1812. The KING against The Inhabi.` tants of TON. which mentions the person coming into the parish with his or her family. The certificate act does not require the names of the children forming part of the family to be introduced into the certificate, though it may answer a convenient purpose by identifying them more easily LEEK WOOTafterwards.] The certificate operates upon each person named in it, as if he had been the only person certified. The case of The King v. Coldashton (a), which seems to bear the other way, was long antecedent to The King v. Testerton, and so far as it may be deemed contrary to, was overruled by the latter. In the former case, the child who was deemed to have acquired a derivative settlement was indeed named in the certificate; but it was within the age of nurture; whereas here the child was 12 years old at the time, and capable of gaining a settlement in his own right. Another objection was made to the order in this case, that the paupers removed were not inhabiting at the time in the parish which procured the order but it was observed that no such objection was made before the sessions; and the Court afterwards considered that to be a sufficient answer. Park and Reynolds, contrà, relied principally on the cases of The King v. Coldashton (a), and The King v. Deddington (b), as ruling the present; which they observed had been overlooked in The King v. Testerton, and R. v. Bath Easton, and diminished their authority. R. v. Deddington was the case of a derivative settlement acquired by purchase in the certificated parish, though such a mode of acquiring a settlement is not named in the certificate act; but the Court thought that a derivative (a) Burr. S. C. 444. (b) Burr, S. C. 528. settle 1812. The KING against The Inhabitants of LEEK WOOT. TON. settlement might be acquired by the children of the pur- Lord ELLENBOROUGH, C. J. Where there are conflicting decisions upon the construction of a statute, the Court must refer to that which is and ought to be the source of all such decisions, that is, the words of the statute itself. Some cases have been cited upon this occasion which are certainly of great weight, but which are in contradiction to the prior cases of Coldashton and Deddington; and therefore the Court are obliged to refer to the fountain-head of all, the statute, to see which of them most corresponds with the words of it; and upon the best consideration I think that the cases of Coldashton and Deddington range more strictly within the words of the stat. 8 & 9 W. 3. c. 30.and 9 & 10 W. 3. c. 11. The second of these statutes recites the former, which empowers the granting of such certificates to provide for the person mentioned in the certificate, with his or her family; and the legislature evidently meant that the certificate should be entire to protect the pater-familias and his family, whether named or not; and the naming of any of the family is mere matter of convenience, in order (a) 2 Const. 583. and Cald. 426, the 1812. The KING against The Inhabitants of TON. the more easily to identify them, but is not directed to be done by the legislature, nor are any powers taken away from or given to such children on account of their being named or not named in the certificate. The stat. 8 & 9 W. 3. says that when any person coming to inhabit LEEK WOOTand reside in any parish shall at the same time bring and deliver a certificate to the parish officers, thereby owning the person or persons mentioned in the certificate to be an inhabitant or inhabitants of the parish certifying; every such certificate shall oblige the parish to provide for the person mentioned in the certificate, together with his or her family, when chargeable. Now the person to be named in the certificate is the pater-familias, with his family, if he happen to have any; and then, and not before, it shall be lawful for any such person and his or her children, &c. to be removed. I am aware that the word such is not in the enacting part of the clause; but I think it must to complete the sense be incorporated there, being in the antecedent part of the statute. The scope and object of the act was to protect the residence of a father or mother coming with their family into another parish, without casting a burden upon it, or enabling them to gain a settlement there except in the two ways mentioned. There is nothing in the act which requires the nomination of the constituent parts of their family, and it is mere artificial reasoning which makes the distinction between such of the children as are and such as are not named in the certificate; a distinction which the act itself does not make. Then as the child, though named, was still to be considered only as a constituent part of the family, it brings it to the question, Whether he was ousted of his derivative settlement from the father? Upon that point I think that the language of 1812. The KING against The Inhabi tants of LEEK WOOT TON. of Lord Mansfield is founded in reason, and not opposed by the act, that the children of all parents must have the settlement of the father until they acquire another for themselves. I think therefore that the pauper in this case, continuing part of his father's family at the time, derived the settlement from him, and was not repelled from it by the circumstances of being named in the certificate. GROSE, J. agreed. LE BLANC, J. The sessions have sent this case for the opinion of the Court upon the question, Whether the pauper acquired a derivative settlement from his father? We must therefore take it that the son came into the certificated parish as part of his father's family, never having gained a settlement in his own right; though that is not stated in the case. Then coming into the parish as part of his father's family under the certificate, with only a derivative settlement from his father, the question is whether, while he continued part of his fa ther's family, a settlement gained by his father there will not also be communicated to the son; whether the settlement of the son will not also shift with that of the father? The cases of Testerton and Bath Easton have not decided that the son, coming into a parish and continuing as part of his father's family under a certificate, is not capable of having his derivative settlement shift with his father's settlement; they only decided that a child named in the certificate so far stood in a different situation from that of a child who was not named, as that the settlement of a son so named, who had ceased to be part of the father's family, should not shift with that of his fa ther. 1812. The KING against The Inhabitants of TON. ther. Now here the son had gained no settlement of his own at the time, but was living with the father as part of his family; and the cases of Coldashton and Deddington have decided that the settlement of a son so circumstanced, though named in the certificate, shall vary with LEEK WOOTthe subsequent settlement of the father; and that if he come into the parish as part of the father's family with a certificate, his being named in it does not prevent the shifting of his settlement with his father's. This case therefore is distinguishable from those of Testerton and Bath Easton. BAYLEY, J. The true construction of the certificate act seems to be that a pauper having an independent settlement of his own, and not merely a derivative settlement from the father, shall not, if named in the certificate, gain a settlement in the certificated parish, except in one or other of the ways permitted to the father himself, but if the child come into the parish under the certificate with his father, having only a derivative settlement from the father, what is there to prevent his settlement shifting with that of his father, as in other cases? The act does not say it shall not; and the cases say that though named in the certificate he shall be treated as part of his father's family, and his settlement shift with his father's. It is said indeed that by the words of the act, the settlement of a certificated person can only be acquired in the certificated parish by two modes, and that this is not one of them. But I think the fallacy of the argument is this, that the children do not come into the parish under the certificate suo jure, but only as part of the father's family and under his protection. The cases of Coldashton and Deddington have decided this |