the legislation proposed. How much more will the brutal ill-humour of a man be excited against a woman who, as the mother of a family, not only imposes additional expense upon-if he will pay it but also legally unfits herself for contributing anything towards it in the act. . . . . It is indubitable that no greater blow could be struck at the popularity of marriage among the lower orders than this; that no more cogent reasons for illicit connections among the operative-class could easily be devised."*

I am anxious to quit this part of my subject, and that must be my excuse for dealing with yet another phase of it-and that the very gravest phase of all-by means only of still another quotation, and also of my own writing, for in no other way can I do so as briefly. The subject that I now approach is thus mentioned by Mr. Jevons in his article. Having discussed some obvious objections to schemes similar to his own, he continues :-"The Factory Act Commissioners bring forward, moreover, other serious difficulties; for instance, the danger of adding a new and very powerful motive for concealment of birth." The Factory Act Commissioners did, indeed, not only bring forward this consideration as a serious difficulty, but considered it so serious a one as to be insuperable, and four or five years before another Commission, which had undertaken the investigation of the question, arrived at the same conclusion. What induced them to do so was something even more serious, however, than the fear of concealment of birth, a something thus described ::

"Just as penalties on marriage will teach women to live without marriage, so penalties on child-bearing will deter women from having children born. . The crime of infanticide is no mere spectre of the imagination, it is a terrible and notorious fact. The vast impetus that would be given to the motives which most commonly induce it by these proposed changes in the law cannot be questioned, for by far the greater number of women who destroy their illegitimate children destroy them, not on account of the illegitimacy, but upon account of their utter inability from various causes to support them."+

On this passage I then asked the following questions, and expressed the subsequent opinion:-

"Are we to make this inability compulsory and universal among a class where the horrible temptation has already secured some hold? Are we to make it as operative-more operative-in the case of legitimate as of illegitimate children? It is a solemn question: yet that such would be the inevitable effect of excluding mothers peremptorily from work there is grave reason to fear."‡

To that opinion, expressed seven years ago, I hold, in spite of, and not less in consequence of, all that has been since added to the controversy; and even, accepting for the moment as proven many of the cruelties that Mr. Jevons charges upon mothers in the factory districts and elsewhere, I would say, nevertheless, that this is essentially a case in which "the remedy would be worse than the disease."

One or two other issues were mentioned as being necessary to be taken into account before practical legislators should be expected to * Fortnightly Review, May, 1875, p. 674,-"The Employment of Mothers in Factories," by W. Cooke Taylor.

"Infant Mortality: Its Causes and Remedies." Manchester: A. Ireland & Co. "The Employment of Mothers in Factories." Fortnightly Review, May, 1875.

pledge themselves to the scheme propounded. It would be necessary to show, it was said, that even if it were desirable, it also was feasible; that the machinery provided for putting it in operation was of a trustworthy and unexceptionable kind; that the operation itself was a legitimate stretch of the authority and functions of government. With regard to the first-named it would be hasty to say at once that anything is impossible only because there are great difficulties in its way. The difficulties in the way of such an enterprise as this, however, seem not only overwhelming, but the more overwhelming the more closely they are surveyed. Let us reflect, for instance, for even ever so short a time, upon the endless artifices that could, and assuredly would, be used to balk the success of so meddling a piece of legislation. Let us think of the dangers, to delicacy on one side, and to actual health on the other, that might be incurred. Let us think of the deteriorating effects that would be produced by the resort to such artifices. Let us consider the exceeding hardships of putting the law in force in some cases, in such a one for instance as that described in the quotation from Mrs. Butler's letter. I quite agree with Mr. Jevons that "any law which.... becomes entirely ineffective is a reproach to legislation, and by first quieting agitation, and then discouraging further efforts, does far more harm than good," and therefore if such a law as this were required to be enforced it should be enforced efficiently. But imagine the popular outcry that would be raised against it, and justly raised against it, if at any time it should result in a terrible disaster involving possibly the life of one of the working women concerned. Such a catastrophe might occur at any time. Consider its prying, petty character; the amazing interference with personal rights and responsibilities that it would sanction; the private and often painful details with which it would be constantly concerned. Nor are these difficulties lessened, but rather much increased, when we unite in consideration with them the machinery by which the law is proposed to be impelled. I have nothing to say against the Factory Inspectors as a body, but so far as I know, there is not anything in their training that would qualify them for the medical duties that would thus be thrust upon them, and I do not think therefore that they should undertake them. I should have thought indeed that if inspection were to be furnished from the Factory Department at all, it should rather be looked for from among the certifying surgeons than the inspectors, and I offer Mr. Jevons the suggestion. But against the police being entrusted with any portion of these duties I venture to enter my strongest protest. They have many important duties to perform already, and for the most part they perform them not merely well, but admirably. There are several other important duties, even in this connection, which might with advantage be added to the list. But this particular duty under review is one for which I believe them to be most eminently disqualified, an opinion which I also believe will be shared by every honest industrious working woman who might look forward to being at some time handed over to their tender mercies.

