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nization, which is fit to convey that common life to all the parts so united.
§. 5. The case is not so much different Identity of in brutes, but that any one may hence see
animals. what makes an animal, and continues it the same. Something we have like this in machines, and may serye to illustrate it. For example, what is a watch? It is plain it is nothing but a fit organization, or construction of parts to a certain end, which when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain, If we would suppose this machine one continued body, all whose organized parts were repaired, increased or diminished by a constant addition or separation of in, sensible parts, with one common life, we should have something very much like the body of an animal; with this difference, that in an animal the fitness of the organization, and the motion wherein life consists, begin together, the motion coming from within ; but in machines, the force coming sensibly from without, is often away when the organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.
$. 6. This also shows wherein the iden- Identity of țity of the same man consists : viz. in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body. He that shall place the identity of man in any thing else, but like that of other animals in one titly organized body, taken in any one instant, and from thence continued under one organization of life in several successively fleeting particles of matter united to will find it hard to make an embryo, one of years, mad and sober, the same man, by any supposition, that will not make it possible for Seth, Ismael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Cæsar Borgia, to be the same man. For if the identity of soul alone makes the same man, and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be possible that those men living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the same man: which way of speaking must be, from a very strange
use of the word man, applied to an idea, out of which body and shape are excluded. And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers who allow of transmigration, and are of opinion that the souls of men may, for their miscarriages, be detruded into the bodies of beasts, as fit habitations, with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet I think, no-body could he be sure that the soul of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, would yet say that hog were a man or Heliogabalus.
$. 7. It is not therefore unity of subIdentity
stance that comprehends all sorts of idensuited to the idea,
tity, or will determine it in every case :
but to conceive and judge of it aright, we must consider what idea the word it is applied to stands for; it being one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a third the same person, if person, man, and substance are three names standing for three different ideas; for such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be the identity: which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would possibly have prevented a great deal of that confusion, which often occurs about this matter, with no small seeming difficulties, especially concerning personal identity, which therefore we shall in the next place a little consider.
$. 8. An animal is a living organized Same man.
body; and consequently the same animal, as we have observed, is the same continued life communicated to different particles of matter, as they bappen successively to be united to that organized living body. And whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenuous observation puts it past doubt, that the idea in our minds, of which the sound man in our mouths is the sign, is nothing else but of an animal of such a certain form : since I think I may be confident, that whoever should see a creature of his own shape and make, though it had no more reason all its life than a cat or a parrot, would call him still a man; or whoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse, reason and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a cat or a parrot; and say, the one was a dull irrational man, and the other a very intelligent rational parrot. A relation we have in an author of great note is sufficient to countenance the supposition of a rational parrot. His words are * :
" I had a mind to know from prince Maurice's own “ mouth the account of a common, but much credited
story, that I heard so often from many others, of ” an old parrot he had in Brazil during his govern
ment there, that spoke, and asked, and answered “ common questions like a reasonable creature : so that " those of his train there generally concluded it to be “ witchery or possession; and one of his chaplains, who " lived long afterwards in Holland, would never from " that time endure a parrot, but said, they all had a “ devil in them. I had heard many particulars of this
story, and assevered by people hard to be discredited, " which made me ask prince Maurice what there was of it.
He said, with his usual plainness and dryness “ in talk, there was something true, but a great deal “ false of what had been reported. I desired to know “ of him what there was of the first? He told me short " and coldly, that he had heard of such an old parrot “ when he had been at Brazil; and though he believed
nothing of it, and it was a good way off, yet he had so much curiosity as to send for it: that it was a very great and a very old one, and when it came first into the room where the prince was, with a great many Dutchmen about him, it said presently, What
a company of white men are here! They asked it “ what it thoaght that man was, pointing to the prince ? “ It answered, soine general or other; when they “ brought it close to him, he asked it, † D'ou venez
* Memoirs of what passed in Christendom from 1672 to 1679, p. 1 + Whence come ye? It answered, From Marinnan.
The Prince, To whom do you belong? The parrot, To a Portuguese. Prince, What do you there ? Parrot, I look after the chickens. The Prince Laughed and said, You look after the chickens: The parrot answered, Yes, I, and I kuow well enough how to do it,
“ vous ?
$6 vous? It answered, De Marinnan. The prince, A " qui estes vous. The parrot, A un Portugais. Prince, “ Que fais tu la? Parrot, Je garde les poulles. The
prince laughed, and said, Vous gardez les poulles? « Thie parrot answered, Oui, moi; et je sçai bien faire; " and made the chuck four or five times that people
use to make to chickens when they call them. I set “ down the words of this worthy dialogue in French, “ just as prince Maurice said them to me. I asked “him in what language the parrot spoke, and he said, “ in Brasilian; I asked whether he understood Brasi“lian ; he said, no, but he had taken care to have two “ interpreters by him, the one a Dutchman that spoke “ Brasilian, and the other a Brasilian that spoke * Dutch; that he asked them separately and privately, “and both of them agreed in telling him just the same
thing that the parrot had said. I could not but tell “this odd story, because it is so much out of the way, * and from the first hand, and what may pass for a good
one; for I dare say this prince at least believed hims self in ail he told me, having ever passed for a very “honest and pious man.
I leave it to naturalists to “reason, and to other men to believe, as they please hou
upon it: however, it is not, perhaps, amiss to relieve “or enliven a busy scene sometimes with such digressions, whether to the purpose or no.”
I have taken care that tire reader should Sanre man.
have the story at large in the author's own words, because he seems to me not to have thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagined that so able a man as he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the testimonies he gives of himself, should take so much pains, in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin so close not only on a man whom he mentions as his friend, but on a prince in whom he acknowledges very great honesty and piety, a story, which if he himselt thought incredible, he could not but also think ridiculous. The prince, it is plain, who vouches this story, and our author, who relates it from him, both of them call this talker a parrot: and I ask any one else, who thinks such a story. fit to be told, whether if this parrot, and all of its kind, had always talked, as we have a prince's word for it this one did, whether, I say, they would not have passed for a race of rational animals : but yet whether for all that they would have been allowed to be men, and not parrots ? For I presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the idea of a man in most people's sense, but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it: and if that be the idea of a man, the same successive body not shifted all at once, must, as well as the same immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man. $. 9. This being premised, to find wherein
Personal personal identity consists, we must consider
identity, what person stands for ; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present serie sations and perceptions: and by this every one is to himself that which he calls self; it not being cousidered in this case whether the same self be continued in the same or divers substances. For since consciousness always accoinpanies thinking, and it is that which niakes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists personal identity, i. e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person ; it is the same seif now it was then; and it is by the saine self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done. §. 10. But it is farther inquired, whe
Conscious. ther it be the same identical substance?
ness makes This few would think they had reason to personal doubt of, if these perceptions, with their identity.