period of his command, could not be regarded as a striking force ready for immediate action; while he had even asserted that it would take six months to make it ready, a considerable proportion of its ships being manned with nucleus crews; upon which the Committee cautiously observe that the evidence showed "that the nucleus crew ships were capable of very rapid mobilisation, and had attained a satisfactory standard of efficiency." Lord Charles Beresford's remedy for present deficiencies was the establishment in home waters of

an active homogeneous fleet in full commission and complete in every type of ship. He proposed that the battleships and cruisers of this fleet should be organised in three main divisions, two of which would invariably be present with the flag of the Commander-in-Chief, the third being usually detached to cruise independently. The numerical establishment of ships in each of these main divisions should in his opinion be such that, after allowing for a percentage absent for purposes of refit, any two combined would possess a superiority in capital ships over the largest hostile force which could be assembled against them at short notice. The number of ships present with the flag of the Commander-in-Chief at one time should not in his opinion as a rule exceed 60, this being, he believed, the maximum number that one man can effectively control. For administrative purposes each division would be dealt with by its own Vice-Admiral, enabling the Commander-in-Chief to devote himself entirely to the preparation and training of his fleet for war. Behind the active fleet there would be a reserved fleet manned with nucleus crews.

Upon this the Sub-Committee artlessly observe that there is

no difference in principle between the suggestions on this head made to them by Lord Charles Beresford and the plan recently adopted by the Admiralty, towards which the Board claimed that their previous dispositions had been directed. Since March 1909 the whole of the naval forces in Home waters, with the exception of the Atlantic Fleet, have been united in the Home Fleet under the command of a single flag officer. The former Nore Division is now the 1st Division, the old Channel Fleet the 2nd Division, both these being fully manned, the nucleus crew vessels form the 3rd Division, and the special reserve ships the 4th Division of the Home Fleet. The only portion of the force in Home waters which remains outside the Home Fleet organisation is the Atlantic Fleet, which, though closely associated with the Home Fleet, is still retained as an independent command capable of being detached if necessary to show the Flag elsewhere without breaking up the organisation of the Fleet in Home waters.

The dates speak for themselves, showing as they do how far the efficiency of the Navy and the safety of the nation were jeopardised by the hateful vendetta waged against a great seaman by a jealous bureaucrat. As we know, Admiral Wilson's Channel

Fleet of sixty-six vessels was broken up in 1907, on Lord Charles's succession to the command, which was deliberately kept as an impotent fragment during his term of service. But the moment he was cast on the beach, in March 1909, the new Home Fleet, founded on the principles for which he had strenuously contended, materialised, and the Admiralty actually claim credit for the constitution of a great homogeneous fleet in home waters under a single supreme command. In the face of these facts the following paragraph in the Report sounds ironical, especially the opinion of Sir Arthur Wilson, which is practically a condemnation of the policy of the Admiralty during the last two years:

In the opinion of the Committee the above organisation of fleets in Home waters satisfies in substance all Lord Charles Beresford's requirements, the only important difference being that the Atlantic Fleet is retained for strategical reasons as an independent command, instead of becoming one of three fully manned divisions of the Home Fleet. They concur with Sir Arthur Wilson in regarding the present organisation as free from the objections which might, in their opinion, have been fairly urged against the arrangements which preceded it, upon any other view than that those arrangements were of a transitory and provisional character.

These other "arrangements were only "transitory" because Lord Charles Beresford was "transitory." They began with him and ended with him, being nothing but a piece of personal spite.

The Committee's Humour

As regards the deficiency of small craft and destroyers, of which Lord Charles had continually complained, and which formed one of the most serious counts in his indictment, the Sub-Committee are far too modest to express any opinion, presumably because they were unable to endorse the Admiralty view, which had hitherto been the Ministerial view: "The evidence laid before the Committee showed that these criticisms were based upon considerations affecting naval construction and naval strategy of a controversial character, on which expert opinion is sharply divided. Upon the technical issues raised, the Committee do not feel competent or bound to express any opinion. They are satisfied, however, that as regards vessels of these classes, there is no such deficiency as to constitute a risk to the safety of the country." This passage was penned by a humorist, because if the Committee are incapable of expressing any view upon the

shortage of cruisers, destroyers, &c., what value attaches to their assertion that there was no risk? Nor is the nation likely to be reassured by the suggestion that the general tenor of the evidence "leads them to the opinion that there is no sufficient foundation for Lord Charles Beresford's apprehensions" as to the inability of the Admiralty to protect trade owing to the lack of cruisers. The Sub-Committee thus deal with the question of war plans and the development of a General Staff at the Admiralty, a reform which is a condition precedent to the British Navy being seriously organised for war, and the one which of all others is anathema maranatha to Sir John Fisher, who has devoted the five best years of his life to obstructing it. We reproduce these paragraphs textually:

Lord Charles Beresford's original statement in his letter to the Prime Minister that " upon assuming command of the Channel Fleet I was unable to obtain any strategical scheme or plan for the disposal in war of the forces under my command" was modified under cross-examination, and the Committee are satisfied that he had no substantial grounds for complaint in this matter.

