1812. BELL against ANSLEY. "is to pay no more than the sum he subscribed; and "the plaintiff is answerable to Reynolds for his share.” However he offered to reserve the point if the defendant's counsel thought they could support it; but they declined it, and there was a verdict for the plaintiff. If this case were now to be decided, the payment of money into court would clearly have excluded the objection; but as the case then stood, and the law was then held, the objection ought not to have prevailed. It does not appear that Reynolds was interested when the policy was effected; and if he were not, then the policy was well effected upon the only interest meant to be covered by it. Here the plaintiffs were not, as in that case, the persons with whom the contract was made; as far as that circumstance can operate as a ground for the judgThe second ground assigned for the judgment, that the defendant will only have to pay once, and that the plaintiff would be answerable to Reynolds for his share, is certainly not a tenable one. This case, therefore, cannot be relied upon as an authority for the defendant upon the point now in question. Upon the ground, therefore, that it is a material allegation, namely, the allegation on whose account and for whose use and benefit a policy is made; and that the statement ought to be according to the truth; we are of opinion that the variance in this case was fatal, and that the rule for a nonsuit should be made absolute. ment. STEPHENS 1812. THI STEPHENS against DERRY. HIS came on upon a rule to shew cause why the plaintiff should not bring the postea into court and file the plea roll, so that the defendant might enter a suggestion thereon, that the debt recovered in this action did not amount to 57. (47. 15s.), and that at the time of commencing the action the plaintiff and defendant were both resident and seeking their livelihood within the city of London, and the defendant liable to be summoned to the court of requests there, pursuant to the statute 39 & 40 G. 3. c. 104. (public local.) It appeared from the defendant's affidavit, that at the time the debt was contracted he was employed as clerk to and boarded with Mr. Hughes, who had apartments in the plaintiff's house within the city. That at the commencement of this action the plaintiff resided and still resides within the city, and the defendant was and still is employed as clerk (a) to and resides with certain solicitors within the city, by which he obtains his livelihood: and that the debt was contracted within the city, and not elsewhere. By the plaintiff's affidavit it appeared that the debt was contracted for clothes, which were delivered in the city, but that before and at the time and for six months afterwards the defendant lodged with his wife in the county of Middlesex, first at Backhill, and then at Pentonville,where they now reside, and where the wife carries on the business of a mantua-maker, and that they have no property within the city of London. (a) At weekly wages, as appeared by another affidavit. L2 Topping Tuesday, June 16th. Under the Lonrequests act, don court of 39 & 40 G. 3. c. 104. a hus band domiciled in Middlesex, where his wife carried on busi ness, though he was employed as a clerk in the office of solicitors in London, is not privileged to be sued only in London, as a his livelihood person seeking there; for that means seeking the whole of his livelihood there. 1812. STEPHENS against DERRY. Topping and Espinasse were heard against the rule; and Park and Gaselee in support of it. The latter referred to Holden v. Newnham (a), and Jefferies v. Watts (b). Lord ELLENBOROUGH, C. J. In order to entitle a party to be sued in London by seeking his livelihood within the city, he should seek the whole of his livelihood there, and not be in a state of vagrant existence for this purpose, seeking it partly within and partly without the city. Here the defendant seeks for employment at a certain office in the city, where he may get process, which he is to serve elsewhere. The statute must have a sober construction; for it would be extravagant in its terms, if taken in their greatest latitude; and it must mean that a party shall only be privileged to be sued in the city court, as seeking his livelihood within the city, where he so carries on his business there, as that is the only proper place to find him, in order to serve him with process; for otherwise, if a man kept a stand within the city for only half an hour in the day, though all the rest of the time he carried on business elsewhere, he would be privileged to be sued there only. If he seek his livelihood partly in the one place and partly in the other, there is no reason why he should be sued only in London. Here the defendant may be said to seek his livelihood substantially in the place where he is domiciled, and where his wife continually carries on business. GROSE, J. I consider this man as seeking his livelihood in the place where he lives and carries on his business. (a) 13 East, 161. (b) 1 New Rep. 153. LE BLANC, 66 LE BLANC, J. The question is brought before the Court for the first time for the construction of the words, seeking his livelihood," in the act; the Court therefore should put such a construction as will fall in with the views of the legislature, and yet avoid the inconvenience which would ensue from too extended an interpretation of these general words. The question is whether this man was residing or seeking his livelihood at the time within the city of London. It is not pretended that his place of domicile was not elsewhere; and as to seeking his livelihood, that must mean seeking the whole of his livelihood within the city: it is the only sensible construction which can be put upon those words in the act. How else can we interpret what is a seeking of his livelihood there? for otherwise if a person only went his round occasionally in the city to seek for employment, though his general residence were elsewhere, he must always be sued in London; as may happen to be the case of porters, newspaper-carriers, and the like; which never could have been within the contemplation of the legislature. Now this person may fairly be said to seek his livelihood where he resides with his wife in Middlesex; for the trade carried on by her agency is his trade; he is liable for the debts contracted in it, and entitled to the profits: but if we were to put the construction on the act now contended for, every tradesman who supplied her with goods in Middlesex would be obliged to sue her husband in London. In the case of Kaye and Freshfield's clerk (a), it did not appear that he carried on business any where else than in their office 1812. STEPHENS against DERRY. (a) 13 East, 161. in 1812. STEPHENS against DERRY. in London; yet the Court was not prepared to say that he was within the act. BAYLEY, J. was of the same opinion. Rule discharged. Friday, June 12th. A wager by which the defendant re ceived from the plaintiff 100 guineas on the 31st of May 1802, in consideration of p fpay GILBERT, Clerk, against Sir MARK SYKES. ΤΗ THE plaintiff declared in assumpsit upon a wager, and stated the consideration and promise to be, that if he would then pay the defendant one hundred guineas, on the 31st of May 1802, the defendant would pay him one guinea a day so long as Napoleon Bonaparte should live : ing the plaintiff and then averred the payment to the defendant of the a guinea a-day 100 guineas, which he accepted: and that N. B. was still living; of which the defendant had notice; and further, that though the defendant did pay to the plaintiff a guinea a-day for a long time after the making of the promise and after the receipt of the 100 guineas, namely, up to sation upon the the 25th of December 1804, yet that he had not paid the probability of as long as Na poleon Bona parte (then first consul of the French republic) should live; which bet arose out of a conver his coming to a guinea a-day since; and so the plaintiff concluded to his violent death by assassination damage of 22967. at that rate, from the defendant's or otherwise, is breach of promise. void on the grounds of immorality and impolicy. At the trial at York before Thompson, B. the facts stated in the declaration were proved, together with other circumstances of subsequent confirmation of the wager by the defendant, which in the ultimate consideration of the case left no doubt as to the fact of the defendant's final acceptance of it; though there was material evidence, in the circumstances under which the wager was originally proposed and taken up, which was at the defendant's own table after dinner, and in the opinion of those who were |