Money Talks: The International Monetary Fund, Conditionality and Supplementary FinanciersMoney Talks argues that, contrary to conventional explanations, the changes in the terms of International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality agreements are best explained by shifts in the sources for borrowing state financing. The Fund regularly relies on external financing to supplement its loans to countries facing payment imbalances. As a result, these supplementary financiers are able to exercise leverage over the Fund and the design of its conditionality programs. The book's conclusions are supported by rich empirical material gathered directly from the IMF archives, including descriptive statistics and statistical analyses using an original data set, which is the first to code the terms of the 249 Fund conditionality agreements from 1952 when Fund conditionality began to 1995, as well as case studies substantiated with archival and interview evidence. |
Contents
The Theory of Supplementary Financier Influence | 16 |
A History of International Monetary Fund | 37 |
Observable Implications and Explanations | 73 |
Creditor States as Supplementary Financiers | 110 |
Private Financial Institutions as Supplementary | 145 |
Multilateral Organizations as Supplementary | 175 |
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Common terms and phrases
actors argued arrears average number balance of payments bank-friendly conditions bilateral binding conditions borrowing country Boughton Brazil bureaucratic changes in Fund chapter commercial banks conditional loan arrangements Conditionality Data Set country's creditor deficit dependent variable design of Fund developing countries discussed ditionality economic ESAF Executive Board external financing first-credit tranche fiscal Fund activity Fund agreement Fund conditional loan Fund conditionality agreements Fund loan agreement Fund programs Fund resources Fund staff Fund's Ghana Haiti Ibid IMF Archives included increase instance interests International Monetary Fund Joseph Gold lending macroeconomic managing director ment million Model multilateral multilateral organizations negotiations number of binding observable implications performance criteria PFIs phasing Polak political private financial institutions procedural conditions proxy reform relatively sector sources specific stand-by arrangement supplementary financier argument Table targets terms of Fund tionality tions U.S. aid U.S. dollars U.S. preferences U.S. Treasury United Vaubel World Bank
References to this book
Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries Michael Tomz No preview available - 2007 |
Discipline in the Global Economy?: International Finance and the End of ... Jakob Vestergaard No preview available - 2008 |