There remains a final issue to discuss, and I approach the discussion of it with a feeling of relief, almost of gladness. I am sorry indeed to part with my opponent, whose opinions up to now, I need scarcely assure him, I have done my utmost to confute, but I am happy to be able before parting to enter on some common ground of argument which I can cordially share with him. This last issue, too, is a general one, and there is no further need accordingly for the introduction of those painful details and particularities, which were inevitable, both upon his side and mine, in the earlier part of the discussion. It concerns the proper functions and sphere of Government in dealing with the protection of persons employed in productive labour generally. Speaking of the duty incumbent on the State to protect those who cannot protect themselves, Mr. Jevons says :—

"Philosophers will urge that we are invading abstract rights, and breaking through the teachings of theory. Political economists might no doubt be found to protest likewise that the principles of political economy are dead against such interference with the freedom of contract. But I venture to maintain that all these supposed natural abilities, principles, rules, theories, axioms, and the like, are at the best but presumptions or probabilities of good. There is, on the whole, a certain considerable probability that individuals will find out for themselves the best paths in life, and will be eventually the best citizens when left at liberty to choose their own course. But surely probability is rebutted or destroyed by contrary certainty."

These are weighty words, and admirably express a very weighty truth. They are moreover words that greatly needed to be spoken with authority and weight at the present time. The proper sphere of Government is the sphere of its highest usefulness, wherever that may lie, nor does it always lie, nor even for long periods of time usually lie, exactly in the same place. The duty of the statesman is to remedy proved abuses first, and fit them into his scheme of statescraft afterwards, as best he may. Here then I am gratified to find myself at one with my opponent at last. It is only in the application of these principles to particular cases that he and I do not agree, and specially, I will flatter myself in believing, in their application to this particular case. If Mr. Jevons had established a "contrary certainty" of advantage against the manifold disadvantages, some of which only I have pointed out here, which completely invalidate this last, and all similar proposals on the same matter, then the other issues involved in the contention might fairly have been left to settle themselves, or required at all events to show "contrary certainties" on the other side. It is because he has entirely failed to do this, while several of those other issues remain so momentous, so appalling indeed in all their possibilities and so utterly adverse to his argument, that this article has been written, and that I find myself, not a little to my surprise the while, not in the position of his disciple but his adversary :

"Infelix puer, atque impar congressus Achilles."

WHATELY COOKE TAYLOR.

"NATURAL RELIGION," BY THE AUTHOR

OF "ECCE HOMO."*

I

FIND it impossible, in reflecting upon this book, to get rid of an impression produced by its last three pages. That impression is one of doubt whether the ultimate purpose of the author may not be a very different one from that which the rest of the book has seemed to imply. The book appears to be written with the view of advocating Natural Religion and urging an intelligent acceptance of it. By Natural Religion the author means a worship which recognizes nothing but what is found in Nature, that is, in the known universe. In one or two places he lets fall a hint that he, personally, does not consider the Natural Religion of which he is the advocate to be quite satisfactory. At the beginning of the second chapter he says (p. 25) :—

"I have suggested the thought of a God revealed in Nature, not by any means because such a view of God seems to me satisfactory, or worthy to replace the Christian view, or even as a commencement from which we must rise by logical necessity to the Christian view. I have suggested it because this is the God Whom the present age actually does, and, in spite of all opposition, certainly will worship, also because this aspect of God is common to all theologies, however much in some it may be slighted or depreciated, and lastly, because I do not believe that any theology can be real or satisfying that does not make it prominent as well as admit it. I can conceive no religion as satisfactory that falls short of Christianity."

