Revival not to extend to part revoked before revocation of whole. showing an intention to revive the same; and when any Will or codicil which shall be partly revoked, and afterwards wholly revoked, shall be revived, such revival shall not extend to so much thereof as shall have been revoked before the revocation of the whole thereof, unless an intention to the contrary shall be shown." A codicil has the effect of republishing the Will to which it Codicil to refers as from the date of the codicil, so as to bring down the date of the Will to the date of the codicil (i). But reference to the Will is necessary. In order that republication may be implied, something must be found in the second testamentary instrument from which the inference can be drawn that, when making and executing it, the testator "considered the Will as his Will" (k). The reference need not be by date, but there must be a sufficient identification in the reviving codicil of the Will intended to be revived (). revive Will must refer to it expressly or by inference. Reference in codicil to a last Will. of reference. Where a testator refers in a codicil to a last Will, and there is nothing in the contents of the codicil to point to any particular Will, it must be construed to refer to the Will in legal existence as the last Will and not to a revoked Will (m). Where a codicil, by mistake as to the date of a prior Will, Error in date refers to an earlier Will than that intended to be referred to, the codicil will not revive the earlier Will to which it refers, and the codicil may be admitted to probate together with the later Will (n). But where it is not a mere mistake of date, but the codicil makes reference to the provisions of the earlier Will, such earlier Will is confirmed and will revive; and as the later Will was not revoked by the codicil, all three documents must be admitted to probate (o). As every codicil is, in construction of law, a part of the Codicil confirming Will Will, a testator by expressly referring to and confirming the does not set (i) Re Champion, [1893] 1 Ch. 101 ; Re Rayer. [1903] 1 Ch. 685. (k) Re Smith, (1890) 45 C. D. 632. (1) In the Goods of McCabe, (1862) 2 Sw. & Tr. 474, 478; Williams (10th ed.) 144, n. (m). (m) Williams (10th ed.) 144; Hale r. Tokelove, (1850) 2 Robert. 318, 326. (0) In the Goods of Stedham, (1881) up part revoked by prior codicil. Codicil reviving revoked Will does not necessarily revive every codicil. Effect of reference to Will by date merely. Codicil cannot revive Will not in existence. Sect. 34. Re be deemed Will will not be considered as intending to set it up against a it is equally clear that the testator may by apt words express his A reference to the Will by its date merely will not set up an inoperative codicil, nor revoke all instruments other than the original Will itself. To the latter class of cases the principle applies that a clear disposition is not to be revoked except by clear words (r). A testator cannot by codicil revive a Will not only revoked but destroyed, since it has no existence (s). Sect. 34 of the Wills Act provides that "every Will vived Will to re-executed or republished, or revived by any codicil, shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to have been made at when revived. the time at which the same shall be so re-executed, republished or revived." made at time Incorporation by republication of unat tested altera tions and unexecuted papers. A codicil duly executed will give effect and operation to unattested alterations in a Will; or to unexecuted papers which have been written between the periods of the execution of the Will and codicil, where the Will, if treated as executed on the date of the codicil and read as speaking at that date, contains language which would operate as an incorporation of the documents to which it refers (t). (P) Williams (10th ed.) 147; In (q) Per Fry, J., in Green . Tribe, (s) In the Goods of Steele, (1868) L. R. 1 P. & D. 575, 576; In the Goods of Reade, [1902] P. 75. (t) Williams (10th ed.) 154; In the Goods of Smart, [1902] P. 238, 241; ante, p. 9. CHAPTER II. OF THE APPOINTMENT OF EXECUTOR SECT. 1.