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thing to be, and not to be?” And a great part of illiterate people, and savages, pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general propositions. I grant, men come not to the knowledge of these general and more abstract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so, be. cause, till after they come to the use of reason, those general abstract ideas are not framed in the mind, about which those general maxims are, which are mistaken for innate principles; but are indeed discoveries made, and verities introduced and brought into the mind by the same way, and discovered by the same steps, as several other propositions, which nobody was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this discourse. I allow therefore a necessity, that men should come to the use of reason before they get the knowledge of those general truths; but deny, that men's coming to the use of reason is the time of their discovery.
. 13. In the mean time it is observable, By this they that this saying, That men know and assent
are not dis,
tinguished to these maxims, when they come to the
from other use of reason, amounts in reality of fact to knowable no more but this, That they are never
truths. known or taken notice of, before the use of reason, but may possibly be assented to, some time after, during a man's life; but when, is uncertain : and so may all other knowable truths, as well as these; which therefore have no advantage nor distinction from others, by this note of being known when we come to the use of reason; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary. §. 14. But, secondly, were it true, that If coming to
the use of the precise time of their being known, and assented to, were, when men come to the
the time of use of reason, neither would that prove their discothem innate. This way of arguing is as
very, it would
not prove frivolous, as the supposition of itself is false.
them innate. For by what kind of logic will it appear,
that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first constitution, because it comes first to be observed and assented to, when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a distinct province, begins to exert itselt? And therefore, the coming to the use of speech, if it were supposed the time that these maxims are first assented to (which it may be with as much truth, as the time when men come to the use of reason) would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to say, they are innate, because men assent to them, when they come to the use of reason. I agree then with these men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exercise of reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of reason is the precise time when they are first taken notice of; and if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them innate. All that can with any truth be meant by this proposition, that men assent to them when they come to the use of reason, is no more but this, that the inaking of general abstract ideas, and the understanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it, children commonly get not those general ideas, nor learn the names that stand for them, till, having for a good while exercised their reason about familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their ordinary discourse and actions. with others, acknowlcdged to be capable of rational conversation. If assenting to these maxims, when men come to the use of reason, can be true in any other sense, I desire it may be shown; or at least, how in this, or any other sense, it proves them imate. The steps by
$. 15. The senses at first let in particular which the
ideas, and furnish the yet einpty cabinet; mind attains and the mind by degrees growing familiar several truths with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind, proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty : and the use of reason becomes daily more visible, as these materials, that give it einployment, encrease. But though the having of general ideas, and the use of general words and reason, usually grow together; yet, I see not, how this any way proves thein innate. The knowledge of some truths, I contess, is very early in the inind; but in a way that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired : It being about those first which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earliest to do, which make the most frequent inpressions on their senses. In ideas thus got, the mind discovers that some agree, and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of memory; as soon as it is able to retain and perceive distinct ideas. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the use of words, or comes to that, which we commonly call “the use of reason.' For a child knows as certainly, before it can speak, the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter (i. e. that sweet is not bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that wormwood and sugar-plums are not the same thing.
§. 16. A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he comes to be able to count seven, and has got the name and idea of equality: and then, upon explaining those words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the truth of that proposition. But neither docs he then readily assent, because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting till then, because he wanted the use of reason; but the truth of it appears to him, as soon as he has settled in his inind the clear and distinct ideas, that these names stand for : and then he knows the truth of that proposition, upon the same grounds, and by the same means, that he knew before, that a rod and a cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same grounds also, that he may come to know afterwards, " that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be," as shall be more fully shown here
after. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas, about which those maxims are; or to know the signification of those general terms that stand for them ; or to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for; the later also will it be before he comes to assent to those maxims, whose terms, with the ideas they stand for, being no more innate than those of a cat or a weesel, he must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the first occasion that shall make him put together those ideas in his mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree, according as is expressed in those propositions. And therefore it is, that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-seven, by the same selfevidence, that he knows one and two to be equal to three : yet a child knows this not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of reason, but because the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty-seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those which are signified by one, two, and three.
$. 17. This evasion therefore of general Assenting as soon as pro- assent, when men come to the use of reaposed and son, failing as it does, and leaving no difunderstood, ference between those supposed innate, and proves them not innate.
other truths, that are afterwards acquired
and learnt, men have endeavoured to secure an universal assent to those they call maxims, by saying, they are generally assented to as soon as proposed, and the terms they are proposed in, understood: seeing all men, even children, as soon as they hear and understand the terms, assent to these propositions, they think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For since men never fail, after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these propositions were first lodged in the understanding, which, without any teaching, the mind, at the very first proposal, immediately closes with, and assents to, and after that never doubts again.
$. 18. In answer to this, I demand “whe- If such an asther ready assent given to a proposition sent be a .nark upon first hearing, and understanding the then that terms, be a certain mark of an innate prin- one and we ciple?" If it be not, such a general assent is are equal to in vain urged as a proof of them: if it be three; that said, that it is a mark of innate, they must not bitterthen allow all such propositions to be in- ness ;” and a nate, which are generally assented to as soon thousand the as heard, whereby they will find themselves like, must be
innate. plentifully stored with innate principles. for upon the same ground, viz. of assent at first hearing and understanding the terms, that men would have those maxims pass for innate, they must also admit several propositions about numbers to be innate: and thus, that one and two are equal to three; that two and two are equal to four ; and a multitude of other the like propositions in numbers, that every body assents to at first hearing and understanding the terms, must have a place amongst these innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and propositions made about several of them ; but even natural philosophy, and all the other sciences, afford propositions, which are sure to meet with assent as soon as they are understood. That two bodies cannot be in the same place, is a truth, that nobody any more sticks at, than at these maxims, “ that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; that white is not black; that a square is not a circle; that yellowness is not sweetness :" these and a million of such other propositions, as many at least as we have distinct ideas of, every man in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing what the names stand for, must necessarily assent to. If these men will be true to their own rule, and have assent at first hearing and understanding the terms, to be a mark of innate, they must allow, not only as many innate propositions as men have distinct ideas; but as inany as men can make propositions wherein different ideas are denied one of another. Since every proposition, wherein one different idea is denied of another, C4