In connection with the question of War Plans it should be mentioned that Lord Charles Beresford attributed many of the Admiralty's alleged shortcomings to the absence of a proper strategical department. The First Lord of the Admiralty furnished the Committee with a résumé of the steps which have recently been taken [our italics] to develop a War Staff at the Admiralty, and indicated further advances in this direction, which are in contemplation.

In the opinion of the Committee, the investigation has shown that during the time in question no danger to the country resulted from the Admiralty's arrangements for war, whether considered from the standpoint of the organisation and distribution of the Fleets, the number of ships, or the preparation of War Plans.

They feel bound to add that arrangements quite defensible in themselves, though not ideally perfect, were in practice seriously hampered through the absence of cordial relations between the Board of Admiralty and the Commanderin-Chief of the Channel Fleet. The Board of Admiralty do not appear to have taken Lord Charles Beresford sufficiently into their confidence as to the reasons for dispositions to which he took exception; and Lord Charles Beresford, on the other hand, appears to have failed to appreciate and carry out the spirit of the instructions of the Board, and to recognise their paramount authority.

The Committee have been impressed with the differences of opinion amongst officers of high rank and professional attainments regarding important principles of naval strategy and tactics, and they look forward with much confidence to the further development of a Naval War Staff, from which the Naval members of the Board and Flag Officers and their staffs at sea may be expected to derive

common benefit.

VOL. LIV

2

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD greatly disconcerted the Fisherite Press, which had the hardihood to treat the Report of the Sub-Committee as a verdict for the Admiralty and a crushing blow Lord to their bête noire, by publishing a letter expressing Charles's Approval his "great satisfaction " with that document, as well he might, because it showed that several essential reforms consistently advocated by him and strenuously resisted in Whitehall were now being officially adopted. As Lord Charles pointed out, "the Sub-Committee formed by the Prime Minister from members of his own Cabinet was virtually called upon to investigate a policy for which the Cabinet is responsible. Unless they had committed themselves to the complete reorganisation of the Admiralty, it would hardly be possible for them to have produced a Report more in accordance with my statements." The chief fruits of two years' efforts might be thus tabulated:

(1) A large homogeneous fleet has been formed.

(2) It is stated that this fleet will be placed under a single supreme control. (3) There is to be combined training of units with their respective divisions. (4) Some combined training of fleets took place during the recent manœuvres. (5) It is believed that the effective strength at sea will be maintained by the substitution of those vessels away for purposes of refit or of repair by others. (6) The "nucleus crew" ships are now regarded as a reserve.

(7) A Naval Strategical Bureau or War Staff at the Admiralty, to the necessity of which frequent attention has been called, is stated to be in process of formation.

(8) A complete change has taken place in the organisation and distribution of the Fleet on the lines suggested.

The writer added: "The manner of bringing about these reforms is quite immaterial, provided that the reforms are accomplished." He met the criticism of the Sub-Committee upon himself for having "failed to appreciate and carry out the spirit of the instructions of the Board and to recognise their paramount authority," which was balanced by the statement that "the Board of Admiralty did not take Lord Charles Beresford into its confidence," by inquiring how under such conditions it was possible for him "to divine what was in their Lordships' minds, and what their wishes were." Upon the Admiralty and the Admiralty alone must devolve all responsibility for strategic plans, allocation of fleets, and numbers of vessels employed. But while "the authority of the Admiralty

must be paramount. . . it is the duty of the Commander-inChief, if he thinks plans, allocations, and numbers of ships are inefficient, or are insufficient to enable him to carry out the orders he may receive from authority, to make respectful representations to that effect." And in this connection Lord Charles aptly cited Napoleon's dictum: "Every Commander-in-Chief who undertakes to execute a plan which he thinks bad or injurious is criminal; he ought to make representations, to insist upon a change, finally to resign, rather than be the instrument of the ruin of his own people." Lord Charles had been guided by this view. "On these lines I have done my duty."

The Organiser of Disaster

We can assure our readers that it has been no satisfaction to us to have been compelled of late years to attack the Admiralty. Quite the contrary. We hailed the advent of Sir John Fisher in Whitehall with unbounded enthusiasm, rejoicing at the prospect of an able admiral acquiring practical control of British naval policy through the influence which his pungent conversation gave him over Parliamentarians, who invariably succumb to an epigram. We naturally assumed that the First Sea Lord's brilliant talents would be exclusively devoted to the best interests of the Navy, and we abstained from criticising his earlier reforms in the belief that even if mistaken he was at any rate single-minded. It was only gradually and very reluctantly that we realised that the great man was a "wrong 'un "-a sort of naval Winston Churchill who was playing entirely for his own hand, to whom intrigue was the breath of life, who misled the politicians, disorganised the Navy, set squadron against squadron and ship against ship, poisoned the Press and deceived the country. It would take an entire number of the National Review to do justice to the career of our "sailor politician,” to give him the name by which he is described and damned by his admirers. We need only say now that Sir John Fisher is above all living Englishmen responsible for the disastrous position into which we have drifted vis-à-vis Germany. Should it come to hanging, he will be entitled to the nearest lamp-post. His first crime was the reduction of British Naval Estimates by about £5,000,000 during the last two years of the late Unionist Government—a measure for which there was not the shade of a shadow of a pretext or any articulate demand in