local conditions. Never was criticism less well founded. It is true that before leaving England to take up his Indian duties the new Commander-in-Chief was invited to draw up a memorandum on the military position in India. But the document was no more than a purely theoretical treatise-it was not in the least intended as a full or a final statement of the possibilities and difficulties attending the situation.

Needless to say, the leading conditions of military efficiency are axiomatic, and therefore universally applicable. It is universally true that a modern army-to borrow Lord Kitchener's own words-is not "a costly toy maintained for purposes of ceremonial and display," but "simply an insurance against national disaster." It is universally true that "expenditure of money on an inefficient army can no more be defended than the payment of premiums to an insolvent company." It is universally true that the application of business methods means that the efficiency of an army "must be purchased at the lowest possible price." If these were indeed Lord Kitchener's "preconceived notions," so much the better.

Of their specific applicability as a corrective to any shortcomings in India, it would have been strange indeed if Lord Kitchener had not known something even before he set foot in the country. Yet, so far from displaying undue haste in proposing changes, Lord Kitchener, with characteristic caution and ability to keep his own counsel, looked well about him before formulating any definite scheme of reform. The avenger of Gordon, as his countrymen well know, is no hustler. His plans for "smashing the Mahdi" were matured long years before they were carried out. His winding-up of the South African struggle was a task demanding not less patience and perseverance than determination and driving power.

Immediately on his landing in India on November 28, 1902, Lord Kitchener was of course bound to form some first impressions. He found no indication of any serious attempt to render our forces in India, for the critical first year of a campaign, independent of assistance from home. To secure this independence was an object which he set himself to attain. He needed no long experience either to note the want of co-ordination of military business among his own staff, or to mark the existence of a like

defect in those of the various commands. To meet these evils to some extent, he introduced reforms in the composition and working of staffs and commands, and at the same time sought to bring the departments composing Army Headquarters into closer touch with each other by an Army Order, issued early in 1903, establishing an Advisory Council at Army Headquarters, with himself as president. It will hardly be maintained that a previous Indian experience was necessary to convince Lord Kitchener of the need of this important measure.

In order, however, to form his own judgment on specifically Indian questions of military policy, the new Commander-in-Chief determined to take plenty of time to investigate the situation. His first object was to make a thorough personal examination of the terrain of the North-West Frontier. In April 1903 he rode through the whole of the southern section of the frontier, from Nushki through the Zhob, Gumal, Tochi, and Kuram valleys, to Peshawar. In the following August he started on a six weeks' tour through the northern section, from the north end of the Malakand Pass, through Chitral and Gilgit to the Kilik and Minteke Passes leading on to the Pamirs. The distance traversed in the last-named journey by riding and walking was little short of 1500 miles, and was covered in sixty days. On only one occasion did the party pass two consecutive nights at the same place.

These journeys, undertaken by the Commander-in-Chief in order to make himself acquainted with frontier problems at first hand, gave him time to ponder over the bearings of important administrative questions, as well as to absorb and assimilate the opinions of high experts to which he had already lent an attentive ear.

At Simla in 1903, during the interval between the two frontier journeys, Lord Kitchener had discussed certain administrative topics with the Viceroy, but no question was definitely raised, and the Commander-in-Chief determined to postpone any formal proposals until he should have occupied his post for a full twelvemonth.

Twice that period was, in fact, to elapse before he took action. Not until January 1, 1905, did Lord Kitchener's opinions crystallise into a definite shape. The greatest and the fundamental of all

the reforms he desiderated was the abolition of the dual control, as he himself appropriately named the co-existence side by side of a Commander-in-Chief having a seat on the Viceroy's Council, and of a Military Member of Council holding a position on it equal in status with, and superior in influence to, that of the Commander-in-Chief. The points of the controversy which ensued are too familiar, and its outcome is too recent, to be treated here at length. Lord Kitchener has lately reminded us that, though in the long run good results were attained in the past under the dual control, they were only reached "by following very devious roads, and therefore took much time to accomplish, while the methods employed were far from economical, and the policy was lacking in continuity." The system certainly involved enormous delay and endless discussion. The two departments became, as it has been expressively described, " paperlogged "with unnecessary verbiage. Efficiency was outraged by an arrangement under which the Commander-in-Chief could not obtain the ammunition he deemed urgently necessary, while economy was flouted when he was presented with a quantity of ordnance stores he had not asked for and did not require.

The controversy has been settled-it is to be hoped permanently-by the elimination of the Military Member, or rather by the absorption of his office in that of the Commander-in-Chief. Yet the old question is still occasionally mooted, albeit in a new form, a doubt being expressed whether any future occupant of Lord Kitchener's post, unless he be endowed with Lord Kitchener's abnormal energy, can cope with the augmented responsibilities of the position.

