the lightning, or feeling the shaking of the house, which are sensible enough to
those who are waking: but in this retirement of the mind from the senses, it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking, which we call dreaming: and, last of all, sound sleep closes the scene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think, almost every one has experience of in himself, and his own observation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence, is, that since the mind can sensibly put on, at several times, several degrees of thinking, and be sometimes even in a waking man so remiss, as to have thoughts dim and obscure to that degree, that they are very little removed from none at all, and at last, in the dark retirements of sound sleep, loses the sight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever : since, I say, this is evidently so in matter of fact, and constant experience, I ask whether it be not probable that thinking is the action, and not the essence of the soul ? since the operations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission, but the éssences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation. But this by the by.
CHA P. XX.
Of Nlodes of Pleasure and Pain. 1. MONGST the simple ideas, Pleasure and which we receive both from pain simple
ideas, sensation and reflection, pain and pleasure are two very considerable ones. For as in the body there is sensation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain or pleasure ; so the thought or perception of the mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you please, These, like other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the simple ideas of the senses, only by experience. For to define them by the presence of good or evil, is no otherwise to make them known to us, than
by, making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves, upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to or considered by us.
§. 2. Things then are good or evil, only Good and evil, what.
in reference to pleasure or pain. That we
call good, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good, or absence of any evil. And on the contrary, we name that evil, which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us; or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleasure and pain, I must be understood to mean of body or mind, as they are commonly distinguished; though in truth they be only different constitutions of the mind, sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body, sometimes by thoughts of the mind. Our passions
S. 3. Pleasure and pain, and that which moved by causes them, good and evil, are the hinges
on which our passions turn: and if we reevil.
flect on ourselves, and observe how these, under various considerations, operate in us; what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal sensations (if I may so call tltem) they produce in us, we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our passions. Love.
:.. 5. 4. Thus any one reflecting upon thie
thought he has of the delight, which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call love. For when a man declares in autumn, when he is eating them, or in spring, when there are pone, that he loves grapes, it is no more but that the taste of grapes delights him; let an alteration of health or constitution destroy the delight of their taste, and he then can be said to love grapes no longer. Hatred.
$. 5. On the contrary, the thought of
the pain, which any thing present or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call hatred. Were it my business here to inquire any farther than into the bare ideas of our passions, as they depend on different modifications of pleasure and pain, I should remark,
that our love and hatred of inanimate insensible beings,
For whatsoever good is proposed, if its absence carries no displeasure or pain with it, if a man be easy and content without it, there is no desire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare velleity, the term used to signify the lowest degree of desire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is so little uneasiness in the absence of any thing, that it carries a man no farther than some faint wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous use of the means to attain it. Desire also is stopped or abated by the opinion of the impossibility or unattainableness of the good proposed, as far as the uneasiness is cured or allayed by that consideration. This might carry our thoughts farther, were it seasonable in this place.
§. 7. Joy is a delight of the mind, from
very well-being of his children causes delight, is always as long as his children are in such a state, in the possession of that good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that pleasure.
9. 8. Sorrow is uneasiness in the mind, Sorrow.
upon the thought of a good lost, which might liave been enjoyed longer; or the sense of a present evil.
6. 9. Hope is that pleasure in the mind, Hope.
which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight in. Fear.
s. 10. Fear is an uneasiness of the mind,
upon the thought of future evil likely to befal us. Despair.
§. 11. Despair is the thought of the un
attainableness of any good, which works differently in men's minds, sometimes producing uneasiness or pain, sometimes rest and indolency.e Anger.
§. 19. Anger is uneasiness or discompo
sure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a present purpose of revenge. Eivy.
§. 13. Envy is an uneasiness of the mind,
caused by the consideration of a good we desire, obtained by one we think should not have had it betore us.
$. 14. These two last, envy and anger, sions all men not being caused by pain and pleasure, simhave. ply in themselves, but having in them some mixed considerations of ourselves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, iş wanting in them: but all the rest terminating purely in pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we love, desire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in respect of pain ultimately: in fine, all these passions are moved *by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasiere and pain, or to have pleasure or pain some way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject (at least if a sensible or