But the system had only to be divested of its theological shell to become Spinozistic naturalism.

§ 55. Spinoza

Baruch (Benedict) SPINOZA,1 Spinosa, or Despinoza, was born at Amsterdam, in 1632, of Portuguese Jewish parents, truths in his philosophy: first, reason and experience, without con science, cannot yield us real truth; secondly, experience without conscience necessarily leads to pessimism; and finally, the will — for that is what Pascal means by the words heart (cœur) and feeling (sentiment) takes precedence of reason, and subjects it to its laws.

1 Benedicti de Spinoza opera quæ supersunt omnia, iterum edenda curavit, præfationes, vitam auctoris, nec non notitias, quæ ad historiam scriptorum pertinent, addidit, H. E. G. Paulus, Jena, 1802-03. More recent editions by A. Gfrörer, Stuttgart, 1830; Riedel, R. des Cartes et B. de Spinoza præcipua opera philosophica, Leipsic, 1843; C. H. Bruder, 3 vols., Leipsic, 1813-46; completed by J. van Vlooten, Ad. B de Sp opera quæ supersunt omnia, supplementum contin. tractatum de Deo et homine, etc., Amsterdam, 1862; [best edition by Van Vlooten and Land, B. de Sp. opera quotquot reperta sunt, 2 vols., The Hague, 188283]. Spinoza's complete works translated into French by Saisset, Paris, 1842; 1861; 3 vols., 1872; [into German by B. Auerbach, 2d ed., 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1872; phil. works trans. into German by Kirchmann and Schaarschmidt (in the Philos. Bibliothek, 2 vols.). The Chief Works of B. de Sp., transl. into English by R. H. M. Elwes, 2 vols., London, 1883-84 ff.; Ethics, transl. by White, London, 1883; 2d ed., 1894; Selections, tr. by Fullerton, New York, 1892; new ed, 1895; transl. of Tractatus de intellectus emendatione, by White, New York, 1895.TR.] Biographies of Spinoza by Coler (in Dutch, 1705, in French, 1706) and Lucas (La vie et l'esprit de Mr. Benoît de Spinosa, 1719); Armand Saintes, Histoire de la vie et des ouvrages de Spinosa, Paris, 1842; J. van Vlooten, Baruch d'Espinoza, zyn leven en schriften, Amsterdam, 1862; [2d ed., Schiedam, 1871]. [T. Camerer, Die Lehre Spinozas, Stuttgart, 1877; F. Pollock, Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy, London, 1880; J. Martineau, A Study of Spinoza, London, 1882; also in Types of Ethical Theory, Oxford, 1886; J. Caird, Spinoza, Edinburgh, 1888; R. Worms, La morale de Spinosa, Paris, 1892; L. Brunschvigg, Spinoza, Paris, 1894. See also K. Fischer's excellent volume on Spinoza, History of Philosophy, I., 2. For full references see Leber weg-Heinze and A. van der Linde, B. Spinoza Bibliografie, Gravenhage 1871.TR.1

who were, it seems, in good circumstances. In accordance with the wishes of his father he studied theology, but soon showed a decided preference for free philosophical speculation. After being excommunicated by the synagogue, which made unsuccessful attempts to bring him back to the faith of his fathers, he repaired to Rhynsburg, then to Voorburg, and finally to The Hague, where he died, a poor and persecuted man, in 1677. His love of independence led him to decline the Heidelberg professorship of philosophy offered him by Karl Ludwig, the Elector Palatine. He wrote his principal works at The Hague between the years 1660 and 1677. In 1663 he published the treatise entitled: Renati Descartes principiorum philosophiæ Pars I. et II. more geometrico demonstratæ, and in 1670, the anonymous work: Tractatus theologico-politicus, in which he discusses and gives rationalistic solutions of such prob lems as inspiration, prophecy, miracles, and free investigation. His chief work, Ethica more geometrico demonstrata, and several other less important treatises, were issued after his death under the care of his friend Ludwig Meyer. His Tractatus de Deo, homine, ejusque felicitate was unknown to the philosophical public until 1852.2

Spinozism, as set forth in the Ethics, is the logical consequence of the Cartesian definition of substance, and the consistent application of the method of the French philoso

1 [Ludwig Stein has shown (Neue Aufschlüsse uber den litterarischen Nachlass und die Herausgabe der Opera posthuma Sp.'s, Arch. f. G. d. Ph., I, 1888) that the Opera posthuma were published by the physician G. H. Schuller and not by Meyer. Meyer most likely wrote the preface. - TR.]

2 Published by Ed. Böhmer, Halle, 1852; [by Van Vlooten, Amsterdam, 1862; by Schaarschmidt, id., 1869. German translation; by Schaarschmidt (vol. 18, Phil. Bibliothek), 1869; by Sigwart, 2d ed., Tübingen, 1881.-TR.].