- Who is capable of being Executor. THE King may be constituted executor; in which case he King. appoints such persons as he shall think proper to officiate the execution of the Will, against whom such as have cause of action may bring their suits; also the King may appoint others to take the accounts of such executors (a). A corporation sole may be executor (b). Trustee Act, 1906 (6 Edw. VII. c. 55), ss. 1 sole. Under the Public Corporation and 2, the Public Trustee is a corporation sole, under that name, and may be appointed executor either alone or jointly with others (bb). A corporation aggregate may be appointed executor, and in Corporation that case the Court will grant letters of administration with aggregate. the Will annexed to a person, styled a syndic, who has been duly appointed by the corporation to take the grant (c). In In the Goods of Hunt (d), where a limited company was appointed executor, the Court granted administration with the Will annexed to the general manager as the nominee of the company, and accepted the company as sole surety for the administrator under the administration bond. There would be a practical difficulty in appointing a corporation aggregate to act jointly with an individual as executors, since a grant of letters of administration with the Will annexed would not be made so long as there existed a person able and willing to accept probate (e). Until the passing of the Bodies Corporate (Joint Tenancy) Act, 1899 (62 & 63 Vict. c. 20), there was a difficulty in a (a) Williams (10th ed.) 158. (b) In the Goods of Haynes, (1842) 3 Curt. 75. (bb) See Appendix. (c) In the Goods of Darke, (1859) 1 Sw. & Tr. 516. (d) [1896] P. 288. () In the Goods of Martin, (1904) 90 L. T. 264. Partnership firm. Alien. Effect of Naturaliza natural person being a trustee jointly with a corporation, as a corporation and a natural person could not hold property as joint tenants, but only as tenants in common (f). This Act (s. 1) provides that a body corporate shall be capable of acquiring and holding any real or personal property in joint tenancy in the same manner as if it were an individual; and where a body corporate and an individual, or two or more bodies corporate, become entitled to any such property under circumstances or by virtue of any instrument which would if the body corporate had been an individual have created a joint tenancy, they shall be entitled to the property as joint tenants. A limited liability company may be wound up and dissolved, but the Act of 1899 provides that where a body corporate is joint tenant of any property on its dissolution the property shall devolve on the other joint tenant. A limited company can take and hold land without licence in mortmain under s. 18 of the Companies Act, 1862. On dissolution of a company under ss. 142 and 143 of the Act of 1862, freehold and leasehold properties will revert to the grantor and do not vest in the Crown as bona vacantia (ff). The appointment as executors of an ordinary partnership firm is considered to be an appointment not of the firm collectively, but of the persons composing it individually. Consequently the dissolution of the firm does not affect the appointment (g). It would seem that an alien and even an alien enemy was always by our law capable of being executor (h). By the Naturalization Act, 1870 (33 Vict. c. 14), s. 2, real tion Act, 1870. and personal property of every description may be taken, acquired, held, and disposed of by an alien in the same manner in all respects as by a natural-born British subject. Infant. An infant may be appointed executor, and even a child en rentre sa mère. But if an infant is appointed sole executor, by stat. 38 Geo. III. c. 87, s. 6, he is altogether disqualified Thompson's Settlement () In the Goods of Fernie. (1849) 6 N. C. 657. (f) Re Trusts, [1905] 1 Ch. 229. (ff) Hastings Corporation r. Letton, [1908] 1 K. B. 378, 387. (4) Williams (7th ed.) 229. from exercising his office during his minority, and administra- woman. Married Now since January 1, 1883, by the Married Women's Effect of Property Act, 1882, s. 1 (2), a married woman is capable of Women's Proentering into and rendering herself liable in respect of and perty Act, 1882 (45 & 46 to the extent of her separate property on any contract and of Vict. c. 75). suing and being sued either in contract or tort, or otherwise, in all respects as if she were a feme sole, and her husband need not be made a party to any action or other legal proceedings brought by or taken against her, and any damages or costs recovered against her in any action or proceeding shall be payable out of her separate property and not otherwise. And by s. 24 the word "contract" in this Act shall include the acceptance of any trust, or of the office of executrix or administratrix, and the provisions of this Act as to liabilities of married women shall extend to all liabilities by reason of any breach of trust or derastavit committed by any married woman being a trustee, or executrix, or administratrix, either before or after her marriage, and her husband shall not be Husband not () Williams (10th ed.) 159. (k) As to the law before the Act see Williams (10th ed.) 160, 360; Clough r. Bond, (1838) 3 My. & Cr. 490; liable unless |