WAR ON OTHERS' ACCOUNT.

BY GROTIUS

(From the "Law of War and Peace.")

[HUGO DE GROOT, Latinized GROTIUS, the founder of international law on principles of natural equity, was born in 1583 at Delft, Holland, of a rich and distinguished family. With precocious talents developed by powerful tutors, he wrote good Latin verse at nine; entered the university of Leyden at twelve; went with John of Barneveldt's embassy to Henry IV. at fifteen ; under Scaliger's prompting edited Capella's encyclopedic "Satyricon" at sixteen, and Aratus'"Phænomena " at seventeen; took LL.D. and began law practice at about eighteen; and about the same time wrote three Latin Scriptural dramas and various Latin poems. At twenty he was chosen government historiographer of the Spanish war, and began "Annals of the Low Countries," wrought on all his life and published posthumously. The next year he wrote the "Law of War-Prize," a first draft of his immortal work; only one chapter was published, entitled "Mare Liberum" (The Ocean Free), assailed in 1632 by John Selden in "Mare Clausum " (The Ocean an Enclosure). In 1610 he produced "The Antiquity of the Batavian Republic," to justify the revolt from Spain. In 1613 he was chosen pensionary of Rotterdam, and ex-officio member of the StatesGeneral. Taking the losing side with Barneveldt in the religious contest in the Netherlands, which he tried to end by a bill of compromise, Barneveldt's overthrow and judicial murder by Maurice dragged down Grotius into confiscation and life imprisonment. Keeping up his physical health by whipping a top, and his mental health by writing Latin verses and a treatise "On the Truth of the Christian Religion," — a widely popular tract, attempting to unite all sects on the common bases of all creeds, after two years he escaped in a book-chest, but remained a lifelong exile, despite all appeals and a new prince. Taking asylum in France under Louis XIII., he published in 1622 a vindication, which the States-General proscribed as a libel, ordering the author seized wherever found; and in 1625 his monument, "On the Law of War and Peace." After attempts at return to Holland, and having to fly once more, he took the post of ambassador to France from Sweden, then ruled by Oxenstiern; but was disliked by Richelieu and snubbed by the court, had himself recalled in 1645, and died on a journey in that year. The spring of his efforts, besides ardent patriotism and sincere piety, was a deep desire to have states and religious parties compete in peaceful emulation and recognition of mutual right, instead of intolerance and war. His probity was stainless, and his accomplishments manifold.]

1

-

WHEN we above spoke of those who make war, it was said and proved by us that, Natural Law, not only each person has an executive power to assert his own right, but also the rights of others. Whence it follows, that the causes which justify him whose interest is concerned, do also justify those who help him.

The first and closest of such relations is, the care which we are bound to exercise for those who are under us, whether as

members of a family or of our civil community; for these are, in a way, a part of him who is at the head of the body, as we there said. Thus the Gibeonites having put themselves under the Jewish people, that people took up arms for them, with Joshua for their leader. Our ancestors, says Cicero, often undertook war, because merchants and sailors belonging to them were treated with injury. And elsewhere, How many wars did our ancestors undertake because Roman citizens were injured, their navigators detained, their merchants despoiled! The same Romans, though they would not take up arms for their allies, yet when the same peoples had become their subjects, thought it necessary to do so. The Campanians say to the Romans, Since you will not allow us to defend our property against force and injury by our own just force, you will certainly defend it by yours. Florus, as ambassador of the Campanians, says that the league which existed before, had become more sacred by the surrender of all his countrymen. It was considered a point of good faith, says Livy, not to desert those who had surrendered to us.

But yet it is not always, even if the cause of a subject be just, that it obliges the rulers to enter upon a war; but then only, if it can be done without the damage of all, or the greater part, of the subjects. For the office of the ruler is concerned more with the whole than with the parts; and in proportion as the part is greater, it approaches nearer to the nature of the whole.

Therefore if one citizen, though innocent, be demanded by the many, in order to be put to death, it is not doubtful that he may by given up, if it appear that the state of which the demand is made is much too weak to contend. Vasquius disputes against this opinion; but if we look, not so much at his words, as at his purport, he seems to come to this, that such a citizen is not likely to be deserted, when there is a hope that he may be defended. For he adduces the history of the Italic infantry, which deserted Pompey when his cause was not yet desperate, being assured of their safety by Cæsar; which he blames, and deservedly.

Whether an innocent citizen may be delivered into the hands of the enemy, to avoid the otherwise imminent destruction of the city, the learned dispute, and the dispute existed also in ancient times; as when Demosthenes narrated the clever fable of the wolves requiring the sheep to give up their dogs

for the sake of peace. That it is not lawful to do so, is maintained not by Vasquius only, but Sotus also, whose opinion Vasquius condemns as approaching to perfidy. Yet Sotus holds that such a citizen is bound to surrender himself to the enemy: this Vasquius denies, because the nature of civil society, which every one enters into for his own advantage, does not require such a step.

