leaving the Fleet itself definitely superior to the opposing fleet." We required

(1) One large homogeneous fleet, complete in all units.

(2) Single supreme control, coupled with administrative decentralisation of squadrons.

(3) Combined training of units with their respective divisions.

(4) Combined training of fleets.

(5) Maintenance of effective strength at sea by the substitution of other vessels, to replace those withdrawn for purposes of refit or of repair.

How far did we conform to these principles ?

Instead of one large homogeneous fleet, complete in all units and superior to the fleet of the potential enemy, there are to be two divisions of the main fleet, which are apparently to be based upon separate ports, and a third division, the Atlantic Fleet, an "adjunct," based upon a third port, and under the command of a separate Commander-in-Chief. Under these conditions the principles (1) of homogeneity and (2) of single supreme control are not observed, and a policy of dispersal of forces instead of one of concentration has been adopted. The fleet should be organised in three divisions, some two of which should be always together, and when together they should be superior to the fleet of the potential enemy. All three divisions should be under one Commander-in-Chief for training in peace and during war, the administrative functions being entrusted to the Admirals commanding divisions. Further, I fail to understand how (3) the combined training of units with their respective divisions and (4) the combined training of fleets can be adequately carried into execution. With regard to (5), the maintenance of effective strength at sea by the substitution of other vessels to replace those withdrawn for purposes of refit or of repair, no statement has been published. I am therefore unaware whether the Admiralty Order of August last abolishing the system of substitution is still in force. The proposed redistribution of the Fleet, like previous redistributions, reduced effective strength, while "the necessity of increasing the personnel and therefore of incurring increased expenditure, is avoided by means of the withdrawal of four battleships and two armoured cruisers from active commission." In Lord Charles Beresford's opinion the strategical and tactical situation produced by this policy must be regarded with "the very gravest apprehension." He had laboured under a similar apprehension throughout the period of his command, and he reviewed the chopping and changing which had taken place during that time, the original reduction of the Channel Fleet from 66 vessels to 21, its subsequent increase under pressure to 60 vessels, the creation of the so-called Home Fleet containing nearly 250 vessels, "of which only a fifth were fully manned, the remainder being only a reserve fleet manned

by nucleus crews," which was nevertheless "ordered to be regarded as an advance striking force for immediate action, and always to be kept ready to proceed instantly, without an hour's delay, in execution of orders, as every minute would be of vital value." His demand that the three fleets, Channel, Home and Atlantic, should be combined from time to time for the purpose of fleet training under the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet, who would command them in time of war, had never been met except upon one occasion in October 1907, while so little effort was made to keep the Channel Fleet at effective strength that last September he was actually obliged to proceed to sea with six battleships instead of fourteen, and "during the two years of my command, the average number of vessels withdrawn for refit per week has been two to three battleships, one to two armoured cruisers, nine to ten destroyers."

Procedure of
Committee

THUS none of the five principles essential to the proper organisation of the Fleet for war, "upon the condition of whose observance I accepted my command," had been observed. It was equally obvious that no strategic scheme based on such defective arragements could be put into execution on the outbreak of war, "while the deficiency in the important units, small craft and destroyers, constituted a grave weakness. To the Board of Admiralty belonged the responsibility of the general conduct of a war, including the principal objective and the provision of the forces to be employed; but to the Admiral commanding belonged the responsibility of so using the forces placed under his orders as may best secure the end in view, and if he considered the forces at his disposal inadequate to secure that end, it was his duty to represent the matter to the Admiralty. Vainly had he endeavoured to secure a serious plan of campaign, or to induce the Admiralty to realise the deficiencies. Correspondence had continued up to December 1908, and on the 19th of that month "I received an intimation from the First Lord that he had reduced the term of my command from three years to two years, and that I should therefore be superseded on the 24th March following." To this remarkable letter, the Prime Minister replied:

Statements so grave upon matters vital to the national safety proceeding from an officer of your eminence and of your long and distinguished service,

clearly call for prompt and thorough examination. I propose, therefore, without any avoidable delay to institute an inquiry into the points you have laid before me. I shall myself preside over the inquiry, and I shall take steps to secure that those who are associated with me in conducting it are both impartial and competent.

The Sub-Committee began sitting on April 27, when Lord Charles Beresford amplified the views expressed in his letter. Throughout the inquiry he was accompanied by Admiral Sir Richard Custance, while the Admiralty was represented by Mr. McKenna and Sir John Fisher. After twelve meetings, devoted to the taking of oral and documentary evidence, a transcript of the whole proceedings was forwarded to Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson (a member of the Defence Committee), who subsequently gave the Sub-Committee his views, and was subjected to cross-examination. None of the evidence is published, but according to the Report, the general purport of Lord Charles Beresford's statement was to the effect that from April 15, 1907, when he assumed the command of the Channel Fleet, down to the date of his letter to the Prime Minister on April 2, 1909, "the Admiralty's arrangements for war were inadequate to secure the safety of the country," the principal defects lying under three main heads: Part I., the Organisation and Distribution of the Fleet in Home Waters; Part II., Small Craft and Destroyers; Part III., War Plans.

