If a man devises land, and then makes a feoffment or conveyance of it, and afterwards repurchases it, yet the will stands revoked by the feoffment, and the repurchase is no declaration of the testator's mind to set it on foot again 4. Although a covenant or articles do not at law revoke a will, yet, if entered into for a valuable consideration, amounting in equity to a conveyance, they must consequently be an equitable revocation of a will or any writing in nature thereofr. If a man devises land to J. S. and afterwards bargains and sells it to another, though this be not inrolled within six months, according to the statute, consequently nothing can pass to the bargainee, yet this is a revocation of the will; because here is a solemn act done, which plainly shews the intention of the testator to countermand the wills. If a man seised in fee devises to A B in fee, or for life, and afterwards makes a lease to C D for years, this even at law shall not be a revocation, but during the years for the testator's intent does not appear further than during the term of years: and, where an husband was possessed of a term for forty years, devised it to his wife, and afterwards leased the same land to another for twenty years, and died; it was held that this lease was no revocation of the whole estate, but only during the twenty years, and that the wife should have the residue by the devise ". So, if a man seised of lands devises the same in fee, or for life, and afterwards makes a lease thereof to another for years, it shall not be a revocation but during the years: though, in case a person bas devised lands to one and his heirs, and afterwards leases 9 Gilb. on Wills. 101. 2 P. Will. 624. s Gilb. on Wills, 111. t1 Roll's Abr. 616. will not operate beyond what the particular purpose requires, yet if the conveyance goes farther than what that purpose requires, it will be a revocation. Therefore, if a man in such a case conveys the whole of his estate, taking back an estate for life or giving an estate for life to another, that is a revocation. Vawser v. Jeffery, 2 Swanst. 273. the same to him for a certain term, to commence after the devisor's death, this is a revocation of the whole estate ". Where a man was seised of a lease for three lives, which he devised, and afterwards surrendered the whole lease and took a new one to himself and his heirs for three lives, it was decreed by Lord Chancellor King, that this renewal of the lease was a revocation of the will, as to this particular. So where a testator devised by his will a leasehold estate, which he held under Magdalen College, and after the making of his will, before his death renews his lease, by surrendering the old one, and taking a new lease, it was determined by the Lord Chancellor that this was a revocation of the devisey. And thus it hath lately been determined where a leasehold estate was specifically given and surrendered by the testator after having made his will (8). And where testator held an w 1 Roll's Abr. 616. y 2 Atk. 593, 5 New Abr. 527. 2 Hone and Medcraft, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 261. for (8) The renewal of a lease for lives is always a revocation, because the renewed lease being a new purchase of a freehold estate, cannot pass by a will previously made. Mar, wood v. Turner, 3 P. Wms. 170. Digby v. Legard, 2 Dick, 500. Abney v. Miller, 2 Atk. 597. And in respect to a lease years, if a testator simply bequeath a lease of which he is possessed at the making of his will, and afterwards renew that lease, the legatee is not entitled to the benefit of the new lease, for the new lease is not given to him, but the old lease only, which by the renewal is adeemed and gone. James v. Dean, 15 Ves. 238. But a testator may, if he please, in the case of a chattel lease, give not only the actual lease of which he is possessed at the making of his will, but such renewed or other lease of the same premises as he happens to be entitled to at the time of his death. In every case, therefore, where the lease has been renewed by the testator, after the making of his will, the true inquiry is, whether it appears from the context of the whole will to have been the testator's intention that the legatee should take, not merely the actual lease, if it subsisted at his death, but any renewed or other lease of the same premises which he might then happen to be possessed of. Id. ibid. Colegrave v. Manby, 6 Madd. 72. estate for three lives, which he devised to his wife, and afterwards purchased the reversion in fee of the lifehold estate, the purchasing the fee was held a revocation, and the land thereby to descend upon the heira. In case a fortune be given to a child by the father, subse quent to the making of his will, wherein he had bequeathed her a portion, this shall be taken as a revocation of the legacy and will for so much; as where a man by his will gave his four daughters 600l. a-piece, and afterwards married his eldest daughter to the plaintiff, and gave her 700%. portion. After that he makes a codicil, and gives 100%. apiece to his unmarried daughters, and thereby ratifies and confirms his will, and dies. The plaintiff preferred his bill for the legacy of 6007. given to his wife by the will. It was held by the master of the rolls, that the portion given by the testator in his lifetime should be intended in satisfaction of the legacy. And it was agreed to be the constant rule of the court of chancery, that where a legacy was given to a child, who afterwards, upon marriage or otherwise, hath the like or greater sum, it should be intended