## A Bargaining Model for the Cooperative N-person Game |

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### Contents

COMPARISON WITH OTHER THEORIES | 2 |

THE nPERSON BARGAINING GAME WITH GIVEN DISAGREEMENT PAYOFFS | 4 |

A BARGAINING MODEL FOR THE GENERAL CASE | 9 |

8 other sections not shown

### Common terms and phrases

agreement all-player syndicate assumption Axiom bargaining model boundary H characteristic function coalition complementary syndicate comprehensive strategies available comprehensive strategy cr conditional dividends Conflict between Firm conflict payoffs const cooperative game corresponding determinate solution disagreement payoff vector dividend vectors Doctor of Philosophy final payoff vector Firm 2's game F games with transferable given claim vector given disagreement payoffs given syndicate Given the comprehensive Hence Howard Raiffa hyperplane K(u hypersurface joint profit joint strategy linear linear transformation maximize the difference maximizes the product mutually optimal comprehensive n-PERSON GAME Nash's theory negative dividends non-cooperative game number of players optimal comprehensive strategies optimal fighting strategies optimal strategies optimal with respect original game point of H pure strategies Raiffa sectional syndicates set of mutually Shapley value side payment solution concept stage steel price supporting hyperplane symmetric game Syndicate 23 Theorem threat strategies three firms transferable utility two-person unconditional unique solution upper boundary