thought of claiming the victory. Indeed, it does not necessarily follow that because the senses are veridical in showing us objects, they show us the latter as they are. The agreement which, dogmatism assumes, exists between our mode of conceiving things and their mode of being, is, according to Campanella, a consequence of the analogy of beings, and this, in turn, is the consequence of an indemonstrable truth: their unitary origin. Besides, he will not grant that the human mind has an absolute knowledge of things. Our knowledge may be correct without ever being complete. Compared with God's knowledge, our knowledge is insignificant and as nothing. We should know things as they are, if knowledge were a pure act (if to perceive were to create). In order to know the things in themselves, or absolutely, we should have to be the absolute as such, i. e., the Creator himself. But though absolute knowledge is an ideal which man cannot realize, an evident proof that this world is not his real home, — the thinker ought to engage in metaphysical research.

Considering its subject-matter, universal philosophy or metaphysics is the science of the principles or first conditions of existence (principia, proprincipia, primalitates essendi). Considering its sources, means, and methods, it is the science of reason, and more certain and authoritative than experimental science.

To exist means to proceed from a principle and to re turn to it. What is the principle, or rather, what are these principles? for an abstract unity is barren. In other words: What is essential to a being's existence? Answer: (1) That this being be able to exist. (2) That there be in nature an Idea of which this being is the realization (for without knowledge nature would never produce any thing). (3) That there be a tendency, or desire for realiz1 Univ. phil. sive metaphys., P. I., 2, c. 1.

2 By thus categorically affirming the will as the principium essendi,

ing it. Power (posse, potestas, potentia essendi), knowledge (cognoscere, sapientia), and will (velle, amor essendi), — such are the principles of relative being. The sum of these principles, or rather, the supreme unity which contains them, is God. God is absolute power, absolute knowledge, and absolute will or love. The created beings, too, have power, perception, and will, corresponding to their propinquity to the source of things. The universe is a hierarchy comprising the mental, angelic, or metaphysical world (angels, dominations, world-soul, immortal souls), the eternal or mathematical world, and the temporal or corporeal world. All these worlds, even the corporeal world itself, participate in the absolute, and reproduce its three essential elements: power, knowledge, and will. So true is this that even inert nature is not dead; nay, feeling, intelligence, and will exist, in different degrees, in all beings, not even excepting inorganic matter.1

Every being proceeds from the absolute Being, and strives to return thither as to its principle. In this sense all finite beings whatsoever love God, all are religious, all strive to live the infinite life of the Creator, all have a horror of non-being, and in so far as all bear within themselves non-being as well as being, all love God more than themselves. Religion is a universal phenomenon and has its source in the dependence of all things on the absolute Being. Religious science or theology is so much higher than philosophy, as God is greater than man.2

In spite of these concessions to Catholicism, in spite of his Atheismus triumphatus, and his dream of a universal monarchy for the Holy Father, Campanella's attempted

Campanella differs both from the materialists and the pure idealists. No one before Leibniz more clearly conceived the fundamental con ception of concrete spiritualism.

1 Univ. phil., P I., 2, c. 5 ff.

2 Id.. III., 16, 1-7.

reforms were suspected by the Church, and miscarried. Philosophy could not hope to make any advance in Italy; henceforth she takes up her abode in countries enlightened or emancipated by the religious reformation: in England and on both banks of the Rhine.1

§ 51. Francis Bacon

In England the philosophical reform receives the impress of the Anglo-Saxon character, and takes quite a different turn from the Italian movement. The sober and positive English mind distrusts the traditions of Scholasticism as well as the hasty deductions of independent metaphysics. It prefers the slow and gradual ascent along the path of experience to Italian speculation, which quickly reaches the summit, and then, unable to maintain itself, becomes discouraged and falls back into scepticism. It is impressed with the fact that the School and its methods had no share in the recent progress of the sciences; that these intellectual conquests were made outside of the School, nay, in spite of it. The sciences owe their success neither to Aristotle nor to any other traditional authority, but to the direct contemplation of nature and the immediate influence of common-sense and reality. True, the bold investigators of science reasoned no less skilfully than the logicians of the School, but their reasonings were based on the

