to be excused for misnomers, for the subject was new to them, and all their political ideas and language came from European sources, where sovereignty is held of original right, and wielded by the visible government, this being monarchical; while in the united states, the government has no original rights and powers whatever, and the sovereignty dwells down in the people always, and is only manifested through "substitutes and agents." Moreover the powers of making war, peace, treaties, coinage, and of taxing, etc., were commonly called reign powers;" and the fathers, to be intelligible, spoke to the people in common parlance, not dreaming that their language would make confusion of ideas, and furnish pretexts for sophistical exposition in the future. At all events, they nowhere hint the idea of Webster, that so far as the delegated powers in the constitution go, "so far state sovereignty is effectually controlled."

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Politicians, like Sheep, follow a Bell. It is doubtful if any man ever lived who was capacitated to entertain the idea of a sovereignty delegating a sovereignty, which could rightfully coerce the sovereignty that did the delegating- at least until office-seeking came to be a profession, and facts, falsehoods, sound arguments, sophistries, and frauds, equal cards in all political games. Politicians adopt and follow the doctrines of leaders and conventions, as thoughtlessly as sheep follow bell-wethers. They all start from Story and Webster's dogmas, as from postulates or premises. If they delve at all in the mine of constitutional history, they pass by a thousand proofs of the falsehood of those dogmas, to cull a few seeming evidences of their correctness. They dare not bring out the truth, for although it may "run and be glorified," it runs slowly, and they cannot go into the next generation to run for office on it. Would Seymour have received a vote in the convention of 1868, if he had expressed the views of Washington, Franklin, Hamilton, and Madison? Would George H. Pendleton be thought of for the presidency, if his was the faith of the fathers (for instance, the ideas of Chancellor Pendleton in the Virginia ratifying convention) instead of the Massachusetts school? The modern Pendleton thinks the powers delegated by the states can be used by the subjects of the states, to coerce these bodies into obedience to the said powers. And, mirabile dictu! Hon. A. H. Stephens "leaves his own, to stand on foreign ground," and strays into the flock. Let us see. Of course he concedes that all the powers of the federal constitution are to be enforced. Then the "specific sovereign powers," he speaks of, are to be enforced" over the authority delegating" them so long as they "are unresumed." Hence, Mr. Stephens's own words assert a coercive power in the federal pact over the states. The theory of his book, however, is, or seems to be, the one unanimously held by the fathers, to wit:

that the states were to associate, and conjointly act, in general government, with entire voluntariness, and that this inconsistent and mischievous war-power of coercing states was to be carefully excluded.

Hon. A. H. Stephens and others on Sovereignty.—Mr. Stephens, in his "War between the States," expresses some views utterly inconsistent with his general theory. I purpose now to notice these somewhat, together with kindred views of other most eminent conservative politicians. In Vol. I., pp. 488-9, he says that "sovereignty is the highest and greatest of all political powers; that it is the source, as well as the embodiment, of all powers;" that it is susceptible of partition and transfer; that "if sovereignty is not parted with by the states, in express terms, . . . it is still retained and reserved to the people of the several states, in that mass of residuary rights, which was expressly reserved in the constitution itself;" and, finally, that it was not expressly reserved in the constitution at first," but was "soon after' "expressly reserved" in the Tenth Amendment.

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This all means that sovereignty, which must be the peculiar and essential characteristic of a state, the very one that causes it to differ from a county or a province, which consists of the right of command over everything, and which was supposed to be above all rights and powers, and to have the absolute disposal of them, is divisible, and subject to grant or reservation; and that, though it might have been parted with, it is actually reserved to the states in the Tenth Amendment of the federal constitution, this being the sole source of, and their only title to, their sovereignty! Moreover, he calls these alleged fractions of sovereignty "specific sovereign powers." All this resembles the doctrines of Dane, Story, Webster, Curtis, G. H. Pendleton, and the New York World, but not those of A. H. Stephens.

The former could say to Mr. Stephens : "As you assert, the sovereignty of the states 'was not expressly reserved in the constitution at first,' but was afterwards 'expressly reserved' in the Tenth Amendment. Did not the constitution thenceforward provide the practical means of preserving that sovereignty? Did not the guaranty of a republican form of government [Art. IV., § 4], and the amendment in question, aided by other clauses, empower and charge the government to see that the states are protected in their rights as reserved, including this right of sovereignty? As sovereignty is thus placed in and under the constitution, as you admit, it must consist with the 'specific sovereign powers,' which you say are granted in the other parts of the instrument. Do you not, therefore, admit that Mr. Webster is right in his dictum, that, so far as the constitution goes, so far state sovereignty is effectually controlled'?"

Does not Mr. Stephens, then, seem entangled in the meshes of his own logic, so that his only escape is to admit that the constitution does not involve state, or any other, sovereignty, but that the pact, including the government it provides for, remains, as a created instrumentality, beneath, and subject to, the authority of the states which established it, as the terms of their association? This, indeed, seems to be the general theory of his book.

In order not to do Mr. Stephens injustice, I here quote him at considerable length, using some italics for my purpose :

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"... One of the main objects in forming the compact, as before stated, and as clearly appears from the instrument itself, was to preserve and perpetuate separate state existence. The guaranty to this effect, from the very words used, implies their sovereignty. There can be no such thing as a perfect state without sovereignty. It certainly is not parted with by any express terms in that instrument. If it be surrendered thereby, it must be by implication only."

