SUBSEQUENT CHANGES IN LAW.

an effect which was put forward as one of the grievances sought to be redressed by the Pilgrimage of Grace, the great northern rebellion, which took place shortly after the statute was passed. Before the Statute of Uses no man could (except in some places, by virtue of a custom) make a will of land. The plan adopted was to make a feoffment to the uses of the will, and then to devise the uses (M. L. R. P. ch. xv.). The effect of the Statute of Uses was entirely to prevent this being done. For as there was no consideration for the use, a use resulted back to the feoffor, and by force of the statute he remained seised. Accordingly, one of the grievances alleged by the rebels was, that now no man could by will provide for his wife and younger sons. To remedy this, the Statute of Wills was passed in 1540 (32 Hen. 8, c. 1), which, inter alia, enabled a man to devise his lands held in socage tenure. In 1660 all tenures, except copyholds, customaryholds, and leaseholds, were by 12 Car. 2, c. 24, turned into free and common socage.

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The subsequent changes in the law of conveyancing that Subseare of importance to be borne in mind are the following:- quent changes in 1. The Statute of Frauds, 1677 (29 Car. 2, c. 3), made law. it necessary for all conveyances of real property (excepting certain leases) to be in writing, the effect being to render a feoffment with livery void, unless evidenced by writing. (See post, p. 77.)

2. In 1833 fines and recoveries were abolished by "The Fines and Recoveries Act, 1833" (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74).

3. In 1841 an Act was passed rendering a release as effectual for the conveyance of freehold estates as a lease and release (4 & 5 Vict. c. 21). (See post, p. 78.)

4. Three years later an Act to simplify the transfer of property was passed (7 & 8 Vict. c. 76), but was repealed the year following by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106.

5. "The Real Property Act, 1845" (8 & 9 Vict. c. 106), made all corporeal hereditaments lie in grant as well as in livery, and provided that a feoffment, other than under a

custom by an infant, partitions, exchanges, leases, assignments, and surrenders, with various exceptions, made after the 1st of October, 1845, should be void at law unless by deed. (See post, p. 77.)

The principal Acts that have since been passed having reference to conveyancing are―

"The Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874."

"The Conveyancing Acts, 1881, 1882, and 1892."

"The Settled Land Acts, 1882 to 1890."

"The Married Women's Property Acts, 1882 and 1893."

"The Land Transfer Acts, 1875 and 1897."

And the more important provisions of such Acts are subsequently dealt with. (See for the references to such provisions the Index and Table of Statutes.)

CHAPTER II.

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS.

No one is likely to become a good draftsman (i.e., a person whose drafts are precise and free from inconsistencies or superfluous words, and therefore lucid) unless he understands the principles by which a person perusing them will be guided in interpreting them, that is, in endeavouring to discover the author's meaning.

of the

If a person has wishes or intentions which he wishes to Statement communicate to another, he does so by means of physical general signs addressed to the senses. There are many signs that problem. he can make use of; they may be addressed to any of the senses. Thus a blow, which is addressed to the sense of touch, affords strong indication that the person who gives the blow is angry with the person struck. The sign may be addressed to the eye, as where a man nods to another; the nod may mean "yes" or "no." The sign may be addressed to the ear, as in the case of speech. Generally, signs are more readily interpreted when they are addressed to two senses at once; it is easier to understand a person speaking to us if we can see the expression of his face.

In all these examples the sign is fugitive, so that if we wish subsequently to discover what wishes a man expressed at a particular time, we cannot refer to the sign itself, for it no longer exists; all that we can do is to endeavour to remember it, or to obtain such evidence concerning it as is afforded by the memory of others.

should be

It is obvious that if a man wishes to preserve an Sign accurate record of what his wishes or intentions were at a 2

E.I.C.

permanent.

Writing, a

sign.

particular time, he should express his wishes or intentions by signs that are permanent. Then there can be no question in the future as to what the signs were; the only question that can arise is what the signs mean. For example, it is not an uncommon thing to commemorate great national events by erecting monuments in stone. The sign itself, the monument, is palpable; the only difficulty is to discover what is meant by it. Some antiquarians, for instance, believe that Stonehenge is a monument raised to commemorate some particular event in our history; no doubt this may be so, but although the sign remains, we do not know what it means.

The art of writing affords a most convenient method of permanent expressing one's intentions by signs which are readily preserved. A person accustomed to writing can express himself as clearly as in ordinary conversation, and it is probable that he will endeavour to express himself with greater accuracy in writing than in conversation, for he knows that, if he fails to express himself with accuracy in writing, the error may be irreparable; he may not learn that he has been misunderstood, or he may not have the opportunity of explaining himself; while a similar error made in conversation would be detected and repaired immediately; for these reasons the expression of a man's intentions as contained in writing is generally more accurate than that of ordinary conversation.

Superior accuracy of writing recognised by the

law of

England.

The law of England recognises the superior accuracy of writing to spoken words as a means of expressing inten tions, when it declares that if a contract is reduced into writing, it shall be proved by that writing and nothing else; or when it declares that no action shall be brought to charge a person who has entered into contracts of certain natures, unless they be reduced to writing or that a will must generally be in writing; the object in all these cases being to exclude uncertainty arising from trusting to men's memory of what has been said, and to prevent perjury.

EXPRESSED INTENTIONS.

One word as to a source of confusion; we commonly speak of a writing containing the expression of a contract as "the contract." In strictness the phrase "the contract' applies to the engagement between the parties, while the writing is the expression of that engagement.

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intentions.

In all these cases, where a written instrument is the only Expressed evidence that we may make use of for the purpose of ascertaining a man's intention when he wrote it, the sole question for our consideration is what are his expressed intentions; a different thing, it will be observed, from his intentions, as he may have had some intentions that he did not express; or his real intentions may have been something different from those expressed in writing. The question always is, not what the parties intended to say, but what is the meaning of that which they have said, of the words which they have used in the written document (a).

words

The proposition that when we are interpreting a document The meanwe are seeking the writer's expressed intentions, is sometimes ings of the enunciated as follows: "In interpreting a document we have employed. only to discover the meanings of the words employed." The latter form of expression is not very accurate, because the same word may be used in different meanings by different persons or by the same person under different circumstances. A sailor and a housemaid may mean things very different by the same word "sheet." An eminent lawyer once. published a treatise on election, which treated of a doctrine of theology, not as might have been expected of the equitable doctrine of election. Again, the words used to express the same thing will be different when used by different persons; they will depend upon the circumstances, character, and habits of the writer. A common instance is afforded by the use of slang terms, for probably the language used by a professional thief, in describing his adventures, would be unintelligible to most educated men. Again, the meaning which the ordinary usage of society affixes to a word changes with the lapse of time: "Jolly," as used in (a) See Interp. ch. iii., "Expressed Intentions."