Arbecche having thus effected her suicide, before the nurse and ladies can hinder her, they, joined, we imagine, by the remainder of the Chorus, proceed to mourn over the cruel fate of the Princess, her husband, and her children, sometimes in blank verse, sometimes in proper lyrics, and sometimes in a sort of unrhymed, irregular lyrical measure. Thus ends this assuredly not less tragical tragedy than any that ever was tragedized by any company of tragedians; amidst all whose horrors, however, the strict decorum which preserves the French stage pure from all actual killing, appears to be most punctiliously observed. It is not, to be sure, distinctly said, that Sulmone retreats behind the scenes to be stabbed; but besides that no entrances or exits are recorded-indeed, that the tragedy does not, from one end to the other, afford a single stage-direction, there can, we think, be no doubt of the fact, from the circumstance of the Semi-Chorus taking the trouble of describing the whole process, as well as from the nature of the latter portion of the process itself, which could not well be represented without material inconvenience to the actor performing the part of Sulmone. How the exhibition of amputated heads and hands is managed, so as not to prove a good deal more offensive than the simple operation of stabbing, we confess we do not conceive. With one single remark that presses to the nib of our pen, we shall now conclude, deeming it equally a work of supererogation, to offer a regular critique of this play itself, or to descant upon the then state of the drama, in a country whose most celebrated historians and judges of literature could rank GiambatistaGiraldi Cintio amongst their excellent poets, esteeming L'Arbecche his masterpiece. The remark which we cannot refrain from making, regards the sort of hors d'œuvre character of the preceding loathsome, and, we should hope, impossible, crime of Queen Selina, which is so carefully and gratuitously imparted to us in the first Act. Never once does Arbecche, amidst her gloomiest forebodings and apprehensions, or subsequently, in the depth of her despair, refer either to her mother's sin, as entailing hereditary pollution upon herself, or to her own unintentional matricide,-in having been the means of exposing the odious criminal to the revenge of an injured husband,—as filial guilt rendering her unworthy of maternal happiness, and for which she must expect punishment. Neither do any ideas of such a kind occur to the tyrant in his anger at the daughter of such a mother, or to the Nurse or Chorus in their regrets. And, indeed, the whole foul history appears to have been so totally forgotten both by the Court and by the family, that had it not been for the very communicative disposition of the ghost of the murdered delinquent, we might have been spared the knowledge of it altogether. 1827. THE NAVY. No. I. In the series of Papers which we All this being the case, we hold our Our very talk, now-a-days, is as the the same eternal prating-of what is and scientifically ballasted, that she for a refit. Charnock, Schomberg, Beatson, Ekins, Brereton, and twenty othersyonder they all are in the "Naval Nook"-in the row beneath the Naval Chronicle-are worth reading, and consulting, and quoting; but by far the best historian of the Navy is, like ourselves, a landsman, Mr James. His work, in six volumes, is an inestimable one, compiled chiefly from the He is a sincere lover, we verily believe best of all authorities, the Log-Book. it, of the truth, and has his heart too, in the right place. It is quite a misunfair to the merits of any man; on take to suppose that he is unjust or the contrary, he often vindicates, successfully, the character of brave and good officers, whom rumour, that great liar, incorrigible even to cuff and kicking, had traduced. He does not scruple, and why should he, with such materials as he has had in his hands, to give his opinions; but he always gives, too, the facts on which these opinions are founded; and we perceive, that in the second edition of his admirable book, he has had occathem indeed; but those few he has sion to qualify or correct very few of qualified or corrected with the greatest manliness. Why should our gallant naval men, although sensitive, fears no other enemy, ought not, like be thin-skinned? A post-captain who a poet, to fear a critic's face; for who 5 B ever was written down on his own quarter-deck? Neither is a post-captain, commodore, nor admiral, like the Pope, infallible. He does not expect people to kiss his toe; but as to his hand, let him stretch it out, and where is the man that will not warmly and proudly grasp it, as one of those hands that have cast the sheetanchor of Britain's prosperity and glory on a rock? In this Article we shall chiefly be indebted to Mr James -whose work ought to be in the library of every man who studies the history of the country. On the first of February 1793, the National Convention declared war against Great Britain and the United Netherlands. According to an official return on the first of October of the previous year, the navy of France amounted to 246 vessels, of which 86, including 27 in commission, and 10 building and nearly ready, were of the line. The squadrons were desig nated according to the ports in which they had been built, or were laid up in ordinary; and of the 86 line-ofbattle-ships, 39 were at Brest, 10 at L'Orient, 13, including the only 64 in the French navy, at Rochefort, and 24, including a strong reinforcement lately arrived from the Biscayan ports, at Toulon. Of frigates at the different ports, there were 78; 18 of them mounting 18 pounders on the maindeck, and none of them