3 Principles, I., 51.

pher. Our author is not content with developing his doctrines by pure deductive reasoning, but also presents them more geometrico. From a certain number of definitions he deduces a system whose parts are logically connected with each other. This method of exposition is not an arbitrary form or a provisional framework: it is of a piece with the system, and, one might say, constitutes its permanent skeleton. When Spinoza treats of the world, of man and his passions, as Euclid in his Elements treats of lines, planes, and angles, it is because, in principle and in fact, he sets as great a value upon these objects of philosophy as the geometer upon his. Just as the conclusions of geometry inevitably follow from their axioms, so the moral and physical facts which the philosopher considers follow with absolute necessity from the nature of things, expressed by their definitions; and he no more inquires into their final causes than the geometer asks to what end the three angles of a given triangle are equal to two right angles. It is not his method that leads him to mathematical determinism; on the contrary, he employs it because, from the very outset, he views the world from the geometrical, i. e., deterministic standpoint. He agrees with Descartes, Plato, and Pythagoras that philosophy is the generalization of mathematics.

I. DEFINITIONS

The fundamental notions of Spinoza's system are substance, attribute, and mode. "By substance," he says, "I

1 We do not at all wish to be understood as denying the influence which the Jewish theology of the Middle Ages exercised on Spinoza's intellectual development. This influence is apparent, and it would be ridiculous to call it in question. It was owing to it that Spinoza found what he did find in Descartes; he was already a pantheist when he took up the study of the French philosopher. Still, we must maintain that his leading thought, and particularly his method, are the logical outcome of the Cartesian system.

Tractatus politicus, c. 1, § 4; Ethics, III., Preface.

understand that which exists in itself, and is conceived by itself, i. e., that which does not need the conception of any other thing in order to be conceived." "By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives as constitut ing the essence of the substance." 2 "By mode I understand the modifications of the substance, i. e., that which exists in and is conceived by something other than itself.”3

II. DEDUCTIONS

1. Theory of Substance

From the definition of substance it follows: (1) that substance is its own cause; otherwise it would be produced by something other than itself, in which case it would not be a substance; (2) that it is infinite5 (if it were finite, it would be limited by other substances, and consequently depend on them); (3) that it is the only substance; for if there were two substances, they would limit each other and cease to be independent, i. e., they would cease to be substances. Hence there can be only one substance, which depends on nothing, and on which everything depends. At this point Spinoza deviates from the Cartesian philosophy; but he deviates from it because the system itself invites him to do so. Descartes himself had

1 Ethics, I., Def. 3: Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur: hoc est id, cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat.

2 Eth., I., Def. 4: Per attributum intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens.

& Eth., I., Def. 5: Per modum intelligo substantiæ affectiones sive in quod in alio est, per quod concipitur.

Id., I., Prop. 8.

4 Eth., I., Prop. 7. Id., I., Props. 11 f. Monotheism here becomes monism. According to monotheism, God is the only God but not the only being; according to monism or pantheism, he is the only being and the only substance; he is the only existing being (Eth., I., Prop. 14; Letter XLI.).

intimated by his definition of substance that in reality God alone is substance, and that the word substance when applied to creatures has not the same meaning as when applied to the infinite Being.1 But instead of removing the ambiguity, he continued to call finite things substances; and in order to distinguish them from God, created sub stances, as though his definition could make a created, relative, and finite substance anything but a substance that is not a substance. Hence we must refrain from applying the term "substance" to things which do not exist by themselves; the term must be reserved for the being which exists in itself and is conceived by itself, i. e., for God. God alone is substance, and substance is God.

Substance being the only being, and not dependent on anything, is absolutely free in the sense that it is determined solely by itself. Its liberty is synonymous with necessity, but not with constraint.2 To act necessarily

means to determine one's self; to act under constraint means to be determined, in spite of one's self, by an external cause. That God should act, and act as he does, is as necessary as it is that the circle should have equal radii. Because a circle is a circle, its radii are equal; because substance is substance, it has modes, but it is free because its own nature and no extraneous cause compels it to modify itself. Absolute freedom excludes both constraint and caprice.3

Substance is eternal and necessary; or, in the language of the School, its essence implies existence. It cannot be an individual or a person, like the God of religions; for, in that case, it would be a determined being, and all determination is relative negation. It is the common source of all personal existences, without being limited by any of them. It has neither intellect nor will: 5 for both presup2 Eth., I., Prop. 17.

1 Principles, I., 51.

Id., I., Prop. 17, Scholium.

Eth., I., Prop. 32 and Corollaries.

4 See also p. 331, 1. 8.