But from this, nothing follows but that a citizen is not bound to this step, by any law properly so called; but it does not follow that charity allows him to do otherwise. For there are many duties, not of justice properly so called, but of good will, which it is not only laudable to perform, but which it is blamable to omit. And of such nature appears this to be, that each person should prefer the life of an innocent multitude to his own. So Euripides. And so Phocion exhorted Demosthenes and others that they should rather submit to death, after the example of the daughters of Leos and the Hyacinthids, than bring an irreparable calamity on their country. Cicero, pleading for Sextius, says, that if he were in a ship attacked by pirates who demanded him in particular, and would destroy the ship if he were not given up, he would rather throw himself into the sea than bring upon all the rest, not only certain death, but even extreme danger of death. And again, he says that a wise and good man will rather consult the safety of all than of any one in particular, even of himself. In Livy we read: I have often heard of men who would rather die for their country, but I have never heard of any who thought it reasonable that their country should perish for them.

But, this being assumed, there remains this doubt, whether, what they are thus bound to do, they can be compelled to do. Sotus denies this, adducing the example of a rich man who is bound to give alms to a needy man by a rule of mercy, but cannot be compelled to do so. But it is to be remarked that the relation of such parties is different from that of superiors compared with subjects. For an equal cannot compel an equal, except to that which he has a right to, speaking strictly. But a superior can compel him to other things, also, which any virtue prescribes; because in the peculiar right of a superior as superior, this is comprehended. Thus, in a great scarcity of corn, the citizens may be compelled to contribute to the common stock what each one has; and thus, in this question before us, it seems to be sound doctrine that the citizen may be compelled

to do that which charity requires. And thus Phocion, whom I have already mentioned, pointed out a very intimate friend of his, Nicocles by name, and said that matters were come to such a miserable condition that if Alexander demanded him, he would be of opinion that he ought to be given up.

As parties whom we are bound to defend, next to our subjects, come our allies. This is comprehended in our engagement with them, whether they have put themselves under the authority and protection of others, or have contracted for mutual aid. He who does not repel an injury for an ally, if he can, is in the wrong as much as he who does the injury, says Ambrose.

That such contracts are not to be extended to wars where there is no just cause for the war, we have elsewhere said. And this is the reason why the Lacedemonians, before they began their war with the Athenians, put the matter to the judgment of all their allies; as also the Romans did with regard to the Greeks, respecting the war with Nabis. We will further add, that even in such a case, the ally is not bound if there be no hope of a good result. For such alliances are contracted, not for the sake of evil results, but of good. An ally, however, is to be defended even against another confederate, except there be some special stipulation to the contrary in some previous convention. Thus, the Corcyreans, if their cause was good, might have received defensive aid from the Athenians, even against the Corinthians, who were their old allies.

The third cause (in which we may undertake war on account of others, subjects and allies being the first two cases) is the cause of friends, to whom we have not promised aid, but to whom it is in a manner due on the ground of friendship, if it can be given easily and without inconvenience. Thus Abraham took arms for Lot, his relative; the Romans commanded the Antiates not to exercise piracy against the Greeks, as being related to the Italians. The Romans, too, often took up arms for their allies, not only when they were bound to do so by treaty, but also for their friends; or threatened to take up arms in such cases.

The last and widest reason for taking up arms, is the connection of men with men as such, which alone is often sufficient to induce them to give their aid. Men are made for mutual help, says Seneca, and the like; so Euripides and Ambrose.

Here the question is raised, whether man be bound to defend man, and people to defend people, from wrong. Plato thinks that he ought to be punished who does not repel force offered to another; and this was also provided by the laws of the Egyptians. But, in the first place, if the danger be manifest, it is certain that he is not so bound; for he may reasonably prefer his own life and possessions to those of others. And in this sense, as I conceive, we are to interpret what Cicero says, that he who does not repel and resist an injury when he can, is as much in fault as if he were to desert his parents, or his country, or his allies: when he can, we are to understand, with convenience to himself: for the same writer elsewhere says, Perhaps we cannot defend men without incurring blame. So Sallust says that when we are asked to assist allies, it is to be considered whether we may abstain from war; and then, whether what is required is sufficiently pious, safe, glorious; or, on the other hand, unbecoming.

And the warning of Seneca is not to be despised: I am willing to help a man who is perishing, but so that I myself do not perish; except I am to be the ransom of a great man or a great cause. And even then, he will not be bound, if the person oppressed cannot be extricated without the death of the assailant. For if he may in some cases prefer the life of the assailant to his own, when he is attacked, as we have elsewhere said, he will not be wrong who either thinks or desires that another person so attacked has the same preference: especially when there is greater danger of irreparable and eternal loss on the part of the invader.

There is also another question, whether a war for the subjects of another be just, for the purpose of defending them from injuries inflicted by their ruler. Certainly it is undoubted that ever since civil societies were formed, the rulers of each claimed some especial right over his own subjects. Euripides makes his characters say that they are sufficient to right wrongs in their own city. And Thucydides puts among the marks of empire the supreme authority in judicial proceedings. And so Virgil, Ovid, and Euripides in the Hippolytus. This is, as Ambrose says, that peoples may not run into wars by usurping the care of those who do not belong to them. The Corinthians in Thucydides say that it is right that each state should punish its own subjects. And Perseus says that he will not plead in defense of what he did against the Dolopians,