less than 12 pounders. Those resembling in size and force the British 28-gun frigates, were classed as 24-gun corvettes. Shortly after the commencement of the war, the French government, in order to provide against those losses which experience had shown were likely to attend a combat with England, ordered to be laid on the stocks 71 ships, including 25 of the line; and to be cast at the national founderies, 3100 pieces of marine ordnance, including 400 brass 36-pounder carronades, the first of the kind forged in France. Several of the old small class seventy-fours, or such as carried 24 pounders only on the lower-deck, instead of being repaired to serve again in the line, or taken to pieces as unfit to serve, were cut down and converted into the most formidable frigates that ever sailed the seas. Holland and Spain were then the maritime allies of England. The navy of Holland, according to her publish [June, from a 74-gun ship, to a six-gun cuted accounts, amounted to 119 vessels, however, the largest were not supe ter. Of her 49 ships of the line, rate; and of these there were but 10 rior to a second class British thirdof which there were but a few, are said in all. Their heaviest ships, indeed, of these, probably a portion were swito have mounted 92 or 94 guns; but vels, while the shallowness of their waters cramped the Hollanders in the dimensions of their ships, and compelled them to adopt, in those larger bluffer contour, than characterised the vessels especially, a flatter floor, and a ships of other nations. The remainder of the Dutch line was composed of 64 and 54-gun ships; the latter a class expelled from the line of battle by all other navies, but retained by the Dutch, as a hardy description of Some of the Dutch frigates were fine two-deckers for their shallow waters. vessels, but very few of them carried heavier metal than long 12-pounders; and vessels mounting but 24 eightpounders, and of 500 tons burden, were designated frigates, although, strictly speaking, but corvettes. of Spain consisted of 204 vessels, of According to Schomberg, the navy which 76 were of the line, mounting from 112 to 60 guns; of which latter class, and of sixty-fours, there were but in commission, and of the under-line 11. Of the 76 ships of the line, 56 were vessels 105; and out of these, Spain stipulated to join the confederacy, ment that ultimately proved of little with 60 sail of vessels,-a reinforcerotten, or rotting, in dock, or at their use; while the navy of Holland lay moorings, in the different harbours, and was of little more than a nominal advantage to this country at the commencement of the Revolutionary War. and four frigates-nearly the whole of Portugal furnished six sail of the line, were fine vessels, and partly officered her navy; of which the seventy-fours by Englishmen. The navy of Naples is said to have consisted of four fine line-of-battle ships, 74 gun-boats, and other vessels, mounting 618 guns in line-of-battle ships, and a body of all, and manned by 8614 men. The 6000 troops, the king of the two Siwhen required, of the British comcilies engaged to place at the disposal, mander-in-chief in the Mediterrancan. The strength of any navy, Mr James well observes, resides, in a national point of view, in its line-ofbattle, rather than its detached or frigate force. He shows very satisfactorily, that the effective British line, at the commencement of the Revolutionary War, consisted of 115, and the French line of 76 ships. The French line possessed eight ships, mounting from 110 to 120 guns each, while the British could produce no ship mounting more than 100 guns. Upwards of a fourth, too, of the British numerical strength was made up of 64-gun ships, whereas the weakest ship belonging to the French mounted 74 guns. Taking, then, the total number of guns mounted on each side, which would be 8718 and 6002, we have a differenc of rather more than four to thee. But as every one of the lower-deck guns of any French line-of-battle ship is of greater nominal caliber, by one ninth, than the heaviest long gun carried by any British ship; and as a French gun, of any caliber, is of greater power, by one twelfth, than an English gun of the same caliber,the mere number of guns on each side is, manifestly, an inadequate criterion of force. Reduce, then, the calibers of the 8718 English, and 6002 French guns into English pounds, and we have the following state Showing that the difference in favour of the British is really very little over one sixth. .C From the middle of July to the middle of December 1793, Lord Howe contrived to cruise, with a fleet of from 17 to 22 of the line, in the Channel, and a battle between the two rival fleets (the French commanded by M. Morand de Talles, numerically equal,) had been so confidently predicted, that the nation was not well satisfied with a bloodless campaign. To suppose, however, says Mr James, that Lord Howe, and his fleet, had not in both instances (off Belleiste and off Carcale Bay) done all that was possible to bring on an engagement, betrayed a total unacquaintance with the subject. The slow sailers of a fleet that chases in line of battle, must always govern its rate of going; and if there be but one ship of that description in the fleet, she must be waited for. The proverbial character of the French ships renders it probable, that the cleverest sailer of the Brest fleet could have outsailed the swiftest sailer of Lord Howe's. Let us now attend to what was going on in the Mediterranean, on the northern coast of which is situated the second naval dépot belonging to France -Toulon. Lord Hood took his station off Toulon, about the middle of August, with a fleet of 21 sail of the