We are now in a position to admire the marvellous dexterity of the Sub-Committee in skating over the exceedingly thin ice provided for them by the Admiralty, with which, be The Report it remembered, their own fate as Cabinet Ministers was intimately and indissolubly bound up. The evidence on the one hand was so overwhelming. and the demeanour of the Admiralty so suspicious, that lawyers accustomed to sift facts like Mr. Asquith and Mr. Haldane could not fail to be shaken in their pre-conceived prejudices, while other members of the Committee equally imbued with the idea that all was for the best under the best of all possible Admiralties, were equally perturbed. At the same time to condemn the Admiralty was to condemn Ministerial colleagues, and to condemn themselves. Any general censure of Fisherism was therefore altogether out of the question. The problem was to let down Whitehall as gently as possible by

emphasising imaginary "difficulties," and avoiding explicit opinions upon disputed points, while at the same time recognising that things had not been as they should be, and promising improvement. This is the clue to the report of the SubCommittee, which will not have sat in vain if its members' eyes have at last been opened to the gravity of the position created by a Department which divides its time between nobbling newspapers, bamboozling politicians, and hocussing the public. We shall soon see whether Mr. Asquith and his colleagues have the courage of their convictions. The Report describes without attempting to explain or defend the mystifying changes which occurred in the distribution of British Sea Power in home waters from the moment Lord Charles Beresford accepted the Channel command. The dispersal of naval strength was so dangerous that "in his view . . . they were liable to be overwhelmed in detail in the event of an unforeseen attack." The Admiralty met this charge by a long rigmarole (reproduced in the Report) familiar to the readers of Fisherite journalese, who are habitually deluged and dazed with statistics of tons and guns, designed in the first place to show that though inferior in numbers to the potential enemy, the Channel Fleet was always superior in power while “the total strength of the British ships in full commission had been overwhelmingly superior to that of the ships maintained by any other nation in full commission, and the reserve strength of the British Fleet had been immensely superior to that of any other Power."

In the words of the Report:

The Admiralty claimed therefore, first, that even when the extreme possibilities of sudden attack are considered, the safety of the "Not Unimcountry was in fact secured by the distribution and organisapeachable" tion which existed during Lord Charles Beresford's two years of command; and, second, that behind the fully commissioned fleets we had such an overwhelming reserve of power that our predominance was secured in the event of any developed war. They pointed out that the organisation in Home waters during Lord Charles Beresford's period of command had been merely a necessary stage during a transitional period of exceptional difficulty in the development of the Home Fleet, and had not, they admitted, been from a strategical point of view an unimpeachable arrangement [our italics].

This damaging admission was presumably wrung from the Admiralty under the pressure of competent cross-examiners.

For the department primarily responsible for the safety of the State to confess that its organisation for war was "not unimpeachable," is to condemn itself. is to condemn itself. As regards the second point emphasised by Lord Charles Beresford, viz., that the Channel Fleet "had rarely been maintained at its numerical establishment owing to the constant withdrawal of ships for necessary repairs and refits," which in his opinion "was calculated to encourage an enemy meditating a sudden attack on this country to bring his fleet to a condition of complete readiness at a moment when our fleets were dispersed and depleted," the Sub-Committee reported that "while admitting that vessels withdrawn from the Channel Fleet for routine purposes of annual refit had not been replaced, the Admiralty claimed that-as already shown-that fleet had always been maintained in superior fighting strength to the largest fleet kept in full commission by any neighbouring nation, having regard to the superior quality of the British ships, and notwithstanding that the number of units was inferior." This, we believe, is the first official admission that ships withdrawn from the Channel Fleet had not been replaced, and that the Channel Fleet was frequently inferior in numbers to the potential enemy. The Sub-Committee thus ingeniously avoided the dilemma presented to them by the convincing evidence of Lord Charles Beresford and the need of covering a Government department: "While the Committee are of opinion that the Admiralty would have been better advised [our italics] in adhering throughout to the principle of placing the chief command in home waters in the hands of a single officer, they think that the exceptional difficulties which confronted the Board during this transitional stage in the evolution of the Home Fleet justified the dispositions made. They are furthermore of opinion that no danger to the country in fact resulted from those dispositions." In other words, Germany abstained from attacking us.

UPON the second point, i.e., as to the depleted state of the Channel Fleet, "the Committee are of opinion that the Admiralty made good their contentions "-a cryptic sentence Depletion of which makes one regret that the evidence was not published. Lord Charles Beresford had likewise strongly insisted that the Home Fleet, as organised during the

Channel Fleet