CHA P. III.

A fecond Peculiarity.-The Divifion of the Legiflative Power.

HE fecond peculiarity which England,

THE

as an undivided State and a free State, exhibits in its Conftitution, is the divifion of its Legislature. But, in order to make the reader more fenfible of the advantages of this divifion, it is neceffary to defire him to attend to the following confiderations.

It is, without doubt, abfolutely neceffary, for fecuring the Constitution of a State, to reftrain the Executive power; but it is still more neceffary to reftrain the Legislative, What the former can only do by fucceffive steps (I mean fubvert the laws) and through a longer or shorter train of enterprizes, the latter does in a moment. As its will alone can give being to the laws, its will alone can alfo annihilate them: and, if I may be permitted the expreffion, the Legislative power can

change the Conftitution, as God created the light.

In order therefore to insure stability to the Constitution of a State, it is indispensably neceffary to restrain the Legislative authority. But here we must observe a difference between the Legislative and the Executive powers: the latter may be confined, and even is the more eafily fo, when undivided: the Legislative, on the contrary, in order to its being restrained, should abfolutely be divided. For, whatever laws it may make for restraining itself, they never can be, relatively to it, any thing more than fimple refolutions—as those bars which it might erect to stop its own motions, must then be within it, and reft upon it, they can be no bars. In a word, the fame kind of impoffibility is found, to fix the Legislative power, when it is one, which Archimedes objected against his moving the Earth.

And fuch a divifion of the Legislature not only renders it poffible for it to be restrained, fince each of thofe parts, into which it is divided, can then ferve as a bar to the mo

tions of the others; but it even makes it to be actually restrained. If it has been divided into two parts, it is probable that they will not in all cafes unite, either for doing, or for undoing if it has been divided into three. parts, the chance that no changes will be made, is thereby greatly increased.

Nay more; as a kind of point of honour will naturally take place between thofe different parts of the Legislature, they will thus be led to make to each other only such propofitions as will at least be plaufible; and all very prejudicial changes will thus be prevented, as it were, before their birth.

If the Legislative and Executive powers differ fo greatly with regard to the neceffity of their being divided in order to their being restrained, they differ no lefs with regard to the other confequences arifing from such divifion.

The divifion of the Executive power neceffarily introduces actual oppofitions, even violent ones, between the different parts into which it has been divided; and that part which in the iffue fucceeds to abforb, and

unite in itself, all the others, immediately fets itself above the laws. But those oppofitions which take place, and which the public good requires should take place, between the different parts of the Legislature, never are any thing more than oppofitions between contrary opinions and intentions; all is tranfacted in the regions of the understanding; and the only contention that arises is wholly carried on with those inoffenfive weapons, affents and diffents, ayes and noes.

Befides, when one of those parts of the Le. gislature is so fuccefsful as to engage the others to adopt its propofition, the refult is, that a law takes place which has in it a great probability of being good :—when it comes to be defeated, and fees its propofition fall, the worst that can refult from it is, that a law is not made at that time; and the lofs which the State fuffers thereby, reaches no farther than the temporary fetting afide of fome more or less useful fpeculation,

In a word, the result of a division of the Executive power, is either a more or lefs fpeedy establishment of the right of the strongest, or

a continued state of war: (a)-that of a divifion of the Legislative power, is either truth, or general tranquillity.

The following maxim will therefore be admitted. That the laws of a State may be permanent, it is requisite that the Legislative power should be divided:-that they may have weight, and continue in force, it is neceffary that the Executive power fhould be one.

If the reader conceived any doubt as to the truth of the above obfervations, he need only caft his eyes on the hiftory of the proceedings of the English Legislature down to our times, to find a proof of them. He would be furprised to see how little variation there has been in the laws of this country, especially in the whole course of the last century, though, it is most important to observe, the

(a) Every one knows the frequent hoftilities that took place between the Roman Senate and the Tribunes. In Sweden there have been continual contentions between the King and the Senate, in which they have overpowered each other, by turns. And in England, when the Executive power became double, by the King allowing the Parliament to have a perpetual and independant exiftence, a civil war immediately followed,