Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public ChoiceWhen one thinks about how collective decisions are made, voting is the method that comes naturally to mind. But other methods such as random process and consensus are also used. This book explores just what a collective decision is, classifies the methods of making collective decisions, and identifies the advantages and disadvantages of each method. Classification is the prelude to evaluation. What are the characteristics of a method of making collective decisions, the book asks, that permit us to describe a collective decision as good? The second part of the book is detailed exploration of voting: the dimensions in which voting situations differ, the origins and logic of majority rule, the frequency of cycles in voting, the Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems, criteria for ways of cutting through cycles and the application of these criteria to a variety of rules, voting over continuums, proportional representation, and voting rules that take account of intensities of preferences. Relatively unknown methods of voting give voting a much greater potential than is generally recognized. Collective Decisions and Voting is essential reading for everyone with an interest in voting theory and in how public choices might be made. |
Contents
8 | |
A Taxonomy of Collective Decision Procedures | |
Relative Advantages of Modes of Making Collective Decisions | |
What is a Good Collective Decision? | |
An Overview of Voting | |
Voting Cycles | |
The Arrow Theorem | |
Strategic Voting and the GibbardSatterthwaite Theorem | |
Criteria for Evaluating RankingBased VoteProcessing Rules | |
VoteProcessing Rules for Selecting One Option from a Continuum of One | |
Other editions - View all
Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice Nicolaus Tideman Limited preview - 2006 |
Common terms and phrases
87 elections achieve alternative vote approval voting Arrow theorem Bucklin voting Chapter choice Clarke taxes coalition collective decision procedures components Condorcet consistency consensus continuum CPO-STV cycles cyclic anomalies demand-revealing process dimensions dominant option eliminated evaluating Example extortion Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem GOCHA set incentive income effects independence of clones individuals invariant loss consistency majority rule matrix of majorities maximin rule mode monotonicity mutual majority consistency Nanson Nicolaus Tideman number of candidates number of voters outcome efficiency paired comparisons pairs of options Pareto perfect-tie responsiveness person plurality positive responsiveness possible preferences procedural efficiency properties pseudo-consensus random process range voting ranked pairs rule RBVPR resistance to strategy resolvability rule lacks rule possesses Schulze method Schwartz consistency sequence of rankings Single Transferable Vote single-peaked Smith consistency Smith set social welfare function symbolic equality Thompson insurance mechanism trade two-ballot majority universal domain vote-processing rule voting procedures weighted Condorcet rule winner winning option