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matter is one that is closely akin to the notion of substance; in certain respects matter is substance itself, while privation is nothing of the kind. It is not the un óv or non-being, but the uń Tw ov or potential being (Suvápel õv), the possibility or capacity of being, the germ and the beginning of becoming. Concrete being, or the particular, represents the development of this germ, the realization of this possibility, the potential actualized (évépyela). Matter is the germ of the form, the potential form; the form, in turn, or rather the union of form and matter, which constitutes the particular thing, is matter in actuality. Thus, in the technical field, wood, the matter of which the table is made, is a potential table; the finished table is the same wood in energy Brass is a potential statue; the statue is the actualization of the brass. In nature, the egg is a bird in capacity; the bird is its évépyela. Matter is the beginning of all things; the Idea (shape or form) is the goal for which it strives; matter is the rudimentary or imperfect state; the form is the perfection or completion (évteléxela). If üln were synonymous with otépnous, matter could not become anything, it could not be united with a form or assume those definite outlines which define the real being; for from nothing nothing can come. Instead of struggling against the form, it strives after it, it desires it (opéryetal %), as the female desires the male. Matter and Idea or form are, therefore, correlative notions; instead of excluding each other, they presuppose and supplement each other ; motion or evolution (κίνησις, μεταβολή) is the term which mediates between them; motion is the transition or trans

1 Phys., X., 10, 4.
2 Met., VIII., 6, 19.

8 It is identical with Leibniz's conception of effort ($ 56), and Schopenhauer's will or will to be (§ 64). Aristotle himself uses the expression Boúheobal, in speaking of nature (Polit., I., 2, 9, 14).

Phys., I., 10, 7.


formation of the former into the latter. Hence the impor tance ascribed by Aristotle to the idea of movement;it enables him, in a certain measure, to escape the dualism of Plato, which the latter himself had attempted to avoid by means of the conception of number or fuxń. His entire system is founded on the trinity of δύναμις, κίνησις, and èvépyeta.2 \If matter is to form what capacity is to energy, the germ to the finished organism, then the opposition between the two principles is far from absolute, and all things are both potentiality and actuality, matter and form. Brass is form or energy in relation to the raw mineral, matter or potentiality in relation to the statue. The tree of which a bed is made is form, shape, or actuality in relation to the seed from which it grew, formless matter in relation to the bed. The youth is form (évepyelą éoti) in relation to the infant, formless matter in relation to the grown man.

The rule that every being is both form and substratum, idea and matter, soul and body, admits of but a single exception: the Supreme Being is pure form and without matter. According to Aristotle, matter invariably forms the starting-point for a process of development; it is the antecedent of a higher perfection. Now the Supreme Being is absolute perfection; hence he contains no matter for a more exalted being; in short, he is immaterial. Aristotle here seems to contradict the nominalistic theory, on which his polemic against the separate Ideas of Plato is based, and, above all, refutes his own statement that everything is material (äravta üln éotis). But this difficulty partly disappears when we take into consideration his definition of the word matter. He means by it matter that has not yet been formed, the provisional as opposed to the final; it denotes imperfection, capacity, undeveloped germ. If this is what is meant by matter, then, evidently, every being in the universal scale of beings is idea or perfection, as compared to the lower stages, and matter or imperfection, as compared to higher beings; and the Supreme Being — but the Supreme Being only — is pure idea, pure form, or pure actuality. Aristotle also declares that the last matter (matter in the final stage of development) and the form are the same (ή εσχάτη ύλη και η μορφή ταυτό!). Hence we may conclude that he would not, perhaps, have objected to calling the Supreme Being éo xátn úrn or the final stage of the universal evolution, though he would have denied that this higher phase of existence is in part material. But he does not accept the pantheistic conception of an absolute that develops, and is matter before being form, potentiality before being energy. If the Supreme Being had first existed in germ and as potentiality, then it would have been necessary for an actual being to exist antecedent to God in order to energize this germ and to make God actual ; for not only does all seed come from a pre-existent actual being, but no capacity ever becomes actual without the coöperation of an actual being. Not capacity but energy, not the potential but the actual, not the imperfect but the perfect, is the first principle anterior and superior to everything else. This favorite conception of Aristotle really agrees with the Eleatic doctrine : ex nihilo nihil ; its logical consequence is the negation of the chaos as the original form of existence, if we may apply the term “ form” to the formless as such, or to the complete absence

1 Id., III., 1 ff.

2 Met., XII., 5, 6; 10, 21. Cf. XII., 2, 10: Tpia 8n tà airia kai tpeis αι αρχαί, κ. τ. λ. The difference in the names (στέρησις, ύλη, μορφή) is not fundamental; for Aristotle has in mind, on the one hand, the three phases of being (eivai), on the other, the three constitutive prin. ciples of existence (ov).

