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Of collective Ideas of Substances. One idea. §. 1. BESIDES these complex ideas of

several single substances, as of man, horse, gold, violet, apple, &c. the mind hath also complex collective ideas of substances ; which I so call, because such ideas are made up of many particular substances considered together, as united into one idea, and which so joined are looked on as one; v. g. the idea of such a collection of men as make an army, though consisting of a great number of distinct substances, is as much one idea, as the idea of a man: and the great collective idea of all bodies whatsoever, signified by the name world, is as much one idea, as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it; it sufficing to the unity of any idea, that it be considered as one represensation or picture, though made up of ever so many particulars. Made by the

§. 2. These collective ideas of substances power of

the mind makes by its power of composicomposing tion, and uniting severally cither simple or in the mind. coniplex ideas into one, as it does by the same faculty make the complex ideas of particular substances, consisting of an aggregate of divers simple ideas, united in one substance : and as the mind, by putting together the repeated ideas of unity, makes the collective mode, or complex idea of any number, as a score, or a gross, &c. so by putting together several particular substances, it makes collective ideas of substances, as a troop, an army, a swarm, a city, a fleet; each of which, every one finds, that he represents to his own mind by one idca, in one view; and so under that notion considers those several things as .perfectly one, as one ship, or one atom. Nor is it harder to conceive, how an army of ten thousand men should make one idea, than how a man should make one idea: it being as easy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great


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number of men, and consider it as one, as it is to unite into one particular all the distinct ideas that make up the composition of a man, and consider them all together as one.

§. 3. Amongst such kind of collective All artificial ideas, are to be counted most part of arti- things are

collective ficial things, at least such of them as are

ideas. made up of distinct substances: and, in truth, if we consider all these collective ideas aright, as army, constellation, universe, as they are united into 80 many single ideas, they are but the artificial draughts of the mind; bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one view, the better to contemplate and discourse of thein, united into one conception, and signified by one naine. For there are no things so remote, nor so contrary, which the mind cannot, by this art of composition, bring into one idea; as is visible in that signified by the universe.

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Of Relation

$. ESIDES the ideas, whether sim

Relation ple or complex, that the mind what. has of things, as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The understanding, in the consideration of any thing, is not confined to that precise object: it can carry any idea as it were beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other. When the mind so considers one thing, that it does as it were bring it to and set it by another, and carry its view from one to the other: this is, as the words import, relation and respect; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it, are wligt we call relatives: and the things, so brought


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together, related. Thus, when the mind considers
Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing into that
idea, but what really exists in Caius; V. g. when I
consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but
the complex idea of the species, man. So likewise,
when I say Caius is a white man, I have nothing but
the bare consideration of a man who hath that white
colour. But when I give Caius the name husband, I
intimate some other person; and when I give him the
name whiter, I intimate some other thing: in both
cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius,
and there are two things brought into consideration.
And since any idea, whether simple or complex, may be
the occasion why the mind thus brings two things to-
gether, and as it were takes a view of them at once,
though still considered as distinct; therefore any of our
ideas may be the foundation of relation. As in the
above-mentioned instance, the contract and ceremony
of marriage with Sempronia is the occasion of the de-
nomination or relation of husband; and the colour
white the occasion why he is said to be whiter than

§. 2. These, and the like relations, exwithout cor. pressed by relative terms, that have others relative answering them, with a reciprocal intimaterms not

tion, as father and son, bigger and less, easily per.

cause and effect, are very obvious to every ceived.

one, and every body at first sight perceives the relation. For father and son, husband and wife, and such other correlative terins, scem so nearly to belong one to another, and through custom do so readily chime and answer one another in people's memories, that, upon the naming of either of them, the thoughts are presently carried beyond the thing so named ; and no-body overlooks or doubts of a relation, where it is so plainly intimated. But where languages have failed to give correlative names, there the relation is not always so easily taken notice of. Concubine is, no doubt, a relative nanie, as well as wife: but in languages where this, and the like words, have not a correlative term, there people are not so apt to take them


contain rela.

to be so, as wanting that evident mark of relation which is between correlatives, which seem to explain one another, and not tú be able to exist, but together. Hence it is, that many of those names which, duly considered, do include evident relations, have been called external denominations. But all names, that are more than empty sounds, must signify some idea, which is either in the thing to which the name is applied; and then it is positive, and is looked on as united to, and existing in the thing to which the denomination is given : or else it arises from the respect the mind finds in it to something distinct from it, with which it considers it; and then it concludes a relation. 9. 3. Another sort of relative terms there

Some seem. is, which are not looked on to be either ingly absorelative, or so much as external denomina- lute terms tions; which yet, under the form and ap

tions, pearance of signifying something absolute in the subject, do conceal a tacit, though less observable relation. Such are the seemingly positive terms of old, great, imperfect, &c. whereof I shall have occasion to speak more at large in the following chapters.

§. 4. This farther may be observed, that. Relation dif. the ideas of relation may be the same in ferent from men, who have far different ideas of the the things re. things that are related, or that are thus lated. compared; v. g. those who have far different ideas of a man, may yet agree in the notion of a father: which is a notion superinduced to the substance, or man, and refers only to an act of that thing called man, whereby he contributed to the generation of one of his own kind, let man be what it will. 6. 5. The nature therefore of relation

Change of consists in the referring or comparing two things one to another; from which com- be without parison, one or both comes to be denomi- any change nated. And if either of those things be inthesubject. removed or cease to be, the relation ceases, and the denomination consequent to it, though the other receive in itself no alteration at all: v. g. Caius, whom I consider to-day as a father, ceases to be so to-morrow, only


relation may

by the death of his son, without any alteration made in himself. Nay, barely by the mind's changing the object to which it compares any thing, the same thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the same time : v. g. Caius, compared to several persons, may truly be said to be older and younger, stronger and weaker, &c.

5. 6. Whatsoever dotlı or can exist, or be Relation

considered as one thing, is positive; and only betwixt two things. so not only simple ideas and substances, but

modes also, are positive beings: though the parts of which they consist are very often relative one to another ; but the whole together considered as one thing, and producing in us the complex idea of one thing, which idea is in our minds, as one picture, though an aggregate of divers parts, and under one name, it is a positive or absolute thing, or idea. Thus a triangle, though the parts thereof compared one to another be relative, yet the idea of the whole is a positive absolute idea. The same may be said of a family, a tune, &c. for there can be no relation, but betwixt two things considered as two things. There must always be in relation two ideas, or things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their comparison. $. 7. Concerning relation in general

, these All things

things inay be considered. Capabie of selacion,

First, that there is no one thing, whe

ther simple idea, substance, mode, or relation, or name of either of them, which is not capable of almost an infinite number of considerations, in retorence to other things; , and therefore this makes no small part of men's thoughts and words : v. g. one single man may at once be concerned in, and sustain all these following relations, and many more, viz. father, brother, son, grandfather, grandson, father-in-law, son-inlaw, husband, friend, enemy, subject, general, judge

, patron, client, professor, European, Englishman, islander, servant, master; possessor, captain, superior, interior, e bjoger, less, older, younger, contemporary, like, unlile, &c. to an alinost infinite number: le being ca


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