in satisfaction of the legacy, unless the testator should declare his intent otherwise; and it was said the words of ratifying and confirming do not alter the case, though they amount to a new publication, being only words of form, and declaring nothing of the testator's intent in this matter. A portion given after a legacy shall not be a satisfaction of it, where it is expressly given in satisfaction of a different claim; or where it is given absolutely, and the legacies under limitations. Neither can a legacy be a satisfaction for a claim aliunde, i. e. from some other person, unless clearly expressed to be so intended d. A parent paying a portion is presumed to mean to per form the gift of a legacy; unless there be a sufficient evidence to repel the presumption. As where a father gave a a Galton v. Hancock, 2 Atk. 424. b Prec. in Cha. 183. 224. Irod and Hurst, 2 Frem. Rep. d Baugh v. Reed, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 192. (S. C. 1 Ves. jun. 257.) Ellison v. Cookson, 2 Bro. Cha Rep. 307. sum to his daughter, by will, and afterwards gave an equal sum as a portion, it was presumed to be an ademption. In this case the Lord Chancellor said, the argument is, that the will is a distribution of the testator's property among his children; and if he advances the portion to a child, the presumption of law is, that the provision is satisfied. It is a presumption capable of being rebutted by evidence. With respect to the rule of law, I think, if neither the rule itself, or the mode of rebutting it had ever prevailed, it would have been as wise; but, as it is, I must admit that such a presumption exists; and though it is argued testators may not know it, yet I think, if there is such a presumption, the subject is bound to know it f - Where a putative father gave a legacy of 1350l. to his daughter, and afterward, in his lifetime, gave 1000. as a marriage portion; and after the marriage gave her and her husband 600., it was held not a satisfaction of the legacy, a declaration of the father's being proved by parol evidence that he intended a further provision. The Lord Chancellor said, The old rule of satisfaction was a rigid one. If I am to believe the only witness produced, the testator in the second gift did not mean to perform the whole purpose, therefore every other act of bounty will stand clear, and advancements to any amount, unless marked with the intent of being the ultimate bounty, will stand unaffected. I do not rest on the witness referring to an intention in the father to do more at his death, but that the testator did not in the gift express any intention of satisfaction; therefore the gift by the will is not satisfied 8. There is a difference where a legacy and portion are given by a stranger, and where the same are given by a parent; as, where a legacy was given by a stranger to a female infant, the same was held not to be adeemed by his paying a marriage portion, and making other provisions for her and her husband.-Lord Chancellor. The word portion, although applied in the case of a parent, shall not be so applied to the gifts of other relations or friends: it has been determined f Ellison v. Cookson, 3 Bro, Cha. Rep. 63. 8 Debeze v. Man, 2 Bro. Cha, Rep. 165. 519. not to extend to a grandfather. Whatever foundation there might be for the original application of the rule, that the advancement of a parent shall not be a further gift, it is not now to be disputed; but it is obvious the intent of the testator is as often disappointed as served by it. Those cases stand on their own ground; this case is an attempt to make a friend's legacy satisfied by a subsequent advancement. There are cases where a man may describe himself so, that that the gift by the will, and that in his lifetime, may be intended for the same purpose, but it must appear that he meant to put himself in loco parentis [in the place of a parent]; for there are no cases where it has been so held; if the second gift appeared to be diverso intuitu [with a different view]. I have gone through all the cases, and it appears to be the result of them, that where a stranger gives a legacy by will, and afterwards gives a sum without any evidence that it is intended for the same purpose, it is not taken for a satisfaction; to make it so, it must appear, at the time of the gift, to be meant as an ademption of the legacy h (9). h Powel v. Cleaver, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 500. (9 In general a person is entitled to the benefit of as many gifts as another chooses to bestow upon him, and a second is not a substitution of a first gift; but, as we have before seen, it is not so as to a debt. Judges in equity have also thought that a portion was in that respect like a debt, and accordingly have held that prima facie a portion to a child, by the will of the parent, if there be any other prior provision, is a satisfaction, unless it is shown clearly that it is not so intended. Hinchliffe v. Hinchliffe, 3 Ves. 516. And on the same principle a subsequent advancement has been held an ademption of a prior legacy. Bellasis v. Uthwaite, 1 Atk. 427. Copley v. Copley, 1 P. Wms. 147. Byde v. Byde, 2 Eden. 19. S.C. 1 Cox, 44. Nor will slight circumstances of difference between the provision by the settlement and that by the will alter the doctrine of satisfaction. Pole v. Lord Somers, 6 Ves. 309. But the doctrine resting entirely upon presumption, the portion given by the will, or the subsequent gift to operate either as a satisfaction of a prior provision, or an ademption of a prior legacy, must be ejusdem |