of Charles II, yet, if the notes and observations which Dr. Parr has now subjoined had been inserted in the text, and been given to the audience from the pulpit, Barrow must have shrunk into a dwarf in the comparison; and instead of resembling our learned preacher to any brother clergyman either of antient or modern times, we should have sought for his prototype among the parliamentary orators during Mr. Hast ings's impeachment, or among the indefatigable counsel on the state trials at the Old Bailey. Considering ourselves as readers, however, and not as auditors, we may say that Dr. Parr has, indeed, selected "a subject of great pith and moment;" and that he has discussed it with such ingenuity, and enforced his remarks with such numerous combinations of erudition, that he excites the liveliest interest, and commands a high degree of respect, even when the judgment hesitates to abandon itself to the swelling torrent of his eloquence,

Mr, Godwin's doctrine of universal philanthropy, as exhi-bited in his well-known work intitled "An Enquiry concerning Political Justice," having engaged the attention of men of learning and science, Dr. Parr deemed this a fit opportunity for publicly examining its merits, delivering his opinion respect ing it, and marking the precise line of conduct which the duty of benevolence prescribes to us as social beings. Much as we admire the richness and variety of his language, we could have wished that, in this important discussion, he had been less rhetorical; that he had displayed less of the character of the literary combatant, and more of the calm and discriminating habits of the philosopher. If Mr. Godwin be (to use the preacher's words in allusion to him) an adventurer who is guilty of the glaring extravagance of attempting to render immediate service to the whole species,' this absurdity constitutes not a crime of that enormity which demands excessive severity of castigation it is rather an amiable enthusiasm; and a Christian may find an example to justify' him in shedding some tears of generous pity over that man, though an infidel, who is convicted of loving too much. The cry, however, was raised against Mr. Godwin; and though he had publicly acknowleged the inaccuracy of his original statements respecting the principle of benevolence, the declamation of Dr. Parr proceeds as if that doctrine had received no modification. We who love truth more than Plato, or than Socrates, do not admire this mode of treating an adversary,

With regard to the principle itself of justice, or benevolence, as it respects the smaller circles of private and social life, and the great circle of human beings; since it had become a topic of inquiry, it was fairly embraced by the preacher; and he

was

¢

was happy in the choice of a text of scripture which contains an exhortation to both parts of this duty, and includes, as the Doctor observes, the substance without the form of genuine philosophy Gal. vi. 4. As we have therefore opportunity, let us do good to all men; especially unto them who are of the household of faith. A critical remark is made on the original expression ἐργαζώμεθα τὸ αγαθιν;, which does not merely imply " let us do good," but " let us work or labour to do it ;" for, as the Dr. shews in a learned note, the word employed by the apostle signifies doing a thing with great effort; grov being applied by Greek writers especially to works of agriculture, and being derived ab niga. Having explained the literal meaning, he proeeeds to illustrate the doctrine of the text; and to discharge his duty on the present occasion by, first, examining how far, in the constitution of human nature and under the circumstances of human life, the principles of particular and universal benevolence are compatible; and, secondly, by making some observations on the charitable institutions over which those gentlemen presided, to whom his discourse was particularly addressed.

We are inclined to believe that the benevolent affections generally require to be warmed into expansion, rather than to be checked and contracted by any chilling hand: but it is possible for wild, mistaken, and impracticable notions of philanthropy to prevail; and for sanguine individuals, by commencing the theory and practice of benevolence at the wrong end, to subvert the principle itself from its very foundation. Such persons ought to peruse the sermon now before us; the substance and tendency of which may be collected from the succeeding passages:

