Mathematics, Science, and EpistemologyEditorsG++ introduction Part I Philosophy of Mathematics 1 Infinite regress and foundations of mathematics 2 A renaissance of empiricism in the recent philosophy of mathematics? 3 Cauchy and the continuum: the significance of non-standard analysis for the history and philosophy of mathematics 4 What does a mathematical proof prove? 5 The method of analysis-synthesis Part II Critical Papers 6 The problem of appraising scientific theories: three approaches 7 Necessity, Kineale and Popper 8 Changes in the problem of inductive logic 9 On Popperian historiography 10 Anomalies versus G++crucial experimentsG++ 11 Understanding Toulmin Part III Science and Education 12 A letter to the director of the London School of Economics 13 The teaching of the history of science 14 The social responsibility of science References Lakatos bibliography Indexes. |
Contents
Infinite regress and foundations of mathematics | 3 |
1 Stopping infinite regress in science | 4 |
by the logicotrivialization of mathematics | 10 |
3 by a trivial metatheory | 20 |
A renaissance of empiricism in the recent philosophy of mathematics? | 24 |
the new vogue in mathematical philosophy? | 25 |
2 Quasiempirical versus Euclidean theories | 28 |
3 Mathematics is quasiempirical | 30 |
Changes in the problem of inductive logic | 128 |
inductive justification and inductive method | 129 |
weak inductive justification degree of confirmation | 131 |
3 The weak and strong atheoretical theses | 138 |
confirmation theory without theories | 142 |
c The conflation of the weak and the strong atheoretical theses | 145 |
d The interconnection between the weak and strong atheoretical theses | 147 |
e A Carnapian logic of discovery | 149 |
4 Potential falsifiers in mathematics | 35 |
5 Periods of stagnation in the growth of quasiempirical theories | 41 |
Cauchy and the continuum the significance of nonstandard analysis for the history and philosophy of mathematics | 43 |
2 Cauchy and the problem of uniform convergence | 45 |
3 A new solution | 47 |
4 What caused the downfall of Leibnizs theory? | 53 |
5 Was Cauchy a forerunner of Robinson? | 55 |
6 Metaphysical versus technical | 58 |
7 Appraisal of mathematical theories | 59 |
What does a mathematical proof prove? | 61 |
The method of analysissynthesis | 70 |
b Analysissynthesis and heuristic | 72 |
c The Cartesian Circuit and its breakdown | 75 |
c1 The Circuit is neither empiricist nor intellectualist The source of knowledge is the Circuit as a whole | 77 |
c2 Induction and deduction in the Circuit | 79 |
c3 The continuity between Pappus and Descartes | 83 |
c4The Cartesian Circuit in mathematics | 88 |
how failed attempts at refutations may be heuristic starting points of research programmes | 93 |
b An analysissynthesis in physics which does not explain what it set out to explain | 97 |
c Pappusian analysessyntheses in Greek geometry | 99 |
d False awareness about analysissynthesis | 101 |
The problem of appraising scientific theories three approaches | 107 |
b Demarcationism | 108 |
c Elitism | 111 |
2 Elitism and allied philosophical positions | 112 |
b Elitists for authoritarianism and historicism | 116 |
c Elitists for pragmatism | 117 |
Necessity Kneale and Popper | 121 |
2 The epistemologicalmethodological level | 124 |
3 The continuity of logical and natural necessity | 126 |
4 Probability evidential support rational belief and betting quotients | 151 |
a Are degrees of evidential support probabilities? | 152 |
b Are degrees of rational belief degrees of evidential support or are they rational betting quotients? | 157 |
c Are rational betting quotients probabilities? | 159 |
5 The collapse of the weak atheoretical thesis | 160 |
b The abdication of the inductive judge | 165 |
method | 170 |
b Acceptability | 173 |
c Acceptability | 181 |
7 Theoretical support for predictions versus testevidential support for theories | 192 |
Appendix On Poppers three notes on degree of corroboration | 193 |
On Popperian historiography | 201 |
Appendix on ultrafalsificationism | 208 |
Anomalies versus crucial experiments a rejoinder to Professor Grunbaum | 211 |
2 The impossibility of Grunbaumian crucial experiments and the possibility of appraising scientific growth without them | 216 |
3 On practical advice | 218 |
4 The characteristic of science is not rational belief but rational replacement of propositions | 220 |
Understanding Toulmin | 224 |
1 Three schools of thought on the normative problem of appraising scientific theories | 225 |
2 Toulmin and the Wittgensteinian thoughtpolice | 228 |
3 Toulmins Darwinian synthesis of Hegel and Wittgenstein | 235 |
4 Conclusion | 241 |
A letter to the Director of the London School of Economics | 247 |
The teaching of the history of science | 254 |
The social responsibility of science | 256 |
| 259 | |
Lakatos bibliography | 274 |
| 277 | |
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Mathematics, Science and Epistemology: Volume 2, Philosophical Papers Imre Lakatos No preview available - 1978 |
Common terms and phrases
accepted according Agassi analysis analysis-synthesis appraisal argument arithmetic axiomatic axioms basic statements body of science calculus Carnap Carnapian Cartesian Circuit Cauchy Cauchy's chapter claim classical concept conjecture consistent convergence course criticism deductive degree of confirmation degree of corroboration demarcation demarcationists Descartes élitist empiricism empiricist epistemological evidence evidential support fact fallible false formal Gödel growth Grünbaum heuristic hypothesis Ibid inductive logic inductivist infallible inference infinite infinitesimal intuition Kneale knowledge Lakatos language game Leibniz lemmas logic of discovery mathematics meta-mathematics metaphysical method methodology neoclassical Newton non-standard analysis paper Pappusian philosophy of mathematics Philosophy of Science Popper Popperian principles probability problem problem of inductive problemshift proof propositions prove quasi-empirical rational belief rational betting quotients rational reconstruction refuted reliability research programme Russell scepticism scientific theories scientist sense set theory T₁ T₂ theorem thesis touchstone theory Toulmin trivial true truth uniform convergence universal volume Wittgenstein Wittgensteinian