Mental Science: A Compendium of Psychology and the History of Philosophy ...D. Appleton and Company, 1882 - Philosophy |
Contents
| 1 | |
| 7 | |
| 11 | |
| 13 | |
| 17 | |
| 23 | |
| 29 | |
| 35 | |
| 36 | |
| 42 | |
| 45 | |
| 48 | |
| 51 | |
| 54 | |
| 67 | |
| 71 | |
| 82 | |
| 85 | |
| 99 | |
| 125 | |
| 143 | |
| 149 | |
| 155 | |
| 161 | |
| 171 | |
| 181 | |
| 198 | |
| 207 | |
| 215 | |
| 216 | |
| 227 | |
| 228 | |
| 251 | |
| 273 | |
| 285 | |
| 309 | |
| 420 | |
| 1 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 7 | |
| 10 | |
| 13 | |
| 16 | |
| 19 | |
| 23 | |
| 27 | |
| 29 | |
| 30 | |
| 39 | |
| 41 | |
| 45 | |
| 57 | |
| 58 | |
| 62 | |
| 63 | |
| 64 | |
| 68 | |
| 73 | |
| 78 | |
| 85 | |
| 88 | |
| 96 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
abstract according acquired action active acute affirmed animal arise Aristotle asso association beauty belief body brain called cause cerebellum character circumstances colour combined condition connexion consciousness degree Descartes discrimination distance distinct doctrine effect elements emotion energy excitement exer exercise existence experience expression fact farther favour fibres force give grey matter habit Heracleitus human idea ideal impression influence innate ideas intel intellectual J. S. MILL knowledge mastication matter means medulla oblongata memory ment mental mind modes moral motive movements muscles muscular feelings nature nerves nervous objects operation organs papillæ Parmenides peculiar perception person physical Plato Platonic Realism pleasure and pain present principle purely pursuit regards retentiveness retina sensations sense sensibility sight smell Sokrates sound Spinal Cord spontaneity stimulation Sublime substance supposed sympathy taste tender theory things thought tion touch truth visible volition voluntary white matter
Popular passages
Page 207 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Page 28 - Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself, must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall or a low, or a middle-sized man.
Page 28 - ... consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract...
Page 203 - The table I write on I say exists, that is I see and feel it, and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.
Page 27 - Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas : and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence.
Page 64 - There is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion.
Page 28 - Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell : for myself I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them.
Page 75 - ... :—States of pleasure are concomitant with\ an increase, and states of pain with an abatement, of some, ; or all, of the vital functions.
Page 214 - This puts the final seal to our conception of the groups of possibilities as the fundamental reality in Nature. The permanent possibilities are common to us and to our fellow-creatures ; the actual sensations are not. That which other people become aware of, when and on the same grounds as I do, seems more real to me than that which they do not know of, unless I tell them.
Page 206 - It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent.