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are innate, when the ideas about which they are can by no means be supposed to be so. The general reception and assent that is given doth not at all prove that the ideas expressed in them are innate : for in many cases, however the ideas came there, the assent to words expressing the agreement or disagreement of such ideas, will necessarily follow. Every one, that hath a true idea of God and worship, will assent to this proposition, " that God is to be worshipped,” when expressed in a language he understands : and every rational man, that hath not thought on it to-day, may be ready to assent to this proposition to-morrow; and yet millions of men may be well supposed to want one or both those ideas to-day. For it we will allow savages and most country people to have ideas of God and worship, (which conversation with them will not make one forward to believe) yet I think few children can be supposed to have those ideas, which therefore they must begin to have some time or other; and then they will also begin to assent to that proposition, and make very little question of it ever after. But such an assent upon hearing no more proves the ideas to be innate, than it does that one born blind (with cataracts, which will be couched to-morrow) had the innate, ideas of the sun, or light, or saftion, or yellow; because, when his sight is cleared, he will certainly assent to this proposition, “ that the sun is lucid, or that saffron is yellow :" and therefore, if such an assent upon hearing cannot prove the ideas innate, it can much less the propositions made up of those ideas. If they have

If they have any innate ideas, I would be glad to be told what, and how many they are. 1. 20. To which let me add: If there be

No innate any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind, ideas in the which the mind does not actually think on, meinory. they must be lodged in the meinory, and from thence must be brought into view by remembrance; i. e. must be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the inind before, unless remembrance can be without remembrance. For to remember is to perceive any thing with memory, or with a

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consciousness,

consciousness, that it was known or perceived before :
without this, whatever idea comes into the mind is
new, and not remembered; this consciousness of its
having been in the mind before being that which dis-
tinguishes remembering from all other ways of think-
ing. Whatever idea was never perceived by the mind,
was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind,
is either an actual perception; or else, having been an
actual perception, is so in the mind, that by the me-
mory it can be made an actual perception again.
Whenever there is the actual perception of an idea
without memory, the idea appears perfectly new and
unknown before to the understanding, Whenever the
memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with a
consciousness, that it had been there before, and was
not wholly a stranger to the mind. Whether this be
not so, I appeal to every one's observation : and then I
desire an instance of an idea, pretended to be innate,
which (before any impression of it by ways hereafter to
be mentioned) any one could revive and remember as
an idea he had formerly known ; without which consci-
ousness of a former perception there is no remem-
brance; and whatever idea comes into the mind with-
out that consciousnes is not remembered, or comes
not out of the memory, nor can be said to be in the
mind before that appearance : for what is not either
actually in view, or in the memory, is in the mind no
way at all, and is all one as if he had never been there.
Suppose a child had the use of his eyes, till he knows
and distinguishes colours; but then cataracts shut the
windows, and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the
dark, and in that time perfectly loses all memory of
the ideas of colours he once had. This was the case
of a blind man I once talked with, who lost his sight
by the small-pox when he was a child, and had no more
notion of colours than one born blind. I ask, whether
any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours
in his mind, any more than one born blind? And I
link no-body will say, that either of them had in his

| any idea of colours at all. His cataracts are
ied, and then he has the ideas (which he remem-
not) of colours, de novo, by his restored sight

conveyed

conveyed to his mind, and that without any consciousness of a former acquaintance: and these now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this case all these ideas of colours, which when out of view can be revived with a consciousness of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory, are said to be in the mind. The use I make of this, is, that whatever idea, being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and if it be in the memory, it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view, without a perception that it comes out of the memory; which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembered. If therefore there be any innate ideas, they must be in the memory, or else no-where in the mind; and if they be in the meinory, they can be revived without any impression from without; and whenever they are brought into the mind, they are remembered, i. e. they bring with thein a perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a constant and distinguishing difference between what is, and what is not in the memory, or in the mind; that what is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever it is suggested by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried, whether there be any innate ideas in the mind, before impression from sensation or reflection. I would fain meet with the man, who when he came to the use of reason, or at any other time, remembered any one of them: and to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will say, there are ideas in the mind, that are not in the memory: I desire him to explain himself, and make what he says intelligible. . 21. Besides what I have already said,

Principles there is another reason why I doubt that

not innate, neither these nor any other principles are because of innate. I that am fully persuaded, that the little use or infinitely wise God made all things in per

little certainfect wisdom, cannot satisfy myself why he

should be supposed to print upon the minds of men some universal principles; whereof those that are pretended innate, and concern speculation, are of no great use; and those that concern practice, not self-evident

, and neither of them distinguishable from some other truths not allowed to be innate. For to what

For to what purpose should characters be graven on the mind by the finger of God, which are not clearer there than those which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be distinguished from them? If any one thinks there are such innate ideas and propositions, which by their clearness and usefulness are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind, and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us whịch they are, and then every one will be a fit judge whether they be so or no; since if there be such innate ideas and impressions, plainly different from all other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in himself

. Of the evidence of these supposed innate maxims I have spoken already; of their usefulness I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter. Difference of §. 22. To conclude: some ideas forwardly men's disco. offer themselves to all men's understand veries de.

ings; some sorts of truth result from any pends upon the different

ideas, as soon as the mind puts them into application propositions; other truths require a train of of their fa- ideas placed in order, a due comparing of culties.

them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be discovered and assented to. Some of the first sort, because of their general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate; but the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us than arts and sciences, though some of them indeed offer themselves to our faculties more readily than others, and therefore are more generally received: though that too be according as the organs of our bodies and powers

of our minds happen to be employed : God having fitted men with faculties and means to discover, receive, and retain truths, according as they are employed. The great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind is from the different use they put their faculties to; whilst some (and those the most) taking things

upon trust, misemploy their power of assent, by lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and doininiog of others in doctrines, which it is their duty carefully to examine, and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow. Others, employing their thoughts only about some few things, grow acquainted sufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their thoughts loose in the search of other inquiries. Thus, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is a truth as certain as any thing can be, and I think more evident than many of those propositions tint go for principles; and yet there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, because they never set their thoughts on work about such angles : and he that certainly knows this proposition, may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions, in mathematicks itself, which are as clear and evident as this; because, in his search of those mathematical truths, he stopped his thoughts short, and went not so far. The same may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a deity : for though there be no truth which a man may more evidently make out to himself than the existence of a God, yet he that shall content himself with things as he finds them, in this world, as they işinister to his pleasures and passions, and not make inquiry a little farther into their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention; may live long without any notion of such a being. And if any person hath by talk put such a notion into his head, he may perhaps believe it; hut if lie hath never examined it, his knowledge of it will be no perfeeter than his, who having been told, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon trust, without examining the demonstration ; and may yield his assent as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of it: which yet his faculties, if carefully employed, were able to make clear and evident to himn. But this only by the by, to show how much our knowledge depends upon the right use of