How Men become New States, and these Sovereign. ing to find the above, let us keep it in view that the American people are not only subjects (i. e. members and citizens) of states, but the states themselves. They as such own all the territory, and have sovereignty over it. Each state is sovereign over that within its own borders, — all are jointly sovereign over that without the states. Now it would be absurd to say that men can, when only subjects, and out of the society in which alone they have governing capacity, go on the territory of the united sovereigns, and, by simply associating themselves, generate a sovereignty there, which shall supplant the sovereignty of the united states! This is the "squatter sovereignty" doctrine, as taught by Cass and Douglas. The congress of states has the right to say, and practically does say: "You pioneers or settlers have the privilege of emigrating to, and occupying, the territory of the united states, within certain limits, on condition that you organize yourselves, abide by the law, keep order, observe morality, promote education, etc.; so that, when sufficient in numbers, you will show capacity for self-government, and fitness to be an equal in this community of communities, or republic of republics." The Status and Rights of a Settler. Once a subject always one, is perhaps as true in a republic as in a monarchy. He must be a member of society, a part of government, and a subject of law. Being a republican, however, he can change his societal connection at will; but no expatriation is, or can be, recognized, which would exempt him from societal duty and law. Even if not generally implied in social compacts, some of the states seem to express it. Thus Vermont declares that "all people have a natural and inherent right to emigrate from one state to another that will receive them." The intending members of the new state, then, go with the permission, and form society under the protection of the sovereignsthe united states; and, with the status of men and citizens, they perfect or consummate the transfer of their citizenship, when the new state is completed, and her equality is acknowledged by the congress of the previous states. "New STATES may be admitted by the congress into this union." [Constitution, Art. IV. § 3.] Whence comes the New State's Sovereignty? The germ of this right of self-government is inherent in man, as has been shown. The complete sovereignty is inherent and original in the collective people, though on the federal domain it is in abeyance for want of right to exercise it; the case being much like that of a man abroad from his commonwealth, who, though he has the status of citizen, cannot in many respects use it. For example, General Grant was a citizen and subject of Illinois before, during, and after his presidency and his travels, but he could aid in ruling, only at home, and under the state, that is, when properly circumstanced. Is it not obvious, then, that the congress of states, by admitting a new state, acknowledges her equality, and her sovereignty over her domain, as well as her equal right to participate in federal government; but does not confer sovereignty by the admission? We must note that the power of congress is not one to admit a province, or other subdivision or dependency, or any body of lower grade than a state, i. e. a political organization of equal rank with those already in union. With deference, I submit some reasons for this view: The power to admit states must be strictly confined to what is written. Without some expression, it cannot be presumed that the states intended to have any inferior bodies in the union. Webster's powerful argument for imposing conditions on Missouri [see Appendix F] was not followed; but the opposite principle seemed to prevail. Among other advocates of it, the great Clay, in 1819, came down from the speaker's chair, and argued five hours against conditions, and hence for absolutely equal states. The technical word "state" is applied, in the constitution, to New York, Virginia, Maine, and Texas, just as it is to France, Italy, Russia, and Spain. [Art. III. § 2; Amendment XI.] And the very thing that makes a state differ from any inferior political organization, is sovereignty. As Daniel Webster said when the constitution uses well-known language, it uses it in its well-known sense. Again, at the very moment of using the word "state," to designate one of the parties that were to ratify and establish the new constitution, the then existing league or federal compact pledged the faith of all the states, that each was a sovereign one, up to the actual going into effect of the new system. [See the 2d article of Confederation.] And this equal sovereignty of the states in the union, was the view of all the leading fathers. [See Part I., Chapter VII.] And, finally, the country has always acted on this idea, for North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Texas were confessedly admitted as absolutely equal, while the ordinance as to the northwest territory, and the Louisiana treaty, provided for the admission as equals of the new states to be carved thereout. Can you think, dear reader, of any political difference between Ohio and Connecticut, Virginia and Missouri, New Jersey and Texas, Georgia and California, as to status, capacity, or rights? Has not each her name, people, organism, autonomy, and place and representation in union? Can it be that the common governmental agency of these sisters holds discretion to treat them otherwise than as absolute equals? CHAPTER XI. THE ULTIMATE ARBITER. N the questions of ultimate supremacy and self-preservation, the fathers seldom did more than incidentally speak, but, as far as they went, they spoke plainly; and all the history of establishing the American federal polity shows, that, in devising the system, they assumed the existence, integrity, and sovereignty of the states, as pre-existent and indestructible facts or entities. The great aim of all was to preserve the said communities, and unite their authority in the general government of their subjects, and their strength in their common defence. To these ends, the said thirteen communities, which the people were, federally made an agency, and charged it with a few important specific duties. As to such matters as prevention, defence, and remedy against evils, dangers, attacks, and hurts, local and internal, these pre-existent commonwealths, each with full mental and governing faculties, original right, and unlimited power, took natural cognizance, and made full provision. The capacity, the authority, and the duty of self-defence must be where dwells