On the 9th of December, 1793, the cause having been called on for trial, Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL opened the case for the Crown as follows:

GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY,

THE Information charges the Defendants with having printed and published a seditious libel, the contents of which you have now heard stated. The Information originally was not filed by me, but by my predecessor in office, who then was, as you now are, sworn to discharge an important_duty to the public, according to the best of his judgment. It has since fallen to my lot to execute that duty, in stating to you the grounds upon which this Information has been filed. And I have no difficulty in saying, that, previous to my coming forward for this purpose, I thought it incumbent upon me to consider, whether, in the office which I now hold, I should, of my own accord, have instituted this prosecution; because I thought that it became me not merely to follow up the measures of that highly respectable character, and to bring his opinion before a Jury, but to be able, in so doing, to say that I approved of those measures, and concurred in that opinion; and to act exactly as he had done, according to the best of my judgment, for the public. Had I been clearly of opinion that this paper was not fit for the consideration of a Jury, I have no hesitation in confessing that I should certainly have discontinued the prosecution. You, Gentlemen of the Jury, I am sure, will do me the justice to believe that I am not capable of the impertinence of saying, that because I may think this paper fit for prosecution, and may think the Defendants guilty, you therefore must think so too. The prosecution does nothing more than declare, that the paper is a proper subject for the discussion of a Jury, and as such, that I consider myself as bound to bring it forward in the course of my professional duty. With respect to the guilt or innocence of the Defendants in publishing this paper, that

And as to another objection that was made, "that such a course, if tolera"ted, would be of great mischief; for then most profligate offenders would get themselves acquitted by surprise, or over-hastening the trial, without "allowing the Queen convenient time to manage her prosecution:"

66

It was answered, "that there could be none, because in Crown causes there "cannot be nisi prius or tales, without a warrant from the Attorney General, "who shall be sure to grant none if he find any such danger." And that such a thing may be at least by consent appears 1 Keb. 195. Rex v. Jones. And the granting a nisi prius amounts to a consent.

question which falls to your consideration, I am perfectly satisfied to leave to your decision. This is a cause of the highest importance, as, indeed, every cause which involves a criminal charge must be important, but this more particularly so from the nature of the charge. It is connected with the press, which has ever been deemed the great palladium of British freedom. In every case in which it is concerned, it is natural, therefore, that the most watchful attention of Englishmen should be excited. It is of great consequence, then, in the first instance, to ascertain what properly constitutes the liberty of the press ;-what are its bounds, and how far it extends;-and on this subject I shall take the liberty of reading to you the sentiments of a character of the highest legal authority, namely, the late Mr. Justice Blackstone.

66

"In this and the other instances which we have lately con"sidered, where blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schis"matical, seditious, or scandalous libels are punished by the "English law, some with a greater, others with a less degree of severity, the liberty of the press, properly under"stood, is by no means infringed or violated. The liberty "of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; "but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon pub❝lications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal "matter, when published. Every freeman has an undoubted "right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; "to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but "if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, " he must take the consequence of his own temerity. To "subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser as "was formerly done, both before and since the Revolution, "is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge "of all controverted points in learning, religion, and govern"ment; but to punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published, shall, "on a fair and impartial trial, be adjudged of a pernicious "tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and

66

good order, of government and religion, the only solid "foundations of civil liberty. Thus the will of individuals "is still left free; the abuse only of that free will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby "laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry; liberty of pri"vate sentiment is still left; the disseminating or making "public of bad sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which society corrects. A man (says a

"fine writer on this subject) may be allowed to keep poi"sons in his closet, but not publicly to vend them as cordials. "And to this we may add, that the only plausible argument " heretofore used for the restraining the just freedom of the 66 press, that it was necessary to prevent the daily abuse of "it,' will entirely lose its force, when it is shown (by a sea"sonable exertion of the laws) that the press cannot be abu"sed to any bad purpose, without incurring a suitable pu"nishment; whereas it never can be used to any good one, "when under the control of an inspector. So true will it be "found, that to censure the licentiousness, is to maintain the "liberty of the press.*"

