gence,

As the curative or catagmatic power in nature, it heals wounds and fractures, like the most skilful physician. Hence it is intelligent, but unconscious; it knows without knowing that it knows.

This distinction between intelligence and inner apperception is not new; we find it in Leibniz and in Schelling. But Hartmann was the first to formulate it with perfect clearness, and to support it by a great mass of facts. It would, however, be a mistake to regard the doctrine that ideas guide the will as creating an essential difference between the disciple and the master; for Schopenhauer, too, has his Platonic ideas, which serve as stages in the evolution of the will. Besides, Hartmann's idea cannot hinder the absolute from willing, i.e., from realizing itself in a world in which the evil necessarily and infinitely exceeds the good, and to which, though it be the best possible world, nothingness would be preferable. All that it can do is to guide the cosmical evolution, and to influence the absolute, by producing a more profound feeling of the universal misery and a more complete knowledge of the secret of things (in a word, by developing consciousness), not to will to be: which would mean the end of the world. Here, then, the difference between disciple and master is more apparent than real. According to Hartmann as well as according to Schopenhauer, the exist ence of the world is an evil, since it is synonymous with pain, sorrow, and anguish, feelings which recur, in different degrees, in myriads of sensible creatures. But, in Schopenhauer's opinion, the evil is irreparable: the world and, consequently, the pains are eternal, and only the individuals that die are relatively redeemed. According to Hartmann, on the other hand, who rests on the principle that no development is without beginning or end, and assumes a creation and an end of the world, the evil is reparable redemption is universal, and even the abso

lute is ultimately redeemed.1 Only, this redemption is not final, for we have no assurance that the latent state to which the will returns is final, that it will not be re-aroused, that there will not be a new world, that is, a new hell. Chance has produced the present universe; the same chance may, in the future, produce an indefinite number of worlds, that is, hells. And here we are back in the doctrine of Schopenhauer.

Voluntarism and idealism cannot really be reconciled, unless we reform the very notion of will, on which the pessimistic system is grounded. Master and disciple both err, not in regarding the will as the essence of things, that is what it is, — but in making it radically and irremediably immoral by assigning as its goal life as such, existence at any cost. Now, existence does not give the will the supreme satisfaction which it craves, unless it be devoted to a higher end. Hence, life is not the absolute end of the creative will, and this is not the will-to-live (der Wille zum Leben), but the will which strives for the good, by using life as a means, or, should occasion demand, by sacrificing life (der Wille zum Guten mittels des Lebens). The good, for pessimism, consists in unmaking what the will has made, and, finally, for the very fact of willing is folly,2-in not willing at all; according to us, it consists in perfecting the will, in organizing it, in fashioning it by means of morality.

1 Hartmann calls this his evolutionistic optimism in opposition to Schopenhauer's absolute pessimism; i. e., he makes the historical evolution culminate at least in the negative happiness of nothingness, while Schopenhauer recognizes in reality neither history, nor evolution, nor progress of any sort.

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(St.

2 In reality God himself committed the "folly" of willing to exist, and, in this sense, his folly is "wiser than the wisdom of men Paul): felix culpa (Augustine).

§ 69. Darwin and Contemporary Monism1

At this point of its evolution, German philosophy approx. imates the teachings of Hobbes and La Mettrie. Schopenhauer's system is bound to spiritualism by a very slender thread. Schopenhauer censures phrenology for assuming a connection between the will and a definite portion of the brain the will is the producer and not the product of organization, a primary principle, preceding the physical organization, and, consequently, independent of the functions of the brain. But though he refuses to let materialism have the will, he abandons to it the intellect, which, he declares, results from brain-action. He holds, moreover, with Kant, that the phenomenal world, and, consequently, the brain itself, which forms a part of it, does not exist inde

1 Besides the two principal works of Charles Darwin, Origin of Species, and Descent of Man, see especially, David Strauss, Der alte und neue Glaube, 1872 [see p. 562]; E. Haeckel, Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte, Berlin, 1868 ff.; [Engl. tr., Natural History of Creation, 1875]; Oscar Schmidt, Descendenzlehre und Darwinismus, Leipsic, 1873; [Engl. tr., The Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism (International Scientific Series)]; L. Noiré. Der monistische Gedanke, Leipsic, 1875; Aphorismen zur monistischen Philosophie, 1877. [See also: T. Huxley, Man's Place in Nature, London, 1863; same author, Lectures on the Origin of Species, New York, 1892; H. Spencer, Principles of Biology, London, 1863-67; E. Haeckel, Anthropogenie, Leipsic, 1874 ff.; English tr., New York, 1895; E. v. Hartmann, Wahrheit und Irrthum im Darwinismus, Berlin, 1875 (Truth and Error in Darwinism, tr. in Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vols. XI.-XIII.); A. Weismann, Studien zur Descendenztheorie, 2 pts., Leipsic, 1875-76; H. W. Conn, Evolution of To-Day, New York, 1886; A. R. Wallace, Darwinism, London, 1889: G. Romanes, Darwin and after Darwin: I., The Darwinian Theory, London, 1892; II., Post-Darwinian Questions (edited by Lloyd Mor gan), 1895; O. Hamann, Entwickelungslehre und Darwinismus, Jena, 1892; R. Schmid, Die Darwinsche Theorie und ihre Stellung zur Philosophie, Religion, und Moral, Stuttgart, 1876; J. G. Schurman, The Ethical Import of Darwinism, New York, 1887; T. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, London, 1893; A. Schleicher, Die darwinsche Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft, Weimar, 1865; 3d ed., 1873.-TR.]