Whether we consider universal benevolence as a quality of nature, or a principle of action, it is highly expedient for us not to misunderstand it's properties or it's office. I admit, and I approve of it, as an emotion of which general happiness is the cause, but not as a paffion, of which, according to the usual order of human affairs, it could often be the object. I approve of it as a disposition to wish, and, as opportunity may occur, to desire and do good, rather than harm, to those with whom we are quite unconnected. I approve it as a capacity sometimes to receive uneasiness from their pains, and satisfaction from their joys; but an uneasiness and a satisfaction far less frequent, less intense, less permanent than the uneasiness and satisfaction which we feel for those around us, and by which we are stimulated to act, as we feel, in their behalf,

of

"A man," says the author of Ecclesiastes, "cannot find what is done under the sun, though he labour to seek it out; yea, though a wise man think to know it, yet he shall not be able to find it." Nature therefore preserved her usual economy and usual kindness, when she did not subject us to any exquisite or habitual anxiety for

an

an object so indistinct, so huge, so far surpassing our powers of exertion and even apprehension as universal good As an aggregate of blessings it is indeed secured by the aggregate efforts of individuals; just as, in the artificial division of labour, through a large and complicated system, he that attentively performs the task allotted to himself takes the surest method of contributing most amply to the cess of the whole.'

sac.

Is it my intention, then, to depreciate the propensity to "do good unto all men," in defiance of the text which commands us to labour in doing it? No. I mean only to state what, as an incentive to action, it ought to be, and what, as a part of our nature, it really is and happy were it for those, who seem to be the loudest in its praise, if they practically fulfilled the purposes which it unquestionably is qualified to answer. As a calm desire of general happiness, it puts us on our guard against the silent encroachments of self-love, or the calm desire of our own happiness-it assists us in quelling the fury of our malignant passions-it raises us above the narrow and sordid aims of our selfish affections-it impells us to attend to the dictates of our reason, when employed in considering by what means the welfare of our fellow-creatures may be most effectually secured -it attaches us to those means, when they are discovered, for the sake of the end-it facilitates and regulates the operations of every amiable, but more confined affection, which may be suited to particular cases, and which produces a greater or less quantity of good, and diffuses it among more or fewer persons, according to the station in which we are placed, and the powers with which we are endowed -it dissipates those gloomy views of human follies and human vices, which, by frequent meditation upon them, contract the heart, and infuse lurking and venomous sentiments of general ill-will towards our species-it incites us to take a higher pleasure, in contemplating the brighter side of every man's character-his talents, his attainments, and his virtues-it prepares us for "doing good unto all men, as we have opportunity," without impeding us in our attempts to do it unto them who are of the household of faith." Instead of separating us from those who are nearer, and therefore dearer to us, it eventually forms a closer union between them and ourselves, by representing them to us as parts of a great whole established and regulated by a common Creator, for the common purpose of happiness to all: and whether we deliberate before we act, or reflect after we have acted, it gives us a firmer confidence in the utility, a stronger love for the moral beauty of those particular affections, which, under the guidance of conscience, urge us to promote the welfare of their peculiar objects. If the modern philanthropists mean thus much only, their words are at a distance from their opinions; if they mean more, their opinions are at variance with facts and I leave them to make their own choice, between ambiguity and errour.'

In a strain of grave irony, Dr. Parr then proceeds to address those who, elevated to the super-sublime of universal philanthrophy, undervalue the interests of kindred, friends, benefactors, and countrymen; and he concludes with the following

splendid

splendid picture of the consequences resulting to those who are immediately connected with us, from an absorption of our private feelings and duties in vague notions of effecting the good of the whole species:

