Matter and Memory |
Contents
1 | |
CHAPTER II | 86 |
OF THE SURVIVAL OF IMAGES MEMORY | 170 |
CHAPTER IV | 233 |
Method 238245 Indivisibility of movement 246253 | 246 |
Real movement 254259 Perception and matter | 259 |
and extension 277291 Soul and body 291298 | 291 |
Summary and Conclusion 299332 | 299 |
333 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
actual affection affective sensation afferent nerves aphasia appears associationism atoms become brain ceived centres ception cerebral common connexion consciousness consists continuity contrary corresponding degree Descartes diagram distinct distinguish division dualism duration effort empiricism epiphenomenal existence experience extensity fact function habit hand homogeneous homogeneous space hypothesis idea idealism impressions independent indetermination infinitely divisible internal kind lesion less living material world matter memory-image mental ments merely metaphysical mind motion movements moving body nascent nature nerves nervous elements nervous system ness organism ourselves pass past perceived phenomena Pierre Janet plane possible action precise present perception problem prolong psychology pure memory pure perception reaction realism reality recognition recollections regard relation remains representation resemblance retina sciousness sensations sense sensible qualities sensori-motor sensory space spinal cord spirit supposed tactile theory things tion uncon unextended vibrations virtual action visual visual perception whence whole
Popular passages
Page xii - There is a close connexion between a state of consciousness and the brain : this we do not dispute. But there is also a close connexion between a coat and the nail on which it hangs, for if the nail is pulled out the coat falls to the ground. Shall we say then that the shape of the nail gives us the shape of the coat or in any way corresponds to it ? No more are we entitled to conclude because the psychical fact is hung on to a cerebral state that there is any parallelism between the two series psychical...
Page viii - Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of 'images.' And by 'image' we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing — an existence placed halfway between the 'thing
Page xii - But there is also a close connection between a coat and the nail on which it hangs, for, if the nail is pulled out, the coat falls to the ground. Shall we say, then, that the shape of the nail gives us the shape of the coat, or in any way corresponds to it? No more are we entitled to conclude, because the physical fact is hung on to a cerebral state, that there is any parallelism between the two series psychical and physiological.