pendently of the intellect. The brain and the intellect mutu ally condition each other; neither exists without the other. The will alone does not, in any way, depend upon organized matter. However, this will, which strives exclusively for existence, differs, neither in principle nor in fact, from the "force" of the materialists. The Realen of Herbart, on the other hand, are so much like "atoms" as to be mistaken for them. The monads of Leibniz perceive of themselves; Herbart's "perception " results from the interpenetration of his Realen, and is not native to them: by themselves they are as unintelligent as atomism's centres of force. According to Herbart as well as according to materialism, intelligence is a product, not a principle. Similarly, that which Hegel calls the creative idea is not conscious intelligence ; it is a principle that becomes conscious intelligence when it is provided with a cerebrum. Where, then, is the essential difference between an unconscious principle and what materialism calls force-matter? Besides, Hegel, like Schopenhauer, Spinoza, and Bruno, agrees with materialism in rejecting the dogma of the creation and government of the world by a supra-cosmic will, the immortality of the soul, and free-will, i. e., the essential doctrines of spiritualism. The Hegelian conception of things and the materialistic philosophy are fundamentally the same, however opposite they may be in form: both substitute naturalism and monism for theism and dualism. Hegelians. abandon ambiguous terms! Call things by their right names! Do not designate the substance which exists prior to intelligence idea, but matter! What distinguishes us from the materialists is, ultimately, the method we employ. Now, ours is manifestly false, theirs is evidently the true one'; hence, let us unite with them! So spoke the liberal Hegelians, particularly LUDWIG FEUERBACH,' renowned for his works

1 Son of the jurist, Anselm Feuerbach; 1801-1872; complete works, 10 vols., Leipsic, 1816 ff. [Cf. K. Grün, L. Feuerbach, 2 vois, Leipsic, 1874.]

36

on Das Wesen des Christenthums1 and Das Wesen der Re ligion, who was afterwards joined by DAVID STRAUSS.3

6

Thus materialism, reinforced by the descendants of Hegelianism and popularized by such talented writers as JACOB MOLESCHOTT, LUDWIG BÜCHNER, CARL VOGT, and ERNST HAECKEL, became in Germany what it had been in France since the eighteenth century: an intellectual power of the highest order, firmly resting upon the basis of facts and having in its favor the double advantage of perfect clearness and comprehensive, thorough knowledge.

1 [The Essence of Christianity], Leipsic, 1841. "Anthropology is the secret of theology. God is man worshipping himself. The Trinity is the human family deified.”

2 Leipsic, 1845.

8 1808-1874. Author of Das Leben Jesu, Tübingen, 1835-36; [The Life of Christ, tr. by George Eliot, London, 1846 ff.]; Der alte und der neue Glaube, 1872 ff.; [Engl. tr. by M. Blind, London, 1873. Collected works, ed. by E. Zeller, 12 vols., Bonn, 1876-78. Cf. A. Hausrath, David Friedrich Strauss und die Theologie seiner Zeit, 2 vols., Heidel berg, 1876-1878. — TR.]

* [See P. Janet, Le matérialisme contemporain, 6th ed., Paris, 1893; Engl. tr. by G. Masson, London, 1866. — TR.]

5 [1822-1893.] Der Kreislauf des Lebens, Mainz, 1852; 4th ed., 1862; Die Einheit des Lebens, Giessen, 1864.

6 [Born 1824.] Kraft und Stoff, Frankfort, 1855; 16th ed., 1888; [Engl. tr., Force and Matter, by Collingwood, 4th ed., London, 1884]; Natur und Geist, 1857 ff.; Sechs Vorlesungen über die Darwinsche Theorie, Leipsic, 1868 ff.; [Die Stellung des Menschen, etc., Leipsic, 1869 f.; Engl. tr., Man in the Past, Present, and Future, by W. F. Dallas, London, 1872.]

[1817-1895.] Physiologische Briefe, Stuttgart, 1845-47; Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft, Giessen, 1854; Vorlesungen über den Menschen, Giessen, 1863.

8 [Born 1834.] Generelle Morphologie der Organismen, Berlin, 1866 ff.; Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte, Berlin, 1868, 8th ed., 1889: [Engl. tr., Natural History of Creation, New York, 1892; Anthropogenie, Leipsic, 1874 ff.; Engl. tr., The Evolution of Man, New York, 1895; Ge sammelte populäre Vorträge, 1878 ff.; Engl. tr., Popular Lectures, 1883 -TR]