Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common LawDoes the seller of a house have to tell the buyer that the water is turned off twelve hours a day? Does the buyer of a great quantity of tobacco have to inform the seller that the military blockade of the local port, which had depressed tobacco sales and lowered prices, is about to end? Courts say yes in the first case, no in the second. How can we understand the difference in judgments? And what does it say about whether the psychiatrist should disclose to his patient's girlfriend that the patient wants to kill her? Kim Lane Scheppele answers the question, Which secrets are legal secrets and what makes them so? She challenges the economic theory of law, which argues that judges decide cases in ways that maximize efficiency, and she shows that judges use equality as an important principle in their decisions. In the course of thinking about secrets, Scheppele also explores broader questions about judicial reasoning—how judges find meaning in legal texts and how they infuse every fact summary with the values of their legal culture. Finally, the specific insights about secrecy are shown to be consistent with a general moral theory of law that indicates what the content of law should be if the law is to be legitimate, a theory that sees legal justification as the opportunity to attract consent. This is more than a book about secrets. It is also a book about the limits of an economic view of law. Ultimately, it is a work in constructive legal theory, one that draws on moral philosophy, sociology, economics, and political theory to develop a new view of legal interpretation and legal morality. |
Contents
The Sociology of Secrecy | 3 |
The Trails of Five Secrets | 5 |
The Concept of Secrecy | 12 |
Forms of Secrecy | 16 |
Justifications for Secrets | 17 |
A Note on Lies and HalfTruths | 22 |
Secrets and the Social Distribution of Knowledge | 23 |
The Economic Analysis of Secrecy An Economic Hypothesis | 24 |
Special Confidence | 149 |
The Conduct of the Knowledgeable Party | 151 |
Comparing Economic and Contractarian Theories of Nondisclosure and Fraud | 161 |
Legitimate Nondisclosure and Equal Access to Information | 167 |
Understanding Privacy | 179 |
Secrecy and Privacy Secrets in the Shadow of Privacy | 181 |
Privacy Claims and Standing to Sue | 187 |
Threshold Rules and Direct Secrets | 191 |
An Overview | 25 |
The Law and Economics of Secrecy | 31 |
Efficient Secrets | 41 |
Secrecy and Strategy | 43 |
The Social Context of Strategic Secrets | 45 |
The Costs of SecretKeeping in a Reactive World | 48 |
Developing a New Jurisprudence | 55 |
A Contractarian Theory of Law | 57 |
Consent as a Basis for Legal Morality | 60 |
How Consent Works | 63 |
Those Who Choose | 66 |
Holistic or Piecemeal | 68 |
Negative and Positive Contractarianism | 69 |
Direct Secrets | 70 |
Serial and Shared Secrets | 79 |
Contractarianism and Utilitarianism | 83 |
A Theory of Legal Interpretation The Mutual Construction of Facts and Rules | 86 |
The Need for a Theory of Interpretation | 88 |
The Interpretive Theory of The Economic Analysis of Law | 91 |
A Theory of Legal Interpretation | 94 |
Implications for the Study of Law | 103 |
How Law Is Not Like Literature | 105 |
Understanding Fraud | 109 |
The Nondisclosure Puzzle and Equal Access to Information | 111 |
When the Buyer Knows More than the Seller | 112 |
When the Seller Knows More than the Buyer | 115 |
Equal Access as a Theory of the Doctrine of Nondisclosure | 119 |
Comparing Contractarian and Economic Theories | 124 |
Legally Relevant Facts in Fraud Cases | 127 |
Buyer and Seller | 130 |
Equal or Superior Means of Knowledge | 134 |
The Relation of the Parties to Each Other | 138 |
The Nature of the Agreement | 143 |
Direct Secrets | 198 |
Serial Secrets | 204 |
Overdisclosure | 206 |
Identification | 211 |
Confidential Relations | 222 |
A Note on Secondhand Secrets | 226 |
Trade Secrets as Corporate Privacy | 231 |
Secrecy | 232 |
Investment | 236 |
Confidential Relations | 240 |
Independent Discovery | 245 |
Comparing Economic and Contractarian Theories of Privacy | 248 |
A Contractarian Theory of Privacy | 258 |
Understanding Implied Warranties | 267 |
The Rule and Reality of Caveat Emptor in New York State 18041900 | 269 |
Caveat Emptor as Legal Puzzle | 271 |
Core Applications of the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor | 275 |
The Original Exceptions to the Caveat Emptor Rule | 280 |
18251900 | 285 |
The Executory Contract 18401900 | 287 |
18601900 | 291 |
Economic and Contractarian Theories of Implied Warranty | 292 |
Concluding | 299 |
The Logic of Legal Secrets | 301 |
Toward a Contractarian Theory of Law | 308 |
Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence | 316 |
An Introduction for Social Scientists | 321 |
References | 329 |
Table of Cases | 339 |
| 349 | |
| 353 | |
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Common terms and phrases
A's secrets access to information acquired information action actor American Law Institute analysis of law argued argument Brown and Root buyer casually acquired caveat emptor chapter Chicago claim common law confidential relationship consent considered contract contractarian theory decided decision defective defendant DePaul University direct secrets discreditable economic analysis ECONOMIC AND CONTRACTARIAN equal access FRAMING SECRECY Georg Simmel IMPLIED WARRANTIES individuals interpretation invasion of privacy investment involving Jeremy Waldron judges JURISPRUDENCE Justice keeping secrets knew knowledge Kronman Laidlaw Law Review legal rules legally relevant facts legitimate means moral nondisclosure normative particular person plaintiff Posner present principle problem property rights question Ratio Decidendi rational reason Repide require disclosure result reveal Richard Posner secret-keeper seller SERIAL SECRETS situation social someone sort strategic secrets target tell theory of law tion tort trade secret transaction costs UNDERSTANDING FRAUD UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY University Press York



