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rit is unknown to us; and so is the substance of body
equally unknown to us. Two primary qualities or
properties of body, viz. solid coherent parts and im-
pulse, we have distinct clear ideas of: so likewise
we know, and have distinct clear ideas of two primary
qualities or properties of spirit, viz. thinking, and a
power of action ; i. e. a power of beginning or stop-
ping several thoughts or motions. We have also the
ideas of several qualities inherent in bodies, and have
the clear distinct ideas of them ; which qualities are but
the various modifications of the extension of cohering
solid parts, and their motion. We have likewise the
ideas of the several modes of thinking, viz. believing,
doubting, intending, fearing, hoping; all which are
but the several modes of thinking. We have also the
ideas of willing, and moving the body consequent to
it, and with the body itself too; for, as has been shown,
spirit is capable of motion.
§. 31. Lastly, if this notion of imma-

The notion terial spirit may have perhaps some diffi

of spirit in culties in it not easy to be explained, we volves no have therefore no more reason to deny or

more diffi. doubt the existence of such spirits, than culty in it

than that of we have to deny or doubt the existence of body. body; because the notion of body is cumbered with some difficulties very hard, and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us. For I would fain have instanced any thing in our notion of spirit more perplexed, or nearer a contradiction, than

the very notion of body includes in it: the divisibility hd in infinitum of any finite extension involving us, whe

ther we grant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated or made in our apprehensions consistent; consequences that carry greater difficulty, and more apparent absurdity, than any thing can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance, $. 32. Which we are not at all to won

We know der at, since we having but some few super- nothing beficial ideas of things, discovered to us only simple ideas. by the senses from without, or by the mind, reticcting on what it experiments in itself withX 3


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in, have no knowledge beyond that, much less of the
internal constitution, and true nature of things, being
destitute of faculties to attain it. And therefore expe-
rimenting and discovering in ourselves knowledge, and
the power of voluntary motion, as certainly as we ex-
periment, or discover in things without us, the cohe-
sion and separation of solid parts, which is the exten-
sion and motion of bodies; we have as much reason to
be satisfied with our notion of immaterial spirit, as
with our notion of body, and the existence of the one
as well as the other. Tor it being no more a contra-
diction that thinking should exist, separate and inde-
pendent from solidity, than it is a contradiction that
solidity should exist, separate and independent from
thinking, they being both but simple ideas, inde-
pendent one from another; and having as clear and
distinct ideas in us of thinking, as of solidity: I
know not why we may not as well allow a thinking
thing without solidity, i. e. immaterial, to exist, as a
solid thing without thinking, i. e. matter, to exist;
especially since it is not harder to conceive how think-
ing should exist without matter, than how matter should
think.. For whensoever we would proceed beyond these
simple ideas we have from sensation and reflection, and
dive farther into the nature of things, we fall presently
into darkness and obscurity, perplexedness and difficul-
ties; and can discover nothing farther but our own
blindness and ignorance. But whichever of these com-
plex ideas be clearest, that of body, or immaterial spi-
rit, this is evident, that the simple ideas that make
them up are no other than what we have received from
sensation or reflection: and so is it of all our other ideas
of substances, even of God himself.
Idea of God.

$. 33. For if we examine the idea we

have of the incomprehensible supreme being, we shall find, that we come by it the same way; and that the complex ideas we have both of God and separate spirits are made up of the simple ideas we receive from reflection: v. g. having, from what we experiment in ourselves, got the ideas of existence and duration; of knowledge and power; of pleasure and happiness; and of several other qualities and powers,

which it is better to have than to be without when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the supreme being, we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity; and so putting them together, make our complex idea of God. For that the mind has such à power of enlarging some of its ideas, received from sensation and reflection, has been already shown.

Ş. 34. If I find that I know some few things, and some of them, or all, perhaps imperfectly, I can frame an idea of knowing twice as many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to number; and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge, by extending its comprehension to all things existing, or possible. The same also I can do of knowing them more perfectly; i. e. all their qualities, powers, causes, consequenccs, and relations, &c. till all be perfectly known that is in them, or can any way relate to them; and thus frame the idea of infinite or boundless knowledge. The same may also be done of power, till we come to that we call infinite; and also of the duration of existence, without beginning or end; and so frame the idea of an eternal being. The degrees or extent wherein we ascribe existence, power, wisdom, and all other perfections (which we can Irave any ideas of) to that sovereign being which we call God, being all boundless and intinite, we frame the best idea of him our minds are capable of: all which is done, I say, by enlarging those simple ideas we have taken from tlie operations of our own minds, by retection ; or by our senses, from exterior things ; to that vastness to which infinity can extend them.

§. 35. For it is infinity, which joined to Idea of God. our ideas of existence, power, knowledge, &c. makes that complex idea, whereby we represent to ourselves, the best ire can, the supreme being. For though in his own essence (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real essence of a pebble, or a fly, or of our own selves) God be simple and uncompounded; yet, I think, I may say we have no other idea

of him, but a complex one of existence, knowledge, , power, happiness, &c. infinite and eternal: which are X 1


all distinct ideas, and some of them, being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been shown, originally got from sensation and reflection, go to make up the idea or notion we have of God.

$. 36. This farther is to be observed, No idea in

that there is no idea we attribute to God, our complex oneofspirits

, bating infinity, which is not also a part of but those got our complex idea of other spirits. Because from sensa.

being capable of no other simple ideas, betion or reflection.

longing to any thing but body, but those

which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to spirits no other but what we receive from thence : and all the difference we can put between them in our contemplation of spirits, is only in the several extents and degrees of their knowledge, power, duration, happiness, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of spirits, as of other things, we are restrained to those we receive from sensation and reflection, is evident from hence, that in our ideas of spirits, how much soever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies, even to that of infinite, we camot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they discover their thoughts one to another: though we must necessarily conclude, that separate spirits, which are beings that have perfcéter knowledge and greater happiness than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal signs and particular sounds; which are therefore of most general use, as being the best and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate communication, having no experiment in ourselves, and consequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how spirits, which use not words, can with quickness, or much less how spirits, that have no bodies, can be masters of their own thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleasure, though we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such a power. Recapitula. §. 37. And thus we have seen, what kind tion. of ideas we have of substances of all kinds, wherein they consist, and how we came by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,


First, That all our ideas of the several sorts of substances are nothing but collections of simple ideas, with a supposition of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist; though of this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all.

Secondly, That all the simple ideas, that thus united in one common substratum make up our complex ideas of several sorts of substances, are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection. So that even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted with, and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged conceptions, we cannot go beyond those siinple ideas. And even in those which seem most remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely surpass any thing we can perceive in ourselves by reflection, or discover by sensation in other things, we can attain to nothing but those simple ideas, which we originally received from sensation or reflection; as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels, and particularly of God himself.

Thirdly, That most of the simple ideas, that make up our complex ideas of substances, when truly considered, are only powers, however we are apt to take them for positive qualities ; v. g. the greatest part of the ideas that make our complex idea of gold are yellowness, great weight, ductility, fusibility and solubility in aqua regia, &c. all mited together in an unknown substratum: all which ideas are nothing else but so many relations to other substances, and are not really in the gold, considered barely in itself, though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution, whereby it has a fitness differently to operate, and be operated on by several other substances.

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