who now monopolize wealth and power in Paris, you will not be at a loss to form a just conclusion, with regard to the public morals. They are not only depraved, to an unprecedented and incredible degree, but are, as you may infer from the representation I have given above, stripped of the protection of that body of opinion, sentiment, and manners, which, according to Mr. Burke, 'makes vice lose half its evils, by losing all its grossness."

The women of Paris, although they still enjoy no small share of influence, and are extremely active in political intrigue, live, nevertheless, in a state of wretched degradation. An exterior, and ceremonious homage is paid to them, but there no longer exists in their favour, that generous loyalty and respectful gallantry of the heart, those feelings of tenderness and deference, which, while they humanize and exalt our own character, invest their objects with much real dignity and power, and tend to produce the very combination of excellence to which alone they are due. The spirit of chivalry, which led to the beautiful relations in which the sexes now stand towards each other in England and in this country, although the offspring of illusion in the first instance, contributed to realize that perfection in the female character, from the mere supposition of which it originally sprung. It created an ambition in the sex to reach the ideal standard of virtue and refinement, which it introduced, and subjected them to a formidable censorship, in the fastidiousness of public opinion to which it gave rise.

No where did the chivalrous spirit flourish more than in France, until the period of the revolution. And although, from a variety of causes, its beneficial influence over the female character was less than elsewhere, it tended to counteract the propensities of vice, and to give to social intercourse, an exterior at least of decorum and elegance. It has now wholly disappeared from the fashionable world of Paris, and with it all the beneficial effects I have enumerated. Women living in a state of avowed concubinage, who do not even bear the names of those with whom they reside, are admitted freely into the higher circles, see the best company at home, and receive from the other sex, as well as from their own, all the customary demonstrations of esteem and deference. They enjoy, in fact, the same degree of estimation as their associates who live in legitimate wedlock, and who, indeed, are, for the most part, entitled to but little more.

Chastity, and even conjugal fidelity, are not classed among the necessary virtues, or the chief ornaments of the female character. Marriage, the origin of all our relations, and the element of all moral obligation,' is considered rather as a release from the bondage of decorum, than as an entrance upon the severest duties; rather as an occasion to give publicity to vice, than seclusion to virtue.

I have said, 'as a release from bondage,' because it is rather singular, that the restraints imposed upon girls, before marriage, are of the most rigid kind;-such as to condemn them to total silence in mixed companies, and to preclude them from all familiar intercourse with the other sex: whereas, after marriage, they enjoy unbounded freedom;-a latitude of indulgence, that opens the door to the most frightful corruption. The matrimonial union is generally formed without any previous acquaintance between the parties, and not having that sacred and awful character which religion and opition communicate to it among us, can be, in such a case, but a sleuder tie, and a feeble restraint.

You may readily infer from the foregoing pages, that love, as a moral sentiment, of the purest delicacy, and of the highest order, is almost entirely unknown in the French capital. In the mind of a Parisian, who considers a woman as little better than a mere animal or automaton, it is no more than the coarsest sensuality, or a transitory impulse of sympathy. No where on earth, however, is 10 much said on the subject of the pure union of hearts. If we except the celebration of the virtues of the Imperial family, scarcely any thing is heard in the theatres but the panegyric of sentimental attachment. Scarcely any other strain is sung, but the sublimity of conjugal affection.'

The new law of divorce opens an easy road to the dissolution of the marriage contract, but advantage is not taken of it as frequently as might be imagined. The temptation to this step, cannot be supposed to be strong, where the conjugal union imposes so little restraint on the disorderly passions of either party. A particular case occurred during my residence in Paris, which deserves to be mentioned, as an illustration of the state of public morals. The wife of an Irish gentleman, domiciliated there, sued for a divorce upon unsubstantial grounds, in the inferior courts, and was unsuccessful in her demand. The cause was carried by appeal to the Court of Cassation, the supreme judicature of France, where the judgment of the other tribunals was reversed, and a decision proBounced in favour of the wife, notwithstanding a very strenuous opposition on the part of the husband. It was notorious, that the applicant was the mistress of the president of the Court of Cassation, and quite evident that the success of her suit was owing to his influence, exerted in a manner equally repugnant to decency and to justice. Nothing could be more shamelessly indelicate, than the manner in which the late divorce of the Emperor was conducted. The nature of the cause alleged, the solemnity of the promulgation, the whole ceremonial, both as to language and form, were alike coarse and offensive. If you wish to form an adequate conception of the morality of Paris, at this moment, I would

refer

refer you to the numberless epithalamiums presented to Buonaparte on the occasion of his marriage, and graciously received. They exceed in grossness and obscenity any productions of the kind to be found in the whole range of poetry.

The civil action, which the English law accords to the husband, against the seducer of his wife, is, I believe, unknown to the jurisprudence of France. At least, I have never heard of a case of the kind. If such a remedy were provided, and generally resorted to, it would be necessary to double the present number of tribunals. I observe that some curious provisions, on the score of adultery, have been introduced into the new penal code, published the last spring. It is declared to be the intention of the Emperor, to vindicate the cause of good morals throughout the empire, and the following regulations have been, therefore, enacted. A woman convicted of adultery, is subjected to the punishment of imprisonment, for a space not less than three months, and not exceeding two years. No denunciation can be valid against her, but that of her husband, and ne himself is not intitled to denounce her, if he have been convicted of the same crime. He may obtain her pardon, if he consent to take her back to his house. The seducer is subjected to imprisonment for the same space of time, and to a fine of not less than one hundred francs, and not more than two thousand-about four hundred dollars. The husband in the same case must be denounced by the wife, and is only made liable to punishment when convicted of having kept his mistress in his own dwelling. The penalty inflicted upon him, is a fine of the same amount as that imposed upon the seducer. The reason assigned for the clause, which prescribes that the wife should denounce the husband, and inversely, is, that they alone are interested in the fidelity of each other, and have exclusively a right to complain, of what is nevertheless, qualified as a breach of public morals.