We may ask, if the elements which give life and vigour to the moral world should be dissolved-if the mother could forget the child that " hanged from her breasts"-if the friend, "with whom we took sweet counsel together," should forsake us, when we are compelled to beg our daily bread-if they, to whose succour we ran on the first sight of their distress, and poured" wine and oil into their bleeding wounds," should ponder, ere they stretch forth their hands to rescue us from wretchedness, and pause, lest peradventure some other human being might be found a little more virtuous, and a little more miserable than ourselves—if the tears of the widow and the cries of the orphan should be disregarded, till their conduct had passed the ordeal of some rigid principle, or it may be too, of some untoward prejudice, in those before whom they lie prostrate-if they who have trodden the same soil with ourselves, spoken the same language, followed the same customs, enjoyed the same rights, obeyed the same laws, bowed before the same altar, should be no more endeared to us, than other men, whose kindness we have never experienced, whose faces we have never seen, whose voices we have never heard - If all these things were done under the pretence of some obligation, which stern, inflexible justice lays upon us, to be extreme in marking what is done amiss, and to weigh every action of man, every motive to act, every consequence of acting, in the balance which every individual may set up within his own bosom for adjusting in every case the direct and most efficacious means to promote the general goodwhat would become of society, which parental affection, which friendship, which gratitude, which compassion, which patriotism do now uphold? how changed would be the scenes around us? how blunted the edge of all our finer affections? how scanty the sum of our hap piness? how multiplied and embittered the sources of our woe?

But between such a state as philosophy recommends, and that in which the will of the Almighty has placed us, there is fixed a gulph, which neither our social feelings, nor our sober reason will suffer us to pass "into regions of sorrow and doleful shades," where love and mutual confidence can never dwell.'

6

Dr. Parr considers the theory, which it is the chief object of this discourse to expose, as produced by the incubation of modern philosophy on modern philanthropy.' True philosophy, however, whether antient or modern, does not willingly assist in the generation of monsters; and were she consulted, she would say that the portrait drawn by the preacher bore no resemblance to any of her children.

It will not be required of us to take any notice of the second part of this discourse, which relates to the immediate occasion of its delivery: but the notes, which are numerous and im

portant,

portant, and which, together with the supplemental disquisitions, are seven times as extensive as the sermon, must not be passed over in silence. For their copiousness, the Dr. apologizes by urging his anxiety to place distinctly before the reader the opinions of many eminent writers on the interesting subject of benevolence; and in return for the labour which he has thus performed, the least compliment that we can pay is the offer of our thanks for the fund of learning which is here brought before our view.-The most prominent feature, in this vast miscellaneous Appendix, is an elaborate reply to the censures thrown on our English Universities by Mr. Gray and Mr. Gibbon. From an eulogy on our noble charitable Institutions, the transition was easy to a defence of the merit and utility of our national establishments for the advancement of learning and religion. Entering on this subject, then, with all the enthusiasm of a man of letters, and with the most ardent filial piety towards his alma mater, Dr. Parr is soon animated to a strain of the most vivid and empassioned declamation: in which he dwells on the advantages of these public seminaries; enumerates the long catalogue of distinguished characters which, even during his own life-time, they have produced; pays classical tributes to his friends; and endeavours to impress on the minds of his readers, the national importance of these magnificent seminaries. In his defence of Universities against Mr. Gibbon, and amid his praise of their members, Dr. Parr thus speaks of himself:

Ill would it become me, tamely and silently to acquiesce in the strictures of this formidable accuser, upon a seminary to which I owe many obligations, though I left it, as must not be dissembled, before the usual time, and, in truth, had been almost compelled to leave it, not by the want of a proper education, for I had arrived at the first place in the first form of Harrow School, when I was not quite fourteen-not by the want of useful tutors, for mine were eminently able, and to me had been uniformly kind-not by the want of ambition, for I had begun to look up ardently and anxiously to academical distinctions-not by the want of attachment to the place, for I regarded it then, as I continue to regard it now, with the fondest and most unfeigned affection-but by another want, which it were unneceffary to name, and for the supply of which, after some hesitation, I determined to provide by patient toil and resolute self-denial, when I had not completed my twentieth year. I ceased, therefore, to reside, with an aching heart: 1 looked back with mingled feelings of regret and humiliation to advantages of which I could no longer partake, and honours to which I could no longer aspire: I visited my companions, my rivals, and my instructors, when either my leisure or my circumstances permitted: I was assisted in a most gracious manner by the Chancellor and several Heads of Houses, when the degree of a Master had become requisite for me, in the pursuit of a most precious ob

ject,