It is an obvious rejoinder that the new arrangement has placed not more, but less, work on the shoulders of the Commender-in-Chief. He is saved the labour, the worry, and the waste of time which the dual control, with its mass of correspondence, its conflicting opinions, and its duplication of work, necessarily entailed. Moreover, by the system of devolution now carried out, the head of the Army is set free to deal unhampered with the larger questions of general military policy. Lord Kitchener has even been heard to complain that the supervisory work now in his hands is scarcely enough to employ his energies fully.

This subject of devolution has occupied a prominent place in Lord Kitchener's scheme of Army reform. He has always insisted that an efficient, well-trained, and well-disciplined army can be acquired only by the organising and training of the troops, as nearly as practicable, in the same formations as will be employed during war, under the same commanders, and with the same staffs. It was to effect this result that he was instrumental in introducing the Divisional system into India:

Divisional and Brigade Commanders are now trained in peace to assume the heavy responsibilities that will fall on them in war. This Divisional system naturally replaced the previous "Commands," as well as the "Districts" subordinate to them, and has entailed an increase to the Indian Army of nine Brigadier-Generals and forty-four Staff Officers. In order to organise the units in these Divisions it was found necessary to redistribute a certain number of them, as has been done, so that each Divisional General can mobilise and train a complete Division from his command without drawing upon others.*

Here we have a definitive acceptance of devolution as a cardinal principle. The policy is fittingly described as one of decentralisation, in so far as it relieves Headquarters of the multitude of details which are better left to the responsibility of the Divisional commander. In the discussion of this point the expression "centralisation" is frequently used with ambiguous meaning. Undoubtedly there has been a strengthened centralisation of authority at Headquarters in the sense that general control and supervision is more effective; but the change has been in the direction of decentralisation so far as it entrusts more initiative and discretion to, and makes larger demands in the way of responsibility on, the subordinate commanders. Lord Kitchener describes the result:

We could now mobilise and place in the field an army consisting of nine Infantry Divisions and eight Cavalry Brigades. It is true that this could not yet be done for the whole force with the ease and absence of friction which, in an army run on business lines, should mark the transition from peace to war conditions; for we should still have to resort, to a certain extent in the later Divisions, to improvised arrangements. But it is certain the mobilisation could be carried out effectively and with a degree of rapidity previously unattainable, and that, in addition, we should leave in India a sufficient force, suitably organised and staffed, to maintain public security in every part of the country.

These Divisions are grouped in two armies, named-not very aptly, from a geographical point of view-the Northern

• Budget Speech, March 29, 1909.

and the Southern, each under the command of a LieutenantGeneral. The relative strengths of the two armies, as well as their positions, were in a measure predetermined by the existing railways, which are imperatively necessary for any strategic movement. In like manner their composition was influenced by the location of the existing cantonments.

The expedient of redistributing the troops into Divisional Areas has been strangely misunderstood to mean the massing of large numbers of troops on the North-West Frontier. It in fact means no such thing, and Lord Kitchener has explicitly declared that he is opposed to the policy attributed to him, and that strategical considerations were co-ordinated with, and in some degree subordinated to, requirements for effective training. Out of nearly a million sterling spent on additional buildings, little more than a quarter of that sum is all that has been allotted to providing accommodation on the frontier. The object of the new Divisional scheme is really not so much strategic as administrative and educational. The effective and economic principles of the redistribution are illustrated by the fact that, in the event of mobilisation, each field Division could be formed from its own Divisional Area and could proceed complete to the scene of action, leaving for defensive purposes the obligatory garrison at a strength which has been accepted as adequate by the civilian authorities.

Even by some who admit the superior advantage of an arrangement which yields nine completely equipped divisions,* each consisting of three brigades-180,000 men in all-over the old system of four divisions, which furnished only 70,000 effec

In a recent panegyric on the mobilisation of a patchwork division at war strength at Aldershot a distinguished military correspondent enlarged on the unique opportunity which it afforded to British officers of seeing complete war divisions in the field. Evidently the writer had not been present at Rawal Pindi in December 1905, when Lord Kitchener led past the Prince of Wales three Indian divisions at war strength in closely massed columns of three brigades, artillery, cavalry, and transport being complete on parade.

+ Some recent critics of Lord Kitchener's reforms have professed themselves shocked at the idea of any Indian native troops being ready for service The idea, good or bad, is not new. It is several years since Indian troops made themselves an excellent name for efficiency and good conduct in China, comparing favourably with certain European troops.

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