Further on (p. 156) a possibility is suggested that the universe, when it is more thoroughly understood, may be disappointing to us. In that case, "humanity has also its necessary old age. And if its old age, then surely that which lies beyond old age. We must not merely give up the immortality of the individual soul-which some have persuaded themselves they can afford to give up-but we must learn to think of humanity itself as mortal. We must abandon ourselves to Pessimism."

Here again is a significant remark:-" Those who flatter themselves that they have shaken off the horror [of a nightmare religion] find a

*London: Macmillan & Co. 1882.

colder, more petrifying, incubus, that of Annihilation, settling down upon them in its place, so that one of them cries out, Oh! reprends ce Rien, gouffre, et rends-nous Satan" (p. 239). I add an anecdote which the author justly considers a striking one :

"It is said that the theophilanthropist Larevellère-Lepeaux once confided to Talleyrand his disappointment at the ill success of his attempt to bring into vogue a sort of improved Christianity, a benevolent rationalism which he had invented to meet the wants of a sceptical age. His propaganda made no way,' he said. 'What was he to do?' he asked. The ex-bishop politely condoled with him, feared it was a difficult task to found a new religion, more difficult than could be imagined, so difficult that he hardly knew what to advise! 'Still'-so he went on after a moment's reflection- there is one plan which you might at least try; I should recommend you to be crucified and to rise again the third day.'' "Yes, indeed!" the author exclaims, "this is a lightning-flash that clears the air!" I looked, but looked in vain, to see how the author would associate his Natural Religion with the Religion of Calvary rather than with the scheme of the theophilanthropist; and when I came to the end of the book I could not help asking in bewilderment, Was he laughing in his sleeve, with Talleyrand, at the weakness of his own newest religion? But these passages are lost in the midst of what seems to be the unqualified advocacy of a religion freed from supernaturalism. What lay beneath them becomes more evident when we arrive at the final pages. "But what of Supernaturalism?" asks the author (p. 258). And his answer is as follows:-"Throughout this volume it has been held aloof." The author has denied "that supernaturalism is necessary either to the idea, or to the practical vigour, or to the popular diffusion, of religion." He has maintained that "when it is made the mainspring of religion it does harm."

"But supernaturalism in religion is quite another thing when it is not thus made the mainspring. If we have learnt to see our God in Nature rather than outside Nature, it does not follow that we are to regard Him as limited by Nature, that is, Nature as known to us. We are all supernaturalists thus far that we all believe in the existence of a world beyond our present knowledge. It is practical Supernaturalism when we allow this world beyond our science to influence us in thought, feeling, or action. We may do so by holding that though we have not science of it yet we have probabilities or powerful presentiments or lastly indications given through exceptional unaccountable occurrences called miracles, which together make its existence practically important to us.

"And if we can think so and if the news thus brought to us are good news, who will not say that a supernatural religion, thus supplementing a natural one, may be precious, nay perhaps indispensable? So much knowledge does our life need, and so little satisfying are the revelations of science, that to many, if not most, of those who feel the need of religion all that has been offered in this book will perhaps at first seem offered in derision. It will be inconceivable to them that religion can be mainly concerned with what all know and all admit. . . . . When the supernatural does not come in to overwhelm the natural and turn life upside down, when it is admitted that religion deals in the first instance with the known and the natural, then we may well begin to doubt whether the known and the natural can suffice for human life. No sooner do we try to think so than pessimism raises its head. The more our thoughts widen and deepen, as the universe grows upon us and we become accustomed to boundless space and time, the more