He shows that this cannot be, and proceeds:

"For sovereignty is the highest and greatest of all political powers. It is itself the source, as well as embodiment, of all political powers, both great and small. All proceed and emanate from it. All the great powers, specifically and expressly delegated in the constitution, such as the power to declare war and make peace, to raise and support armies, to tax and lay excise duties, etc., are themselves but the incidents of sovereignty. If this great embodiment of all powers was parted with, why were any minor specifications made? Why any enumeration? Was not such specification or enumeration both useless aud absurd?

"All the implications are the other way. The bare fact that all the powers parted with by the states were delegated only, as all admit, necessarily implies that the greater power delegating still continued to exist.

"If, then, this ultimate, absolute sovereignty did reside with the several states separately, as without question it did, up to the formation of the constitution; and if, in the constitution, sovereignty is not parted with by the states, in express terms; if, as Mr. Webster said in 1839, there is not a word about sovereignty in it, and if, further, this greatest of all political powers cannot justly be claimed as an incident to lesser ones, and thereby carried by implication, then, of course, was it not most clearly still retained and reserved to the people of the several states, in that mass of residuary rights, in the language of Mr. Jefferson, which was expressly reserved in the constitution itself?

"It is true, it was not so expressly reserved in the constitution at first, because it was deemed, as the debates in the federal convention,

as well as the state conventions, clearly show, wholly unnecessary; so general was the understanding that it could not go by inference or implication from anything in the constitution, or, in other words, that it could not be surrendered without express terms to that effect. The general understanding was the universally acknowledged principle in public law, that nothing is held good against sovereignty by implication. But to quiet the apprehensions of Patrick Henry, Samuel Adams, and the conventions of a majority of the states, this reservation of sovereignty was soon after put in the constitution, amongst other amendments, in plain and unequivocal language.

"This amendment, which was promptly agreed to by the states, unanimously declared that all powers not delegated were reserved to the states respectively. This of course includes, in the reservation, sovereignty, which is the source of all powers, those DELEGATED AS WELL AS THOSE RESERVED. This reservation, Mr. Samuel Adams said, we have seen in the Massachusetts convention, was consonant with the like reservation in the first articles of confederation." [I. Stephens's War, etc., pp. 488-9.]

ment:

Let us stop a moment to analyze and look closely at this state1st. Of twenty different-sized "political powers," for example, "the highest and greatest" would be "sovereignty." What would the rest be? If sovereignty be taken away, where is the right to use the rest?

2d. But sovereignty is no power at all, for "it is the source of all political powers," the spring, which remains, while the rill flows out forever. Good figure and true! Mr. Stephens should have stuck to it. Sovereignty is the source of all political powers.

3d. He changes again, however, and says sovereignty is powers, i. e. "the embodiment of all powers!"

4th. But he changes yet again, and says that even the highest and greatest of them (the same he has just asserted to be sovereignty, as the war-power, the tax-power, etc.), are the mere "incidents of sovereignty," and, of course, not sovereignty itself.

5th. He says that as "all the powers parted with by the states were delegated" by sovereignty, it "implies that the greater power delegating still continued to exist."

6th. He finally says, citing Mr. Jefferson, that sovereignty was in "a mass of residuary rights, expressly reserved in the [original] constitution;" but that, not being itself expressly reserved, it was, several years afterwards, expressly reserved in the Tenth Amendment, which, we find, simply declares that all POWERS not delegated are reserved.

The plain truth is, that neither the constitution, nor the tenth or any other amendment, has aught to do with sovereignty, for this entity

is not subject to either delegation or reservation, as has been shown. It dwells permanently in bodies-politic, acting through their organs, in delegating or reserving powers, all that are delegated being put by sovereignty in, and all not delegated being kept by sovereignty out of, the constitution.

Sovereign American Citizens. Our politicians affect fanciful, attractive, and startling ideas, especially such as flatter the people. Every citizen is a sovereign. Often the idea comes up in a form and place to blush for. For instance, Anson Burlingame, of Massachusetts, claimed in Europe, on the basis of personal sovereignty, the equality of an American citizen with European crowned heads. Governor William Allen, of Ohio, not only seems to think that we have just the number of sovereigns that we have voters, but that they desovereignize themselves at every election. Witness the following, from his speech at Columbus, August 20, 1873: When you elect a representative to congress, "you divest yourselves of your sovereign power, and put it, all in the hands of one man." "At six o'clock in the morning, these ten thousand men are the sovereign people." "At six o'clock in the evening," they have completely "divested themselves" of sovereignty, and "concentrated this tremendous power in the hands of one man." In other words, sovereignty does not dwell fixedly in the people as organized, i. e. in the mind and will of the state, but bobs up and down with the successive delegations and withdrawals of power, like the hammers of a piano, or the "merry dancers" of the Aurora Borealis.

Squatter Sovereignty. — Again, General Cass and Judge Douglass, two democratic candidates for the presidency, seemingly ignoring the pre-established sovereignty of the American united societies, the associated commonwealths, over the territory they jointly owned, held that these personal sovereigns could go and associate themselves for self-government on such part of the public domain as they pleased, and, ipso facto, become sovereign and exclusive. If nomadic, of course, their lines might rightfully fall in any and all pleasant places they might from time to time wander to and occupy.

The fact that these astute politicians labelled their theory "popular sovereignty," which is precisely the theory of this book, did not make it respectable, or even worthy of refutation. [But see Ch. X. infra.]

Only in organization have the people sovereignty, and they are organized and capacitated to act, in political affairs, only as commonwealths or states, as we have seen. As such, they have established a league "between the states," i. e. themselves, and at the same time, and in the same instrument, constituted a governmental agency to rule their subjects for them. Their law, whether the "supreme " funda