8 Met., XII., 3, 8.

ild., VIII., 6, 19. Cf. VII., 10, 27; XII., 3, 8; 10, 8.
? Id., XII., 7, 19-20. Cf. Phys., II., 9, 6.


of all order. Since form or absolute energy and matte: are both eternal, it follows that matter has never been without form, and that there never was a state of chaos.1

The eternal actual Being is both the motive or generating cause, the form, and the final goal of things.

It is the first mover and itself immovable (TTPÔTOV KIVOŪV ου κινούμενον). The existence of this first mover is the necessary consequence of the principle of causality. Every movement implies, in addition to the thing moved, a moving principle, which, again, receives its motion from a higher motive force. Now, since there can be no infinite series of causes, we are obliged to stop at a first mover. To deny this and at the same time to assume the reality of motion, to assume with Leucippus, Democritus, and others, an infinite series of effects and causes without a first cause, is to violate one of the most fundamental laws of thought. Moreover, the first cause acts forever, and the ensuing motion is likewise eternal. The universe has neither a beginning nor an end in time, although it has its limits

in space.

Here a difficulty (atropía) arises : How can that which is immovable and remains so, move ? How can the motive cause act without setting itself in motion ? It must be assumed that God acts as the beautiful and the desirable act. Thus, a master-piece of art or nature moves and attracts us, and yet remains completely at rest itself. Similarly, the ideal which I strive to realize, or the goal at which I aim, sets me in motion without moving itself. So, too, matter is moved by the eternal Idea (hv eivai TEPÔTov) without the slightest movement on the part of the absolute being. It has a desire for God (opéyetal), but God is the first cause of this desire.2

Inasmuch as the Supreme Being is immaterial, it can have no impressions, nor sensations, nor appetites, nor a will 1 Met. XII., 6, 15.

3 Id., XII. 7, 3.

in the sense of desire, nor feelings in the sense of passions all these things depend on matter, the passive or female principle, the recipient of the form. God is pure intelli.gence. The human understanding (volls maOntikós) passes from a potential state through the stages of sensation, perception, and comparison. The divine vous has an imme

. diate intuitive knowledge of the intelligible essence of things. Our discursive thought pursues an object which is different from it and which cannot be attained except by gradual stages, while the absolute thought is identical with its object. Since nothing is higher than God, and since the thought of God has the highest possible object, God is the object of his own thought (ongews vonois). God's life is free from all pain and imperfection, and therefore beyond desire and regret (araońs); it is supremely happy; human life with its emotions is but a feeble image of it. God enjoys what but few favored mortals enjoy, and then only for a limited period of time ; his life consists in the pure contemplation of the intelligible truth, in Dewpía(διαγωγή δ' έστιν οία η αρίστη μικρόν χρόνον ημίν ').

As the final cause of the universe and the highest good (το αγαθόν και το άριστον), God is both in the things or their immanent essence (Taxis) and above the things, apart from the world, or transcendent (kexwplouévov ti kaì aủTò Ka@' aŭto). Discipline exists both in an army and outsiile of it in the mind of the general. Similarly, God is both the law and the law-giver, the order and the orderer of things. Everything is organized, ordered, and harmonized by him and with a view to him; and since he is one (matter alone is manifold 3), there can be but one single, eternal universe. Conversely, the unity which prevails in the world proves the unity of God. Ουκ αγαθόν πολυκοιρανίης είς κoίρανος έστω.

1 Mel., XII, 7, 11. 2 Id., XII., 10, 1, 2. Id., VIII., 6, 21 * Id., XII., 10, 23 (quotation from Pomer).

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