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images 17 Relation between representation
perception 6973 l Approach to the problem of matter
Recollections 105118 Recollections and movements
Of the Survival of Images Memory
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actual affection affective sensation afferent nerves aphasia appears associationism atoms auditory become brain ceive centres ception cerebral common consciousness consequently consists continuity contrary corresponding degree Descartes diagram distinct distinguish division dualism duration effort empiricism epiphenomenal existence experience extensity fact function habit hand homogeneous homogeneous space hypothesis idea idealism images impressions independent indivisible infinitely divisible internal kind lesion less living material world matter memory-images mental ments merely metaphysical mind motion movements moving body nascent nature nerves nervous elements nervous system organism ourselves pass past perceived phenomena Pierre Janet possible action precise present perception prolong psychical psychology pure memory pure perception reaction realism reality recognition recollections regard relation remains representation resemblance retina sciousness sensations sense sensible qualities sensori-motor sensory space spinal cord spirit supposed tactile theory things tion uncon unextended vibrations virtual action visual visual perception whence whole
Page xi - There is a close connexion between a state of consciousness and the brain : this we do not dispute. But there is also a close connexion between a coat and the nail on which it hangs, for if the nail is pulled out the coat falls to the ground. Shall we say then that the shape of the nail gives us the shape of the coat or in any way corresponds to it ? No more are we entitled to conclude because the psychical fact is hung on to a cerebral state that there is any parallelism between the two series psychical...
Page vii - Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of 'images.' And by 'image' we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing — an existence placed halfway between the 'thing
Page xi - But there is also a close connection between a coat and the nail on which it hangs, for, if the nail is pulled out, the coat falls to the ground. Shall we say, then, that the shape of the nail gives us the shape of the coat, or in any way corresponds to it? No more are we entitled to conclude, because the physical fact is hung on to a cerebral state, that there is any parallelism between the two series psychical and physiological.