SECTION XXXVII.

On the natural Tendency of making Fudg es and Crown Lawyers, Peers; of translating Bishops and annexing Preferments to Bishopricks, in what is called,

commendam.

IF

F there is any part of the constitution of England, in the praise of which eloquence may employ her most glowing colors, without entrenching upon the confines of truth, it is the JUDICIAL part of it. The purity of public justice in England, is unequalled in any country which the sun illuminates in his diurnal progress. The reason is obvi ous. The verdict is given by juries of men usually beyond the reach of corruption. No ministerial influence can descend to all the individuals, in middle and humble life, who may be called upon to sit in judgment, and ultimately decide, as jurors, on the property, the fame, and the life, of their fellow-citizens. We have lately had a most glorious instance of the virtue of private citizens, exercising this most important office. The verdicts given in the state trials, in one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four, do more honor to the British character, than all the military exploits in the reign of George the Third, Such verdicts make our con

stitution truly enviable to the nations of Europe. Twelve honest men, on each of these trials, proved to the world, that no power, no authority, no terror, nor even the factitious rage of aristocratical principles, which had been artfully fostered, could lead them to swerve from the right line of justice. They feared God, but not man; and posterity will honor them, when the names of subtle politicians, clothed with a brief but lucrative authority, if mentioned at all, shall be mentioned with detestation. It was well observed by a zealous and honest advocate on the occasion, that he could not despair of the case, when it was brought from the corrupt to the uncorrupt part of the constitution. The days of acquittal were the jubilees of truth, the triumphs of virtue; and, in a time of dejection, revived the hopes of patriotism and philanthropy.

Official judges, not having the final determination of the cause, but feeling the check of the JURIES, commonly conduct themselves, even in state trials, with some degree of candor and moderation. Indeed, we are so happy as to see men appointed to this office, in our time, whose tried integrity gives reason to believe, that, if they were not thus wisely checked, they would, with few exceptions, preserve impartiality.

Nevertheless, though much has been said on the independence of judges, and though

great praise is due to our king, who placed them in their offices for life, and not removable at his pleasure, yet it must be confessed, that there still remain temptations, which might have great influence on men less virtuous than our present judges are. It is observed, that PEERAGES, in modern times, have been bestowed, with, peculiar bounty, on lawyers; and some have ventured to say, that the expectation of this splendid reward may frustrate all endeavours to secure, especially in state trials, the perfect independence of the judges who preside. It is not enough that they do not fear removal from their dignified office. Their hopes may influence more than their fears. They may hope to add to opulence the dignity of family elistinction, escutcheons, coronets, and hereditary seats in the legislature. If themselves have seen too much of the vanity and folly of worldly pomp to admire it, (which, however, is not often the case with men who may be great lawyers, without any philosophy or religion), yet they may have sons, wives, daughters, relatives, and friends, to whom the splendor of life, (as they have, possibly, little solid merit), is valuable in the highest degree. A peerage is therefore, for the most part, a very powerful allurement, I will not say, to disguise the truth or pervert the law, but obsequiously to seek ministerial favor.

When peerages are lavished on lawyers high in place, it is a circumstance viewed with some degree of jealousy by those who are willing to guard constitutional liberty with unwinking vigilance. Perhaps it might afford satisfaction to such men, if judges were by law excluded from all higher elevation; if they were indeed most amply paid and most respectfully revered; but for the sake of preventing the possibility of a wrong bias, where the happiness of the people is most intimately concerned, were prevented from viewing a brilliant dazzling coronet, suspended as their reward, over the scales of justice.

But here an objector will urge, with serious solicitude, that as the House of Lords is a court of judicature, in the last resort, a court of appeal from every court in the kingdom, it is necessary that it should be well supplied with lawyers of eminence.

On this subject Mr. PALEY says: "There appears to be nothing in the constitution of the House of Lords; in the education, habits, character, or professions of the members who compose it; in the mode of their appointment, or the right by which they succeed to their places in it, that should qualify them for their arduous office; except, perhaps, that the elevation of their rank and fortune affords a security against the offer and influence of SMALL bribes....

Officers of the army and navy, courtiers, ecclesiastics; young men who have just attained the age of twenty-one, and who have passed their youth in the dissipation and pursuits which commonly accompany the possession or inheritance of great fortunes; country gentlemen, occupied in the management of their estates, or in the care of their domestic concerns and family interests; the GREATER part of the assembly born to their station, that is, placed in it by CHANCE; most of the rest advanced to the peerage for services and from motives utterly unconnected with legal erudition;.... these men compose the tribunal to which the constitutionentrusts the interpretation of her laws, and the ultimate decision of every dispute between her subjects!".

From this very degrading representation of the House of Lords, the Reverend Archdeacon proceeds to justify the practice of constantly placing in it, some of the most eminent and experienced lawyers in the kingdom. He would, I think, with more propriety have argued against rendering one part of the legislature a court of justice, designed both to make and execute the laws; because every solid politician has agreed in the propriety of keeping the legislative and judicial powers as separate and as distant from each other as it is possible.

I leave this point for the discussion of future political writers, and satisfy myself with