1 The most distinguished among the Italian philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is Giovanni Battista Vico, who died in 1744. He is noted for his Scienza nuova (Naples, 1725), one of the first attempts at a philosophy of history. The attempt has been made by able modern thinkers like Gallupi, Rosmini, Gioberti, Mamiani, Ferrari, etc. (§ 71), to restore to Italy the philosophical prestige enjoyed by that country during the period of the Renaissance (see Raphael Mariano, La philosophie contemporaine en Italie, Paris, 1868). [On Vico see Professor Flint's book in Blackwood's Phil. Classics.TR.]

observation of facts. Conversely, when they started from an a priori conception, or hypothesis, they verified it by experience, as Columbus did, and refused to recognize its truth until it had received this indispensable sanction. Thus we have, on the one hand, an utterly powerless and barren official philosophy; on the other, a surprising advance in the positive sciences. The conclusion which forced itself upon English common-sense was the necessity of abandoning a priori speculation and the abused syllogism in favor of observation and induction.

This conviction, which had been expressed by Roger Bacon as early as the thirteenth century, is proclaimed in the writings of his namesake FRANCIS BACON, Baron of Verulam, Lord Chancellor of England (1561-1626): De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum ;1 Novum organum scientiarum,2 etc.3

1 Appeared in English, 1605.

2 First published under the title Cogitata et visa in 1612.

8 Complete Works, [ed. William Rawley, Amsterdam, 1663]; ed. Montague, London, 1825-34; H. G. Bohn, London, 1846; ed. Ellis, Spedding, and Heath, London, 1857-59, completed by J. Spedding; The Letters and Life of Francis Bacon, including all his occasional works, newly collected, revised, and set out in chronological order, with a commentary biographical and historical, London, 1862-72; [also a briefer Account of the Life and Times of Francis Bacon, by J. Spedding, 2 vols., London, 1879]; Bacon's works, tr. into French by Lasalle, 15 vols., 8vo, Paris, 1800-1803; and by Riaux (Euvres philosophiques de F. Bacon, in the Charpentier collection, 2 vols., 12mo, 1842). See Ch. de Rémusat, Bacon, sa vie, son temps, sa philosophie et son influence jusqu'à nos jours, 2d ed., Paris, 1858; Kuno Fischer, Francis Bacon und seine Nachfolger. Entwickelungsgeschichte der Erfahrungsphilosophie, Leipsic, 1856; 2d ed., completely revised, 1875; [Engl. trans. by J. Oxenford, London, 1857]; Chaignet et Sedail, De l'influence des travaux de Bacon et de Descartes sur la marche de l'esprit humain, Bordeaux, 1865; [Th. Fowler, Bacon (English Philosophers' Series), London, 1881; J. Nichol, Bacon (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics), 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1888-89; Heussler, Francis Baco und seine geschichtliche Stellung, Breslau, 1889. Concerning Bacon's predeces

The problem is, to begin the whole labor of the mind again, to raise science upon an absolutely new basis (instauratio magna). If we would ascertain the hidden nature of things, we must not look for it in books, in the authorities of the School, in preconceived notions and a priori speculations. Above all, we must give up imitating the ancients, whose influence has retarded the progress of knowledge. With the exception of Democritus and a few positivists, the Greek philosophers observed but little and superficially. Scholasticism followed in the footsteps of antiquity. It seems as though the Schoolmen had lost. their sense of the real. Our knowledge is full of prejudices. We have our whims, our preferences, our idols (idola tribus, fori, specus, theatri), and we project them into nature. Because the circle is a regular line and affords us pleasure, we infer that the planetary orbits are perfect circles. We do not observe at all, or we observe but poorly. We infer that because persons have escaped a great misfortune five times, some supernatural agencies have been at work; and we fail to take account of the equally numerous cases when they did not escape. One may truly say with the philosopher who was shown, in a temple, the votive tablets suspended by such as had escaped the peril of shipwreck: "But where are the por traits of those who have perished in spite of their vows?" We assume final causes, and apply them to science, thereby carrying into nature what exists only in our imagination. Instead of understanding things, we dispute about words, which each man interprets to suit himself. We continually confuse the objects of science with those of religion, a procedure which results in a superstitious philosophy and a heretical theology. "Natural philosophy is not yet

sors, Digby and Temple, see J. Freudenthal, Beiträge zur Geschichte der engl. Philos., A. f. d. G. d. Ph., IV., pp. 450-477, 578-603, V., pp. 1-41.TR.].