Whoever has seen the state of society in France, must smile at the tenour of this law. It is obviously a mere bubble, to legislate thus upon abuses which no edicts, however rigorous, can affect, and which, as the French rulers well know, require remedies of a very distinct nature. You have read, in Suetonius and in Gibbon, of the legislative attempts made by Augustus, to reform the similar vices of Rome, and of their utter futility. If Buonaparte, whose actual policy, and whose real interest, it is, to foster the corruption about him, were even animated by dispositions as sincere as those of Augustus, his efforts would be equally ineffectual. Manners are in all instances paramount to laws, and serve, either to fortify or paralyse the latter, as they happen to be in unison, or at variance, with them. The whole system, both of government and manners, in France, must be moulded anew, before the domestic or social virtues can

be

*

be made to flourish, or even the decencies of life resume their influence. A very different example must be set by the French rulers, from that now held forth, if it be seriously meant to give efficacy to any legislative provision for the reformation of the public morals. It was first asserted by Aristotle, in his Politics, that 'such as the heads of the community are, such must the people at large speedily become.' If ever there was a country to which this maxim could be safely applied, France is that country. Cicero, in his treatise De Legibus, has generalized the idea of the Stagyrite, and inculcates a doctrine which well deserves the attention even of the citizens of a free commonwealth. I shall quote his language, for your amusement:- Nec enim tantum mali est peccare principes (quanquam est magnum hoc per se ipsum malum), quantum illud, quòd permulti imitatores principum existunt. Nam licet videre, si velis replicare, memoriam temporum, qualescunque summi civitatis viri fuerunt, talem civitatem fuisse; quæcunque mutatio morum in principibus exstiterit, eandem in populo secuturam. Idque haud paulò est verius, quàm quòd Platoni nostro placet, qui, musicorum cantibus, ait, mutatis, mutari civitatum status. Ego autem nobilium victâ victuque mutato, mores mutari civitatum puto. Quo perniciosius de republicâ merentur vitiosi principes, quòd non solùm vitia concipiunt ipsi, sed infundant in civitatem; neque solùm obsunt, quòd ipsi corrumpuntur, plusque exemplo quàm peccato nocent.'-The vices and crimes of the nobility, though great evils in themselves, are rendered still greater, because they will always be the objects of general imitation. The experience of history teaches, that, in point of morals, such as have been the leading men of a state, such also has been the state itself; and that whatever alteration has taken place in the manners of the great, a similar alteration has followed in those of the people at large. This truth is far better ascertained than the observation of Plato, that the character of a nation changes, by changing the style of its music. But I assert, that it changes by changing the lives and behaviour of the great. Wherefore, profligate princes and profligate leaders are so much the more punishable than other men, because they are not only vicious in themselves, but infuse their vices into the public; and because whatever mischief results from their crimes, still greater results from their example.'

(To be continued.)

* Lib. ii.

ΟΜΝΙΑΝΑ.

DR

OMNIANA.-No. V.

R. Johnson is in doubt, as to the orthography of the verb To STREW, hesitating between STREW and STROW: Skinner,' says he, proposes STREW, and Junius writes STRAW. Their reasons,' he adds, will appear in the word from which it may be derived: STRAWAN, Gothic; STROYEN, Dutch; rτreapan, Saxon; STRAWEN, German; STRÔER, Danish. Perhaps,' he concludes, 'STROW is best, being that which reconciles etymology with pronunciation.'-In the whole of these remarks, he omits to take notice, that the verb is formed of the substantive STRAW; as, of SAW, we form To SAW. To straw, is, first, to lay, spread, or scatter straw; and, secondly, to lay, spread, or scatter any thing else. The French verb, which answers to our verb ΤΟ STREW, is formed in a similar manner, though with some difference as to the material. From JONC, a rush,' there is in that language the verb JONCHER, 'to strew' or straw,' but literally to rush.' It will follow, that in strictness, the orthography of the verb To STREW ought to depend upon that of the substantive STRAW. But is the usual orthography of the word STRAW correct? Does it agree with its etymology? The truth is, that under some aspects, the attempt to fix an orthography agreeing with etymology is idle. The languages of Europe are spoken in an infinity of Jialects; it is not a very great length of time since those who spoke the words were wholly unable to write them; words, while written, are mere sounds; the sounds vary with the dialect; and the orthography then only agrees with the etymology, when it is derived from the form in which the word was first written in the particular dialect under consideration. Now, the various words exhibited above as etymons of the verb To Strew, are only the same word differently pronounced, according to different European dialects, and differently spelt according to its sound in each of those dialects, and according to the value of the letters of the alphabet, as given to them by the several nations. Both STRAW and STREW are orthographies which agree with the etymology of the word. If it be asked, why we write the substantive STRAW, and the verb To STREW, the probable answer is, that we have followed the pronunciation of one dialect for the one, and of another for the other. The mixture of dialects, in the composition of modern English, is such, that examples may be produced, in which we have two or more words having a common etymon or original signification, but which, with us, have not only different sounds, but different meanings.

un

Johnson is inclined to the orthography TO STROW; but further observation would perhaps have satisfied him, that our usual ortho

graphy