the original and inherent mind; for the idea of direct mental, or instinctive, control of physical force is necessitated; and, as attack and hurt are local, the original right, the self-capacity, the self-power, and the sense of duty must be on the spot, feeling, knowing, and acting at once, and directly, for defence or repulsion. Where harm can come, the power and duty to protect and remedy should be near. No Federal Capacity or Duty for Direct Local Defence. — On the other hand, the federal "agents and servants," as the fathers call them, are far removed from the troubles; they only act with delegative authority, and as directed in writing; they are charged with a few important general affairs, and prohibited from meddling with local ones; they are not in duty bound even to know of, originally, much less act on, danger or harm in a state, but must await official advices of it, as well as a formal official call for aid, if this be needed, a call not made on them, but on associated sovereigns, under a treaty stipulation, a call which the government can respond - to, only as an agent and servant. A million cases of domestic violence might occur, without the power, duty, or even attention of the federal agency being required; and in our ninety-odd years of federal history, we have had but two or three such exigencies. It is obvious, then, that all the essentials and ideas of ultimateness are concentred in the commonwealth, where the inherent and original mind dwells, and, in self-defence, directly and functionally acts, with its own organs and instruments; and where Jehovah has placed both the power and the duty of self-preservation. And it seems to follow necessarily 1st. That the state is the ultimate arbiter on all questions certainly, on all that touch her existence, integrity, and sovereignty; 2d. That as the only questions the states, as the establishers of the constitution, intended to place under their federal government and courts, were selected and stated in the federal instrument, all thereout must remain inter-state or international in their character; 3d. That all interpretation or construction must be in favor of the grantors and against the grantees of powers; and 4th. That any federal official, to save himself from the stain and infamy of perjury, must show the written intent of the people to be, that he shall have the specific powers he claims and uses. And here I would stop and ask of the federal judiciary - with due respect, but most solemnly and earnestly to show the power or powers that make them and their co-ordinates "supreme and above the states" that gave them official existence; ratified and established their only commission; and exacted their oath to obey and preserve it. - But let us proceed further on this line, and ask the question, in reference to the "terms of union," as the fathers called them, or the "articles of union," to use the federal convention's phrase: Who is to Judge of Broken Conditions and Forfeitures? -- On reflection, we shall see that when South Carolina (or Massachusetts) federalized herself, she was acting with her own will, from the instinct and with the duty of self-preservation, under the direct authority of God, Who, by making the social instinct a part of man's being, caused society as much as He did man, and made "self-preservation the first law of nature" for both. Self-preservation of the state, then, being the object of both the grants and the conditions, who is to judge as to the violations of the conditions and the forfeiture of the grants, the grantor or the grantee? the sovereign or the subject? the principal or the agent? the master or the servant? The question needs no answer. The God of nature has determined it as to any state—for instance, South Carolina, New York, or Massachusetts-by making self-preservation the first, best, and most imperative law of her being, and giving her a distinct and independent intellect with which to investigate, reason, judge, and will. The possession of mind constitutes the moral being, and implies moral obligations. The state's instinct and duty of self-preservation, like her bodily and mental individuality, continued unchanged after the union was formed, so that she was morally compelled to consider and decide- and especially in the last resort any and all questions affecting her being, her integrity, and her right of government. And under the reciprocal obligations between Massachusetts (or South Carolina) as a body, and the members composing her, she is to govern and protect them, and they are to obey and support her. These duties are essential to the republican social compact. Her statehood and sovereignty involve their liberty. They are she, and she is they. This compact is the only possible tie of allegiance, for the state stands in place of king, prince, or feudal lord. [IV. Kent, 424.] They are bound to defend her, and she them, to the death. This is the law of their nature and of God. She cannot delegate the power to decide in the last resort, but must exercise it herself. If she do not, she abandons statehood, and becomes a province or county, gives up her mental nature and will, neglects the highest of moral duties, violates the sacred law of her God-given being, and, in a word, commits the heinous crime of suicide. Hamilton himself, in defending the present federal pact against the charge of consolidating the states, or abating their ultimate sovereignty, said: "The states are essential component parts of the new system "The destruction of the states would be political suicide." [II. Ell. Deb. 304, 353.] And he further said: "The state governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by national authority. In a confederacy, the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely masters of their own fate." [Fed. 28.] The Pact Itself agrees with the above Philosophy. In the first place, the constitution recognizes throughout, the distinctness of individuality, and absolute independence of organism, mind, and will of the states; and winds up by providing that the said wills are to "ratify," and thereby "ordain and establish," the instrument and the government under it; each will to be declared by a convention. [See Article VII. of the pact.] In the second place, it provides that the wills of states are to amend. The will to do, and that to undo, must be equal. The power to repeal is precisely commensurate with that to ordain and enact. The will which "ordained and established," necessarily lived through the act, and continued unimpaired, so that it could, as it was in duty bound to do continually, consider whether the constituted government did |