1993. Implied Acceptance.-Custom has established the curious dictum that though a promise to marry, to be valid, must be in writing, or in unqualified spoken words, yet the acceptance of a promise need not be in words, but may be taken for granted if nothing indicating the contrary be done. It is considered that this distinction is necessary in consideration of the modest reserve of the female, who is usually, though not invariably, the acceptor.

1994. Reasonable Time.-As a general rule, if the promiser has not married another, nothing in law can be done till an ample "reasonable time" has elapsed; and even then,

1995. Challenge Essential.—No action for breach of promise can be sustained against an unmarried person unless the other party has distinctly challenged the promiser to redeem the promise, and the challenge must be accompanied by an unqualified expression of willingness also.

1996. Messages Effectual.-A challenge to fulfil a promise may be effectually undertaken by a third party-by the father, mother, or any confidential friend.

1997. Plea of Time.-An answer to a challenge may be an effectual bar to proceedings if it truly alleges an insufficient lapse of "reasonable time," but there appears to be no other possible bar, provided that the challenger is chaste and in good health.

1998. Unchastity.—If the man discover, after promising to marry, that the woman is unchaste, that will absolve him from his promise; nevertheless,

1999. Ineffectual Plea.-If the man knows the woman to be unchaste, and, notwithstanding, promises to marry her, his promise is binding, and he cannot effectually plead her frailties as a defence.

2000. Bad Health.-Bad health will in some cases be a justification for breach, especially if the blemish be in the man. In a notable case where a woman promised to marry a man who then appeared in good health, she afterwards discovered that he suffered from an abscess of an aggravated character, and for that reason she refused to marry him. It was decided that she was justified; and it is a well understood rule of law that,

2001. Concealed Maladies.-When a man enters into an engagement to marry, and he is suffering from any peculiar malady, he is under an obligation to disclose the fact, and if he conceal it, he is not entitled to damages for breach of promise, if justification is pleaded for that cause; but,

2002. Contrary Rule.-Malady suffered by a woman, and con

cealed by her at the time of the promise, will be a doubtful defence against a man's breach of promise, and, unless very decided, will fail. The reason of the distinction in such cases is that,

2003. Reason for Distinction.-A woman in most instances is necessarily placed in a position of dependence upon her husband, both as regards herself and her children, and she has a peculiar right to require the fullest candour in reference to anything which may imperil her material interests so seriously as a physical defect, which may, more or less, prevent her husband from obtaining livelihood.

2004. Slight Maladies.—Candour with regard to maladies on either side, though required by law in cases of manifest importance, is not to be supposed obligatory with regard to every little personal peculiarity. The obligation must be considered in the light of what is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances and the permatency of the marriage tie.

2005. Hereditary Diseases.-Discovery, after promise, of hereditary disease suffered by the ancestors of the party, but not at the the developed in the individual, has been set up as a defence of breach, but is generally not admissable. So curious a case occurred in Scotland, which might at any time suggest a parallel in England, that we quote it as peculiarly illustrative of the point :—

2006. Scrofula.-A demand for damages was resisted on the ground that the lady was subject to "hereditary scrofula," but the judgment, in repudiating the plea, declared that "the most consummate beauty, elegance, and accomplishments, were not merely not incompatible with, but were even in some degree allied to that disease." 2007. Hereditary Insanity.-Hereditary insanity, concealed at time of promise, and not already developed in the individual, is considered an insufficient ground of defence, supposing the dictum of the Scotch case to hold good in England.

2008. Refusal Equal to Marriage with Another.-Either the refusal of the promiser to fulfil his promise, or the marriage of the promiser, is of itself ground for an action, and unless the party has been absolved from the promise there can be no effectual defence. 2009. Plea of No Challenge.—Attempt at defence has been made in a case where a man, having promised one woman and married another, then said that if he had been challenged to marry the first in time he would have done so, that he should be quite willing to fulfil his promise, but that being already married, the law stood in the way of his promise. This defence was not admitted; nor yet another, where,

2010. A man, having married in disregard of his promise to another, pleaded that if his wife died he would then marry according to his original promise. The defence was rejected on the ground that he had no right to presume that his wife would die within "reasonable time," and, indeed, that he might probably die before her.

2011. Breach of Condition.-When a promise is accompanied by a condition, and that condition has been broken, a defence upon that ground is conclusive, provided always that no new promise be made subsequently to the breaking of the condition.

2012. Minority.-Minority, on the part of the person deceived, is no bar to proceedings by that party. It was formerly doubted whether a minor could bring an action for breach of promise, but the question is considered settled by a case in which it was decided that,

2013. Though a minor cannot be sued for breach of promise, yet the minor may sue for breach if the other party be of age at the time of the promise.

