democracy and oligarchy; for nobility and merit are to be found only among a few; but their contraries, among the many, as there is not one man of nobility and merit in a hundred, but many without either are everywhere. But to establish a government entirely upon either of these equalities is wrong, as is made clear by the example of those so established, for none of them has been stable. And the reason of this is, that it is impossible that whatever is wrong at the first and in principle should not at last come to a bad result; and therefore in some things an equality of numbers ought to take place, in others an equality in value. However, a democracy is safer and less liable to sedition than an oligarchy, for in this latter it may arise from two causes, the few in power conspiring either against each other or against the people; but in a democracy men conspire only against the few who aim at exclusive power, but there is no instance worth speaking of where the people have raised a sedition against themselves. Moreover, a government composed of men of moderate fortunes comes much nearer to a democracy than to an oligarchy, and is the safest of all such states.

XXXIV

THE PRINCE1

OF PRINCIPALITIES ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN PROPER
CONDUCT AND ARMS

Let no man think it strange if in speaking of new governments, either by princes or states, I introduce great and eminent examples; forasmuch as men in their actions follow commonly the ways that are beaten, and when they would do any generous thing they propose to themselves some pattern of that nature, nevertheless, being impossible to come up exactly to that, or to acquire that virtue in perfection which you desire to imitate, a wise man ought always to set before him for his example the actions of great men who have excelled in the achievement of some great exploit, to the end that though his virtue and power arrives not at that perfection, it may at least come as near as possible, and receive some tincture thereby, like experienced archers who, observing the mark to be at great distance, and knowing the strength of their bow, and how far it will carry, fix their aim somewhat higher than the mark, not with design. to shoot at that height, but that by mounting their arrow to a certain proportion, they may come the nearer to the mark they intend. I say, then, that principalities newly acquired by an upstart prince are more or less difficult to maintain, as he is more or less provident that gains them. And because the happiness of rising from a private person to be a prince presupposes great virtue, or fortune, where both of them concur they do much facilitate the conservation of the conquest; yet he who has committed least to fortune has continued the longest. It prevents much trouble likewise when the prince (having no better

1 From The Prince, by Nicholas Machiavelli, chaps. vi, vii, viii, ix. Translated by Henry Neville, London, 1675.

residence elsewhere) is constrained to live personally among them. But to speak of such who by their virtue rather than fortune have advanced themselves to that dignity, I say that the most renowned and excellent are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and the like; and though Moses might be reasonably excepted, as being only the executioner of God's immediate commands, yet he deserves to be mentioned, if it were only for that grace which rendered him capable of communication with God. But if we consider Cyrus and the rest of the conquerors and founders of monarchies, we shall find them extraordinary; and examining their lives and exploits, they will appear not much different from Moses, who had so incomparable a master; for by their conversations and successes they do not seem to have received anything from fortune but occasion and opportunity of introducing what forms of government they pleased; and as without that occasion the greatness of their courage had never been known, so had not they been magnanimous and taken hold of it, that occasion had happened in vain. It was necessary, therefore, for Moses, that the people of Israel should be in captivity in Egypt, that to free themselves from bondage they might be disposed to follow him; it was not inconvenient that Romulus should be turned out of Alba and exposed to the wild beasts when he was young, that he might afterwards be made king of Rome and founder of that great empire. It was not unnecessary likewise that Cyrus should find the Persians mutinying at the tyranny of the Medes, and that the Medes should be grown soft and effeminate with their long peace. Theseus could never have given proof of his virtue and generosity had not the Athenians been in great trouble and confusion. These great advantages made those great persons eminent, and their great wisdom knew how to improve them to the reputation and enlargement of their country. They then who become great by the ways of virtue (as the princes above said) do meet with many difficulties before they arrive at their ends, but having compassed them once they easily keep them: the difficulties in the acquisition arise in part from new laws and customs which they are forced to introduce for the establishment and security of their own dominion; and

this is to be considered, that there is nothing more difficult to undertake, more uncertain to succeed, and more dangerous to manage than to make one's self prince and prescribe new laws, because he who innovates in that manner has for his enemies all those who made any advantage by the old laws; and those who expect benefit by the new will be but cool and lukewarm in his defense, which lukewarmness proceeds from a certain awe for their adversaries who have their old laws on their side, and partly from a natural incredulity in mankind, which gives credit but slowly to any new thing, unless recommended first by the experiment of success. Hence it proceeds that the first time the adversary has opportunity to make an attempt, he does it with great briskness and vigor, but the defense is so tepid and faint that for the most part the new prince and his adherents perish together. Wherefore for better discussion of this case it is necessary to inquire whether these innovators do stand upon their own feet or depend upon other people, that is to say, whether in the conduct of their affairs they do make more use of their rhetoric than their arms. In the first case they commonly miscarry, and their designs seldom succeed; but when their expectations are only from themselves, and they have power in their own hands to make themselves obeyed, they run little or no hazard, and do frequently prevail. For further eviction, the Scripture shows us that those of the prophets whose arms were in their hands, and had power to compel, succeeded better in the reformations which they designed; whereas those who came only with exhortation and good language suffered martyrdom and banishment, because (besides the reasons above said) the people are unconstant and susceptible of any new doctrine at first, but not easily brought to retain it; so that things are to be ordered in such manner that when their faith begins to stagger they may be forced to persist. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus could never have made their laws to have been long observed, had they not had power to have compelled it; as in our days it happened to Friar Jerome Savonarola, who ruined himself by his new institutions, as soon as the people of Florence began to desert him, for he had no means to confirm them who had been of his

opinion, nor to constrain such as dissented. Wherefore such persons meet with great difficulty in their affairs; all their dangers are still by the way, which they can hardly overcome but by some extraordinary virtue and excellence; nevertheless, when once they have surmounted them and arrived at any degree of veneration, having supplanted those who envied their advancement, they remain puissant, and firm, and honorable, and happy. I will add to these great examples another, perhaps not so conspicuous, but one that will bear a proportion and resemblance with the rest, and shall satisfy me for all others of that nature. It is of Hiero of Syracuse, who from a private person was made prince of that city, for which he was beholding to fortune no further than for the occasion, because the Syracusans, being under oppression, chose him for their captain, in which command he behaved himself so well that he deserved to be made their prince, for he was a person of so great virtue and excellence that those who have writ of him have given him this character, that even in his private condition he wanted nothing but a kingdom to make him an admirable king. This Hiero subdued the old militia, established a new, renounced the old allies, confederated with others, and having friends and forces of his own, he was able upon such a foundation to erect what fabric he pleased, so that though the acquisition cost him much trouble, he maintained it with little.

OF NEW PRINCIPALITIES ACQUIRED BY ACCIDENT AND the SUPPLIES OF OTHER PEOPLE

They who from private condition ascend to be princes, and merely by the indulgence of fortune arrive without much trouble at their dignity, though it costs them dear to maintain it, meet but little difficulty in their passage, being hurried, as it were, with wings, yet when they come to settle and establish, then begins their misery. These kinds of persons are such as attain their dignity by bribes, or concession of some other great prince, as it happened to several in Greece, in the cities of Ionia, and upon