These principles of the law of England, thus laid down by this great man, must be admitted to be incontrovertible. The law allowed Defendants in this, as in every other case, a fair impartial trial, upon the result of which they were to be adjudged guilty or acquitted of the charge exhibited against them; and this principle has been explained by the last act of Parliament, for removing doubts of the functions of juries in cases of libel; the meaning of which act I take to be, that the jury shall try these charges of libels precisely as they try any other charge of a criminal nature;-that they shall hear the case with attention, and hear it impartially ;-that they shall hear the advice of the bench in point of law, and then apply the law, as they understand it, to the facts that appear in evidence, and then they shall acquit or find guilty, as to them shall appear right. The question in this case is, "Whether, upon the facts, as they shall 66 appear in evidence under the law, as you shall understand "it, after the advice of the learned Judge, the Defendants be "guilty, as the information charges them to be?" With respect to the fact, the paper stated in the information, appeared in the Morning Chronicle on the 25th of December 1792. And here I must particularly beg the attention of the Jury to the date of the libel. This paper, charged to be the libel, is dated at the Talbot Inn, at Derby, on the 16th of July 1792, and it did not appear in the Morning Chronicle till the 25th of December 1792. Thus you will observe, that the date of the paper preceded its appearance in the Morning Chronicle six months. Having said this upon the paper itself, it is now my duty to the Defendants to state, that it appeared not to be a publication actually composed by the Defendants, but was said to be,

Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. iv. page 151, 8vo. edition, 1791.

with what truth I do not know, composed and agreed to at a Society for Political Information, held at the Talbot Inn, Derby, signed S. Eyre, chairman. Whether there was such a person, or, if there was, whether he was the author, is to me entirely unknown. It was said to be unanimously agreed to by the persons holding the meeting, and ordered to be printed; how it happened that that order was not executed till the 25th of December, I am unable to explain to you. But be that circumstance as it may, the Defendants are the persons interested in the property and management of the newspaper in which this publication appeared. And I apprehend that the proprietors, printers, and publishers of a newspaper are responsible for whatever it may contain, unless it be admitted as a doctrine, that men may carry on a trade, which is a source of great profit and emolument, entirely through the medium of servants, without being themselves in the smallest degree accountable. Can it be deemed a sufficient apology for the evil tendency of a publication, of which they reap the advantage, that they are not its authors, or that they had no immediate hand in its insertion, and therefore are not bound to answer for what they themselves did not actually commit? On the contrary, I apprehend, that by adopting any publication, they become liable in law for the consequences of that publication, as much as if they were themselves the authors. It is true, that there are many circumstances to be considered, either by me in moving judgment, or when it comes to be determined by the Court, what ought to be the nature and extent of the penalty. The consideration of the degree of guilt incurred by the particular act, might then be attended to, independent of the law of the case. Negligence, omission, inadvertence, all of which, however, constituted a degree of criminality, might then, perhaps, properly be urged as circumstances of extenuation. Though this paper, therefore appeared in the Morning Chronicle, not as the projected act of the Defendants, or of either of them, but as an advertisement signed by a Mr. Eyre, still it was a publication, for which the Defendants, in their capacity, as connected with this paper, were clearly answerable. Another circumstance which deserves your attention, is the time at which this advertisement was brought forward; you will find in the same paper in which it appeared, a vast number of advertisements from various associations in different parts of the kingdom, stating that

there had lately been many seditious writings circulated with the greatest industry, and from the worst intentions, which had already done much mischief, and expressing a determination to take every method in future to discountenance and suppress such publications. You are then to consider how far these advertisements might operate as an antidote to the statement contained in this publication, you are to take into review the whole of the paper and advertisements, that you may be able to judge fairly of the tendency of the contents, and the intention of the writers; you will then decide whether this paper was published with a peaceable temper, and from upright intentions. I have nothing to say, in order to exaggerate the case, or influence your decision; I have never had occasion to do so in any instance; it is neither my duty nor my wish in the present, and I trust that no man in my situation will ever do so upon any future occasion. All cases of which the law takes cognizance, and which are to be determined by ascertaining facts, and applying the law to them, are, thank God, safe in the hands of a Jury, the best guardians of our rights. Every thing in this country that deserves to be called a blessing, is indisputably deposited in their hands, as well as the power to apply a remedy, wherev er their interference was called for to check the progress of an evil. It was from our blessings being vested in their hands, that we derived our security for their enjoyment, and our confidence in their duration. It is for you, Gentlemen of the Jury, exercising your privilege in its full extent, from the facts which I shall now lay before you, to judge of the tendency of this paper, which is the subject of prosecution; from the Bench you will hear laid down, from the most respectable authority, the law which you are to apply to those facts. The right of every man to represent what he may conceive to be an abuse or griev ance existing in the government of the country, if his intentions in so doing be honest, and the statement made upon fair and open grounds, can never for a moment be questioned. I shall never think it my duty to prosecute any person for writing, printing, and publishing fair and couscientious opinions on the system of the government and constitution of this country; nor for pointing out what he may honestly conceive to be grievances; nor for proposing legal means of redress. But was this the case with respect to the present publication? Did the mode in which the writers exposed what they considered as the abuses of the constitution