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Secondly, adequate or inadequate. : Thirdly, true or false.
First, by real ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes. Fantastical or chimerical I call such as have no foundation in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes. If we examine the several sorts of ideas before-inentioned, we shall find, that,
§. 2. First, our simple ideas are all real, Simple ideas
all agree to the reality of things, not that
they are all of them the images or representations of what does exist; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been already shown. But though whiteness and coldness are no inore in snow than pain is; yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness, pain, &c. being in us the effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker to produce in us such sensations; they are real ideas in us, whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves. For these several appearances being designed to be the mark, whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with, our idcas do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing characters, whether they be only constant effects, or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves; the reality lying in that steady correspondence they have with the distinct. constitutions of real beings. But whether they answer to those constitutions, as to causes or patterns, it matters not; it suffices that they are constantly produced by thein. And thus our siinple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree to those powers of things which produce them in our minds; tivat being all that is requisite to make them real, and not fictions at pleasure. For in simple ideas (as has been shown) the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itself no simple idea, more than what it has received.
§. 3. Though the mind be wholly pas, Complex sive in respect of its siinple ideas; yet I ideas are vo think, we may say, it is not so in respect
binatione. of its complex ideas; for those being combinations of simple ideas put together, and united under one general name; it is plain that the mind of man uses some kind of liberty, in forming those complex ideas: how else comes it to pass that one man's idea of gold, or justice, is different from another's? but because he has put in, or left out of his, some simple idea, which the other has not. The question: then is, which of these are real, and which barely imaginary combinations ? What collections agree to the reality of things, and what not? And to this I say, That, §. 4. Secondly, mixed modes and rela
Mixed tions have no other reality but what they modes made have in the minds of men, there is nothing of consistent more required to this kind of ideas to
real. make them real, but that they be so frained, that there be a possibility of existing conformable to thein. These ideas themselves, being archetypes, cannot differ from their archetypes, and so cannot be chimerical, unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent ideas. Indeed, as any of them have the names of a known language assigned to them, by which he that has them in his mind would signify them to others, so bare possibility of existing is not enough; they must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name that is given them, that they may not be of justice to that idea, which common use calls libe
hamë rality. Put this fantasticalness relates more to propriety of speech, than reality of ideas: for a man to be undisturbed in danger, sedately to consider what is tittest to be done, and to execute it steadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex idea of an action which may exist. But to be undisturbed in danger, without using one's reason or industry, is what is also possible to be; and so is as real an idea as the other. Though the first of
these, having the name courage given to it, may, in respect of that name, be a right or wrong idea : but the other, whilst it has not a common received name of any known language assigned to it, is not capable of any deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but itself.
§. 5. Thirdly, our complex ideas of subIdeas of sub
stances being made all of them in reference seal, when to things existing without us, and intended they agree
to be representations of substances, as they with the ex. really are; are no farther real, than as they istence of things.
are such combinations of simple ideas, as
are really united, and co-exist in things without us. On the contrary, those are fantastical which are made up of such collections of simple ideas as were really never united, never were found together in any substance; v. g. a rational creature, consisting of a horse's head, joined to a body of human shape, or such as the centaurs are described : or, a body yellow, very malleable, fusible, and fixed; but lighter than coinmon water : or an uniform, unorganized body, consisting, as to sense, all of similar parts, with perception and voluntary motion joined to it Whether such substances as these can possibly exist or no, it is probable we do not know: but be that as it will, these ideas of substances being made conformable to no pattern existing that we know, and consisting of such collections of ideas, as no substance ever showed us united together, they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary; but much more are those complex ideas so, which contain in them any inconsistency or contradiction of their parts.
such as perfectly repre.
Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.
F our real ideas, some are ade Adequate
quate, and some are inadequate. ideas are Those I call adequate, which perfectly represent those archetypes which the mind
sent their supposes them taken from; which it in- archetypes. tends them to stand for, and to which it refers thein. Inadequate ideas are such, which are but a partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain, §. 2. First, that all our simple ideas are
Simple ideas adequate. Because being nothing but the all adequate. effects of certain powers in things, fitted and ordained by God to produce such sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers: and we are sure they agree to the reality of things. For if sugar produce in us the ideas which we call whiteness and sweetness, we are sure there is a power in sugar to produce those ideas in our minds, or else they could not have been produced by it. And so each sensation answering the power that operates on any of our senses, the idea so produced is a real idea, (and not a fiction of the mind, which has no power to produce any simple idea;) and cannot but be adequate, since it ought only to answer that power: and so all simple ideas are adequate. It is true, the things producing in us these simple ideas are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the causes of them; but as if those ideas were real beings in them. For though fire be called painful to the touch, whereby is signified the power of producing in us the idea of pain, yet it is denominated also light and hot; as if light and heat were really something in the fire more than a power to excite these ideas in us; and therefore are called qualities in, or of the fire. But these being
nothing, in truth, but powers to excite such ideas in
V. 3. . Secondly, our complex ideas of adequate.
inodes, being voluntary collections of sim
ple ideas, which the mind puts together without reference to any real archetypes or standing patterns existing any-where, are and cannot but be adequate ideas. Because they not being intended for copies of things. really existing, but for archetypes made by the mind to rank and denominate things by, cannot want any thing: they having each of them that combination of ideas, and thereby that perfection which the mind intended they should : so that the mind acquiesces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the idea of a figure, with three sides meeting at thee angles, I have a compleat idea, wherein I require nothing else to make it perfect. That the