2014. Refusal of Parents.-Effectual defence may be set up against an action by a minor if there is any evidence that the parents or guardians refused their consent (1733), or were so tardy in according it as to amount to a non-acceptance of the promise (1992).

DAMAGES.

2015. The remedy sought in any action for breach of promise, is usually in the shape of damages, to be laid at an amount corresponding with the means of the defendant.

2016. Loss of Prospects.-Damages, in case of action for breach, are held to compensate the plaintiff for loss of prospects or loss of opportunity.

2017. Injured Feelings-Loss of Market.-The Scotch lawyers have put it somewhat bluntly that damages for breach of promise are to be taken to be not only in consideration of "injured feelings," but also in compensation for "loss of market."

2018. Ancient Law.-Actions for damages on account of breach of promise were unknown previously to 1674; at that time it was held that no action could be maintained upon a promise to marry ; but,

2019. Modern Customs.-Modern customs have distinctly recognized breach of promise as a proper ground for damages; or,

2020. Specific Performance.-An action, in case of breach of promise will lie for specific performance; or,

2021. Effect of Consent.-A consent, by a person still unmarried, to specific performance of a promise of marriage, will stay an action

for damages.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

WOMEN'S RIGHTS.

2022. Unmarried Women.-In considering the law relating to the relative rights, duties, and immunities of husbands and wives, it is desirable to premise that the law makes no distinction between unmarried women and men the former, both before and after they are twenty-one (3087), so far as the rights and responsibilities of property are concerned, are on an exact level with the latter it is only in the event of marriage that a distinction is made; and

2023. Consequences of Agitation.-There can be no doubt that the Married Women's Property Act of 1870 was introduced in consequence of, and solely as a concession to, the persistent representations of the best and ablest advocates of what are called "women's rights."

2024. Revolutionary Movement.-The Married Women's Property Act, though from some points of view only a small modicum of justice, is, in many respects, truly revolutionary; and

NEW COMPLICATIONS.

2025. One of the principal consequences of the Act is to make the law as to husband and wife, which was previously pretty plain and simple, very complicated and variable; thus,

2026. Date of Act.-The Married Women's Property Act was passed on the 9th of August, 1870; and

2027. Prospective and Retrospective Application.-There is a sharp line of distinction between the law relating to wives who were married previously to the passing of the Act, and those who were married subsequently thereto, or who may be hereafter married ; though,

2028. Limited Distinction.-The distinction maintained by the Act between wives married prior to the passing of the Act, and those married subsequently thereto, only applies to legacies (2122) and incomes derived from landed estates (2132); yet,

2029. Large Interests.-As legacies and incomes from landed estates are generally the largest interests which can concern married

women, the exclusion, in those connections, from the privileges conferred by the Act, of all who were wives previously to the passing of the Act, is very remarkable; but,

2030. Consequences of Ignorance.—Women who marry without regard to, or knowledge of, the Act, are immediately placed in precisely the same position as they would have been prior to the passing of the Act; for,

2031. Necessity for Action.-Every single woman, in order to derive advantages from the Act in the event of her marriage, must avail herself of and act upon the provisions of the Act; because,

2032. Passive Forfeiture.—If a woman marries, and passively assents to the common law as it remains, without taking any steps towards applying the Act to her own case, she will forfeit many of the advantages which it was designed to confer; consequently,

2033. Common Law Unaltered.—In the absence of any of the special arrangements which the Act suggests, the law as to the effect of marriage upon the already acquired property of a woman is precisely as it was before (2153); and

2034. Gift of Personalty.—Marriage is an implied gift by the bride to the bridegroom of all her personal goods whatever, unless she has previously taken special means of securing them to herself; and

2035. Movable Property.-Personal goods which a woman impliedly transfers to her husband when she marries, include all movable property whatever; including,

2036. Cash in her possession; also,

2037. All sums of money standing to her credit in any bank ; also,

2038. All household goods which she may be possessed of; also, 2039. All her personal clothing, jewellery, and other valuable ornaments; also,

2040. All her stock-in-trade if she has a trade; also,

2041. Any amount she may have in government securities; also, 2042. Any shares she may have in any joint stock company; also,

2043. Any money she may have deposited in any provident society.

WOMEN ABOUT TO MARRY.

2044. Old Restrictions.—Previously to the 9th of August, 1870, there were no means except a formal marriage settlement (2521) which could secure to a woman any portion of her personal property after her marriage; and