Matter and Memory |
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Page iii
... mind which seeks in the past , in order to apply them to the present , those repre- sentations which are best able to enter into the present situation . -from Chapter II : " The Two Forms of Memory " TRANSLATORS ' NOTE THIS translation ...
... mind which seeks in the past , in order to apply them to the present , those repre- sentations which are best able to enter into the present situation . -from Chapter II : " The Two Forms of Memory " TRANSLATORS ' NOTE THIS translation ...
Page iii
... mind which seeks in the past, in order to apply than to the present, those repre- sentatior tie to enter into the present situation, — from Chapter II: "The '[wo Forms oi Memory" TRANSLATORS* NOTE This translation of Monsieur Bergson's ...
... mind which seeks in the past, in order to apply than to the present, those repre- sentatior tie to enter into the present situation, — from Chapter II: "The '[wo Forms oi Memory" TRANSLATORS* NOTE This translation of Monsieur Bergson's ...
Page vii
... mind in such a way as , we hope , to lessen greatly , if not to overcome , the theoretical difficulties which have always beset dualism , and which cause it , though suggested by the immediate verdict of consciousness and adopted by ...
... mind in such a way as , we hope , to lessen greatly , if not to overcome , the theoretical difficulties which have always beset dualism , and which cause it , though suggested by the immediate verdict of consciousness and adopted by ...
Page viii
... mind and for his mind , or even , more gener- ally , exists only for mind , as Berkeley held . Such a man would always maintain that the object exists independently of the consciousness which perceives it . But , on the other hand , we ...
... mind and for his mind , or even , more gener- ally , exists only for mind , as Berkeley held . Such a man would always maintain that the object exists independently of the consciousness which perceives it . But , on the other hand , we ...
Page ix
... mind against any of the views that we put forward , let him ask himself whether these objections do not imply his return to one or the other of the two points of view above which we urge him to rise . Philosophy made a great step ...
... mind against any of the views that we put forward , let him ask himself whether these objections do not imply his return to one or the other of the two points of view above which we urge him to rise . Philosophy made a great step ...
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Common terms and phrases
actual affection affective sensation afferent nerves aphasia appears associationism atoms become brain ceived centres ception cerebral common connexion consciousness consists continuity contrary corresponding degree Descartes diagram distinct distinguish division dualism duration effort empiricism epiphenomenal existence experience extensity fact function habit hand homogeneous homogeneous space hypothesis idea idealism impressions independent indetermination infinitely divisible internal kind lesion less living material world matter memory-image mental ments merely metaphysical mind motion movements moving body nascent nature nerves nervous elements nervous system ness organism ourselves pass past perceived phenomena Pierre Janet plane possible action precise present perception problem prolong psychology pure memory pure perception reaction realism reality recognition recollections regard relation remains representation resemblance retina sciousness sensations sense sensible qualities sensori-motor sensory space spinal cord spirit supposed tactile theory things tion uncon unextended vibrations virtual action visual visual perception whence whole
Popular passages
Page 41 - This conductor is composed of an enormous number of threads which stretch from the periphery to the centre, and from the centre to the periphery.
Page 13 - I term my perception of the universe, and which may be entirely altered by a very slight change in a certain privileged image - my body. This image occupies the centre; by it all the others are conditioned; at each of its movements everything changes, as though by a turn of a kaleidoscope. Here, on the other hand, are the same images, but referred each one to itself, influencing each other no doubt, but in such a manner that the effect is always in proportion to the cause: this is what I term the...
Page xii - There is a close connexion between a state of consciousness and the brain : this we do not dispute. But there is also a close connexion between a coat and the nail on which it hangs, for if the nail is pulled out the coat falls to the ground. Shall we say then that the shape of the nail gives us the shape of the coat or in any way corresponds to it ? No more are we entitled to conclude because the psychical fact is hung on to a cerebral state that there is any parallelism between the two series psychical...
Page 172 - Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some period of our history, we become conscious of an act sui generis by which we detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first, in the past in general, then, in a certain region of the past - a work of adjustment, something like the focusing of a camera.
Page viii - Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of 'images.' And by 'image' we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing — an existence placed halfway between the 'thing
Page 44 - As my body moves in space, all the other images vary, while that image, my body, remains invariable. I must therefore make it a centre, to which I refer all the other images.
Page 39 - The truth is that the point P, the rays which it emits, the retina and the nervous elements affected, form a single whole ; that the luminous point P is a part of this whole ; and that it is really in P, and not elsewhere, that the image of P is formed and perceived.
Page 4 - All seems to take place as if, in this aggregate of images which I call the universe, nothing really new. could happen except through the medium of certain particular images, the type of which is furnished me by my body.
Page xii - But there is also a close connection between a coat and the nail on which it hangs, for, if the nail is pulled out, the coat falls to the ground. Shall we say, then, that the shape of the nail gives us the shape of the coat, or in any way corresponds to it? No more are we entitled to conclude, because the physical fact is hung on to a cerebral state, that there is any parallelism between the two series psychical and physiological.
Page 248 - But we must not confound the data of the senses, which perceive the movement, with the artifice of the mind, which recomposes it. The senses, left to themselves, present to us the real movement, between two real halts, as a solid and undivided whole.