line, besides frigates and sloops. The French had in Toulon ready for sea, exclusive of several frigates and corvettes, 17 sail of the line-four refitting-nine repairing-and one building. The fleet was commanded by the Comte de Trogoff, a royalist; and the spirit of disaffection to the Republican cause existed both in the fleet, and throughout the southern provinces. Having received some intimation of the disposition of the people in the county of Provence, Lord Hood secretly opened a negotiation with some of the leading men of the Provisional Government, and they agreed to deliver up the town, arsenal, forts, and shipping of Toulon, to the British forces, in the name of Louis the XVIIth, who was to be proclaimed King of France. Of the disasters that followed from this time to the 17th of December, it is not now our business to speak. The expedition had been a fatal one; and at a council of war it was unanimously resolved, that Toulon should be evacuated; that the French ships of war which were armed, should sail out with the fleet, and that those which remained in the harbour, together with the magazines and the arsenal, should be destroyed. The important service of destroying the ships and magazines was intrusted, at his own particular request, to Sir Sydney Smith, and executed with incomparable spirit, and, considering his limited means, great success. Mr James' account of the whole affair of Toulon is by far the best extant; and he concludes it with a statement of the national advantages, in a military point of view, which were lost to France and gained to England by its seizure. According to the official accounts of the time, twentyseven ships of war, from 120 to 14 guns, were burnt, or otherwise destroyed; 15 brought away by the British, and three by the Allies. Of these, one was of 120 guns, 3 of 80, and 16 of 74. But subsequent information lessened the number of vessels supposed to have been destroyed. And with respect to the buildings on shore, it appeared that the grand magazine had escaped the ravages of the flames, the smaller storehouses only having been consumed. Many of the frigates were old and unserviceable, and their destruction or capture not of material consequence to either party. Of the 15 ships brought away by the English, few were good for much, except the three frigates, the Perle, the Arethusa, and the Topaz, which were fine vessels. Scarcely any of the smaller vessels reached a British port, but to be condemned or laid up. The Puissant 74 never again quitted Portsmouth; nor did the Superb, nor Commerce de-Marseilles of 120 guns, ever sail as a cruiser in the service of England. She measured 2747 tons, and as she was the largest, so was she the most beautiful ship that had hitherto been seen, and, notwithstanding her immense size, sailed and worked like a frigate. The Pompey 74 was also a fine ship, and long remained an ornament to the British navy. The Scipion, also a fine vessel, blew up, soon afterwards at Leghorn; most of the crew, says Brereton, perished-Happily, however, says James, no lives were lost-and this latter statement is the correct one. Some of the ships, Brereton tells us, that were supposed to be included in the conflagration, afterwards took their station in the French line of battle. They had not time to burn before the active enemy extinguished the flames in many of them, and even those that were the worst damaged were repaired. The destruction of the ships and magazines, says James, might certainly have been more complete but for the treachery of the Spaniards, (they left entire the French five line-of-battle ships, which they had undertaken to destroy,) while the pusillanimous flight of the Nea politans thwarted the plans of the British; and the only surprise was, that the latter, hurried and pressed as they were, effected as much as they did. On the 13th of May, of the same year (1793) an action was fought be tween the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate, Iris, Captain George Lumsdaine, and a French frigate, supposed at that time to have been the Medée, and so stated in Schomberg's Naval Chronology; but ascertained by James to have been the Citoyenne Francaise, a frigate also, mounting the same number of guns with the Iris, but belonging to a private individual. It was a drawn battle-for just as the Frenchman hauled on board his fore and main tacks, and shot ahead clear of his opponent's guns, the Iris, who was about to make sail in pursuit, lost her foremast, main top-mast and mizenmast, and resumed her course before the wind for Gibraltar. On the 27th of the same month, the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Venus, Captain Jonathan Faulkner, engaged the French 36-gun frigate Semillante, mounting 40 guns. Of this engagement Brereton says, somewhat too laconically, and not quite correctly," that the ships parted by mutual consent. We therefore may be excused fixing the details of an action which has no particular claims to our notice." The truth, however, is, that the Venus had silenced her opponent for half an hour, and would certainly have taken her, had a large ship, under French colours, not appeared to leeward, whom the Semillante, as if recognising a friend, bore up to join, with, as was afterwards learned, five feet water in her hold. This ship was the Cleopatre, 36-gun French frigate, Captain Jean Mullon, who, on the 18th of June following, was taken, after a desperate action, off the Lizard, by the Nymphe, Captain Edward Pellew. "At 5 A.M., finding that the Nymphe had the advantage in sailing, the Cleopa tre hauled up her foresail, and lowered her topgallantsails, bravely awaiting the coming of her opponent. At about 6 |